Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Saturday, Feb. 8 in Baabda. (Credit: AFP)
Confrontation or paralysis: many assumed these were the only options available to Prime Minister Nawaf Salam as he sought to form a government in a Parliament that does not reflect the new power dynamics, with the Shiite duo still threatening to take to the streets if its demands are not met. Yet, the former diplomat and president of the International Court of Justice may have just delivered a political masterclass — and proven that a third way was possible.
Of course, for those who see the glass half empty, the fact that the Finance Ministry remains in the hands of the Shiite duo may feel like a missed opportunity to break this monopoly and assert the new Cabinet’s independence from all parties. But that view ignores two key realities: the political and security costs of direct confrontation, and Parliament’s ability to block the government’s action.
For those who see the glass half full, Salam’s achievement is remarkable. He managed to bring the Shiite duo and, more broadly, all major parties — with whom he will have to negotiate — into the fold while securing several key victories. He succeeded where many before him, including French President Emmanuel Macron during the French initiative, had failed. The political climate may be more favorable today, but Salam has above all demonstrated a sharp understanding of Lebanon’s political intricacies and a skillful ability to navigate them, overcoming different obstacles one by one with methodical precision.
It is not the revolution that many of us hoped for. But it is nonetheless, on paper, the best government Lebanon has had in decades. And, probably, the best that could be achieved under current circumstances without risking a confrontation with Hezbollah.
Salam has achieved his objectives. No single faction holds a blocking third or the ability to paralyze the Cabinet through collective resignation, as the fifth Shiite minister, Fadi Makki, was appointed by Salam and President Joseph Aoun rather than by Amal and Hezbollah. Breaking the monopoly on Shiite representation alone marks a significant victory — but it is not the only one.
While political parties played a major role in forming this government, its members are not party loyalists. Each has an impressive qualification suited to their position, and some have brought Lebanon international recognition for decades. A government is not an academy of sciences, and politics will ultimately dictate its course. But given the spectacle our political class has been offering for years, having such figures in government can only be an asset.
Politically, too, Salam appears to have ensured a majority within the Cabinet on key issues: Resolution 1701, banking sector restructuring and administrative and judicial reforms.
Can this government govern? What can it achieve before the next legislative elections in spring 2026? That is the key question. In Lebanon, Cabinets often function more like condo associations — where each party wields veto power through the minister(s) representing it — rather than as executive bodies implementing a majority-backed policy. Will Salam’s government break free from this straitjacket? Given the political balance at its formation and the regional political context, it just might. Saudi Arabia is paying attention again. The United States, while issuing strong rhetoric, has a vested interest in seeing this government succeed. Iran is on the ropes. Hezbollah, meanwhile, needs Gulf funding to rebuild neighborhoods and villages destroyed in its latest war against Israel.
This new Cabinet appears capable of managing the transition phase, ensuring the implementation of Resolution 1701, stabilizing the country and implementing reconstruction. At the same time, it must break Lebanon’s diplomatic isolation and restore its ties with the Arab world.
All of this seems possible, and it’s already a lot. Can we expect more? Could the first government of the “new era” be the one that tackles Hezbollah’s disarmament and enacts major reforms?
This is where we need to be both demanding and realistic. The formation of the government has reminded those who may have forgotten too quickly that the old order is far from gone, and neither the President nor the Prime Minister currently has the means to dismantle it. The showdown will be even more fierce when they address the issue of Hezbollah's weapons or the future of the banking sector.
The more ambitious Salam's government is in its desire for change, the more it will be confronted with the militia and the mafia — whose interests often converge — who will resort, as in recent weeks, to their entire arsenal: Parliament, the streets and the media.
If this government disappoints, it will of course bear part of the responsibility. But undoubtedly, the most significant will fall on us. Because if the majority of Lebanese truly want change, it is about finally electing a Parliament that reflects this ambition. Or accepting, otherwise, that even the best possible government can only offer what it has.
This article was originally published in French in L'Orient Le-Jour.
