The title is somewhat misleading: it’s still too early to draw any definitive conclusions about the consequences of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. The final chapter has yet to be written.
We still do not know to what extent this war will prove to be a turning point — not only for Donald Trump’s presidency, but more broadly for U.S. supremacy on the international stage.
Not only did the United States fail to achieve its main war objective — forcing the Iranian regime to bend — but Iran is reportedly still retaining around 70% of its ballistic capabilities, according to recent leaks from U.S. intelligence. Even if those figures deserve some nuance — drones cannot simply be equated with long-range missiles — the war highlighted both the limits of an air campaign and the risk of rapidly depleting U.S. interceptor stockpiles in a high-intensity conflict.
Does this amount to a "Suez moment" for the American empire? It is still far too early to say, especially since the weaknesses exposed appear to stem less from military capability itself than from strategic choices, namely the mismatch between maximalist objectives and limited means.
We also do not yet know to what extent this war is reshaping U.S.-Israeli relations, at a time when Israel is more unpopular than ever, including within parts of the Republican camp.
For decades, Benjamin Netanyahu has sought to draw Washington into a direct confrontation with Iran. But the apparent failure of this military campaign until now could end up backfiring on Israel in the short and medium term.
Israel’s strategy of reshaping the Middle East through force has also shown its limits. Not only has the country failed to "eliminate" the Iranian axis, but it appears increasingly isolated as it persists in open-ended wars with no clear strategic horizon.
That said, it remains too early to draw definitive conclusions, especially since Israel is still, in many respects, in a far stronger position than its main adversary. We know even less about how this conflict may reshape the Iranian regime itself. Many analysts believe the regime has emerged more radicalized, more cohesive and more determined than ever to obtain a nuclear weapon, and perhaps even strategically strengthened.
Iran managed to withstand two of the world’s most powerful militaries without collapsing, relying on an asymmetric strategy centered on its ability to overwhelm Gulf monarchies’ defenses with low-cost drones produced in massive quantities and to threaten the Strait of Hormuz.
But the sequence is far from over — the war could resume — and Iran has not yet managed to translate what it sees as a victory into a political agreement capable of reshaping the regional balance in its favor. In reality, no one truly knows the condition of the regime after more than 20,000 strikes in just over a month.
Are there divisions within the security apparatus ? What is the mood among the broader population ? And to what extent can the U.S. blockade suffocate the regime — even if it fails to force it into submission — should it remain in place for months or even years ?
At this stage, there are no clear answers. Too many analyses project political biases onto the conflict. The reality is that reliable data remains scarce, and it will take time to fully grasp the war’s consequences.
One thing, however, already seems clear: for now, the Gulf states appear to be the biggest losers of this conflict.
Officially, they did everything they could to prevent the war, while quietly encouraging Trump behind the scenes to offset their historic enemy. They adopted a position of neutrality, only to become the primary targets of missiles and drones launched by their neighbor.
In the end, they bore the full consequences of a war over which they had virtually no influence, and will now have to rethink their entire security model accordingly.
Certainly, more than 90% of the missiles were intercepted by American defense systems. But the war also demonstrated that just a handful of drones can disrupt one of the world’s most strategically vital economic regions, and that everything the Gulf monarchies spent decades building can be shaken by American inconsistency, Israeli unilateralism and Iranian brinkmanship.
"The dispute between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is secondary. In reality, they are all in the same boat," a senior Arab diplomat recently told L’Orient-Le Jour, as the conflict further deepened divisions between the Gulf’s two leading powers.
Even if they may draw different strategic conclusions from the war, the Gulf monarchies were all exposed by it.
What lessons are they supposed to take away from this? That the United States still prioritizes Israel’s interests over theirs? That the American security umbrella is no longer reliable? That the detente with Iran brokered by China was ultimately an illusion?
Above all, they were attacked almost daily for five weeks without responding in kind.
Was that because they chose not to — so as not to jeopardize the future — or because they simply could not? That is the real question.
Over the past decades, the Gulf monarchies have spent trillions of dollars on weapons and defense. Yet when they needed those capabilities most, they behaved like non-powers, dependent both on the calculations of their enemies and on those of their allies.
Beyond the Iranian case itself, the conflict raises an almost existential question for them: how can they survive in a world ruled by hard power without possessing it themselves? Will petrodollars be enough to compensate for the absence of a military tradition and of populations willing to fight — or at the very least bear the costs of war?
The Gulf monarchies will need, sooner rather than later, to rebuild credible deterrence capabilities, whether on their own or alongside allies. Otherwise, they risk one day becoming prey to actors far poorer than they are, but far more comfortable with the use of force than they are ever likely to be.
This editorial was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour and was translated by Sahar Ghoussoub.
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