In Lebanon, cautious reforms are being received with both hope and doubt.
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government appears to communicate little, some would even say poorly. But its initial record, three months after its formation, is far from negligible, and appears even ‘exceptional’ compared to those of its predecessors over the past two decades.
The long-awaited overhaul of banking secrecy was passed by Parliament; the Cabinet approved draft laws on banking resolution and judicial independence; municipal elections were held; the mechanism for civil service appointments was amended to make it more transparent and efficient; investigations into the 2020 Beirut Port explosion and the assassination of Lokman Slim (who was known for his outspoken criticism of Hezbollah) have been revived; relations with Arab countries have been restored and Gulf tourists are expected to return to Lebanon this summer.
Foreign diplomats, especially Western and Arab, are generally satisfied with how things are progressing and appear willing to provide financial assistance to Lebanon, figures between $10 billion and $15 billion are being discussed, if it continues on this reformist path.
Undoubtedly, many caveats should be added to this picture. The government benefits from a favorable context, and one could hope the train would move even faster.
Regardless of its good intentions and show of unity, Salam’s government could see its actions blocked at any moment by Parliament, where reformist voices remain a clear minority. The law on the distribution of losses will be the most difficult to pass, and the first steps taken by the new central bank governor, Karim Souhaid, are too ambiguous to be truly reassuring.
With less than a year to go before legislative elections, slated for May 2026, neither the traditional political class nor the Lebanese public appears to thirst for reform.
And the patience of “friendly nations,” in a global context where international aid has almost become a dirty word, has its limits. But the opportunity is there, and it is now up to us to seize it.
What about the weapons?
In every conversation, this topic inevitably returns to the table.
Hezbollah’s disarmament south of the Litani River is ongoing, but very little is known about the progress of that process north of the river, with both the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah preferring not to comment. Even less is known about what remains of the party’s arsenal after last year’s devastating war.
President Joseph Aoun, who oversees the issue, is walking a fine line. He insists that the state must reclaim the monopoly on legitimate arms, while pursuing diplomacy through dialogue initiated with Hezbollah.
Initially, Hezbollah softened its rhetoric and showed openness to negotiations under certain conditions, but in recent weeks, the party has hardened its stance and now refuses to discuss handing over its weapons north of the river.
At best, Hezbollah is prepared to consider a new defense strategy, after a full Israeli withdrawal and the launch of reconstruction, in which it would nonetheless retain control of its weapons.
In other words, the party is not ready to turn the page on ‘resistance’ and even seems inclined to expand or recalibrate its scope toward Syria, in light of the power shift in Damascus. Reading between the lines, Hezbollah sees Sunni Islamism as being just as, if not more, threatening than Israel.
The evolution of this issue will largely depend on ongoing diplomatic talks in Oman between the U.S. and Iran. While a diplomatic resolution is clearly desirable, it could also encourage the ‘Iranian axis,’ of which Hezbollah is part, to play the long game and wait for more favorable conditions.
It is therefore imperative, regardless of the major powers’ negotiations, to define an internal timeline and strategy that delivers early results.
Aoun is absolutely right to engage in dialogue with the party and to do everything possible to avoid a military confrontation between the army and Hezbollah. But it is essential for the dialogue’s framework to be clearly defined.
The party’s disarmament is not a subject for negotiation. It must be the starting point, a nonnegotiable condition, without which it will be impossible to avoid a new conflict with Israel, a civil war, or even a mental and political partition of the country.
Once that premise is established, it becomes necessary to discuss how it will be implemented, the future of Hezbollah’s weapons, Lebanon’s foreign and defense policy, the reconstruction of southern Lebanon, the future of the Shiite community, and, more broadly, the need to rethink the Lebanese (power-sharing) formula. And all this must be discussed with more than just Hezbollah.
If the “Party of God” fails to understand that it has no choice but to reinvent itself, assuming it is capable of doing so, it risks facing mounting internal and external pressure that will inevitably lead to a rupture between the Shiite community and the rest of the country.
One essential question remains: If Hezbollah agrees to turn the page on “resistance,” how will Lebanon manage to establish a new balance of power with a neighbor that has the means to impose its will and continues to occupy its territory?
On this point, we must be as honest as possible. Hezbollah’s weapons have brought two devastating wars upon Lebanon, particularly for the Shiite community. Over the past two decades, they have endangered the country far more than they have protected it, handing Israel a golden pretext to strike at will. The weapons are not the solution; they are a major part of the problem.
It must also be acknowledged that Israel responds only to a balance of power. The fact that the new Syrian government is not openly hostile toward it has not stopped Israel, for example, from relentlessly bombing Syrian territory for months.
So what can Lebanon do, when it simply does not have the means to establish a credible deterrent? Will diplomacy be enough, or is the country ultimately doomed, like all small nations in a world governed by neither law nor principle, to find a protector capable of containing its neighbors’ ambitions?