War drags on. Sometimes it’s all-consuming, other times deceptively distant. It can engulf everything in an instant, only to make us feel moments later that living ‘normally’ alongside it is possible. That’s an illusion. War is a shadow that never truly leaves. It gains ground, day by day, creeping into our minds, leaving a lasting mark that becomes impossible to erase.
It takes up space, far too much space, especially in recent days. There’s no respite anymore. Israel strikes day and night, hitting both Beirut’s suburbs and the capital itself. Sometimes death announces its arrival. Sometimes it doesn’t. Pain piles up, and so do the ruins.
Lebanon is vanishing, almost without realizing it. The question is, for how long?
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri remains optimistic. Western diplomats also believe an agreement is within reach. It would involve Hezbollah withdrawing north of the Litani River, Israel doing the same in southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Army taking control. Israel would retain the right to intervene — though this wouldn’t be explicitly stated in the agreement — in case of a violation by Hezbollah.
Is this realistic? The signals seem promising, but caution is still advisable.
Even if U.S. President-elect Donald Trump gave his blessing to the proposal, there’s no reason to believe that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would hand this gift to U.S. President Joe Biden.
Netanyahu has every incentive to escalate operations on the ground until Jan. 20, and even after the new U.S. president takes office, ending the war remains far from certain.
Yes, the Israeli military is weary and believes it has nearly achieved its objectives in Lebanon. Yes, Netanyahu could offer peace to Trump in exchange for a green light to annex the West Bank. Yes, Iran is stretched thin and will have to yield eventually. There are countless rational arguments for both sides to stop here.
But an agreement ultimately requires Hezbollah to accept its defeat and Israel to accept that Hezbollah will survive this war, regardless. On both sides, it seems we’re not there yet.
In any case, the scenarios unfolding for Lebanon offer little solace. Four stand out at present.
The first is the Gaza scenario — a war without end or clear objectives. From the Israeli side, it would involve a desire to completely annihilate the adversary in the broadest sense.
For Hezbollah, this would mean adhering to a logic where ‘resistance’ among ruins, no matter the cost, is considered a victory in itself. This scenario is the most alarming because it is the most destructive for Lebanon. It would imply intensified strikes and a broader ground offensive.
Israel does not appear, for now, to favor this approach in Lebanon. Hezbollah, unlike Hamas, must contend with a more diverse and hostile environment.
While this scenario isn’t the most likely, it is far from impossible.
The second is the Iraqi scenario. An agreement brings stabilization to southern Lebanon, but internal tensions push the country to the brink of collapse. Hezbollah, harboring a spirit of revenge, seeks to reassert its grip on Lebanon. Other parties refuse to return to the pre-Oct.7 status quo and threaten to break away.
Clashes multiply, and the specter of civil war grows bigger. While Lebanon is not post-Saddam Iraq, and Hezbollah has a vested interest in avoiding sectarian conflict at home, no one seems ready for war.
Yet, this scenario rests on an undeniable reality: Unless Hezbollah transforms its militia-driven structure, coexistence with the rest of Lebanon will become increasingly difficult.
The third is the Jordanian scenario, the least likely in our view. This envisions Israeli tanks reaching Beirut and Lebanese political leaders being forced, under duress, to sign a peace agreement with Israel. It would require Hezbollah’s total defeat and likely prolonged Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon.
At this point, such an outcome seems entirely unrealistic. Even in a protracted war, signing peace with Israel would demand a strong executive and at least some degree of consensus on the issue. However, animosity toward Israel remains, at least officially, a rare point of unanimity among Lebanon’s political class.
The fourth is the Syrian scenario, which appears the most likely. The war stops without ever truly ending. Its intensity diminishes, settling into a grim normalcy.
Israel carries out ‘targeted’ strikes at will. Destroyed areas are never rebuilt. Civil war looms but doesn’t erupt. Lebanon empties out, becoming a zombie state, caught between life and death. The entire ‘Axis of Resistance,’ including Iran, could undergo a similar ‘Syrianization’ process — not disappearing but being so weakened it ceases to be a key player and instead becomes a playground for others. Ironically, Assad’s Syria, if it manages to distance itself from Iran, might emerge from this vegetative state just as Lebanon falls into it.
These scenarios, of course, are broad strokes. They don’t capture the necessary nuances, and none fully aligns with Lebanon’s unique situation. But they do serve to help us anticipate the worst in hopes of avoiding it.
Is it possible, then, to imagine a fifth scenario — one that could be called the Lebanese scenario? One that involves a complete Israeli withdrawal and the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah, even over the long term? A scenario leading to a new Lebanon instead of the end of Lebanon?
For now, this remains a mirage. Yet even the worst outcomes are never inevitable.
This article was originally published in French in L’Orient Le-Jour and translated by Sahar Ghoussoub.