With more than 15 countries involved, a conflict on three fronts, over 1,600 people killed, soaring oil prices, and one of the world’s most connected regions almost entirely cut off from air traffic, the region – and the world – is facing a major geopolitical shock. But are the current and future “costs” of this war proportionate to any potential “benefits” that could come from it? That’s the question on everyone’s lips.
Unfortunately, excessive use of force was the only short- and medium-term way that could significantly weaken the Iranian regime and its allies, a prerequisite for breaking from the deadly status quo for the Iranian people and, to a lesser extent, for the wider region.
But given the nature of the actors involved, their intentions, and the far-reaching consequences, will history remember this war as madness or as a “lesser evil” that finally turned the page on 1979 – the pivotal year that reshaped the Middle East?
What will this new Gulf war – the fourth in five decades – be called? The official dawn of the Israeli era in the Middle East? The beginning of the end of Trumpism, overtaken (much like George W. Bush before him), by the overreach of American power?
Or will it be called the first war of the new world – Gaza being, in this sense, the last of the old one – where law, even in its most hypocritical and illusory form, was entirely supplanted by force?
Let’s start with the military dimension. Over the past week, it generated the most commentary, fear, and analysis – turning everyone into a budding expert on drones, interceptors, and missiles, even though it’s by far the most predictable.
The Iranian regime will lose this war – in fact, it already lost. Its strategy of expanding the conflict to maximize costs for its adversary and force Donald Trump to back down has failed. It has backfired, by alienating even more actors, especially its neighbors.
Its leadership is decimated, its skies fully dominated by Israeli and American air force, and its ballistic and naval capabilities severely damaged.
The Iranian regime may give the illusion of resistance by continuing to send drones into the Gulf and Israel, but the military imbalance is so great that the outcome is no longer in its hands.
The real strategic standoff of this conflict will soon unfold, if it has not already begun. It will not be between the Iranian regime and American power, but between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Once Washington achieves its military objectives, the Iranian regime is weakened, and its offensive capabilities obliterated – what will happen next?
Trump told Axios interview that in his view, this would amount to a capitulation, implying he might negotiate with whatever remains of the regime. But will Netanyahu – who believes that the problem is rooted more in the nature of the Islamic Republic than in its actual capabilities – be satisfied? Might he want to push further, perhaps by encouraging the Kurds to launch an offensive to topple the regime or provoke chaos?
The first option – using the Kurds –is far riskier and more unpredictable than current operations, while the second – instigating chaos – will serve neither Washington’s interests nor those of the Gulf petro-monarchies.
Now let’s consider the strategic dimension, by far the most important. If this war ends with a capitulation agreement forced upon on a severely weakened regime, can it truly be said to have been worth it?
How can we be sure that the Iranian government won’t play the long game to rebuild its strength – or intensify repression against its own people, as Saddam’s regime did in the 1990s?
What will the Iranian people gain from this war if it leaves them facing a vindictive regime, strengthened by an agreement with the world’s leading power?
One can hope that the regime will be so weakened that internal divisions will arise, leaving it unable to suppress the next waves of protests – which seem inevitable – especially if international pressure does not ease.
But hope is not a strategy, and we can't rule out the possibility that the Iranian population could be the biggest losers in this conflict.
At the regional level, a scenario in which a severely weakened Iranian regime remains in power will be welcomed by the Gulf petro-monarchies. Iran would no longer be able – at least for years – to act as a disruptive force, ushering in a new era in the Middle East where alliances would largely be reshaped around the Israeli question, now the main driver of regional instability.
The conflict will also have strategic consequences that extend beyond the region. It could reaffirm the U.S. supremacy over China and Russia, who were unable to aid their supposed ally – or, conversely, it might embolden them to carry out similar operations in their own “zones of influence.”
Symbolically, this war will leave deep scars. Assassinating a head of state – especially one with a religious role – is sure to radicalize leaders worldwide, who will realize that only nuclear weapons can protect them, and millions of believers who may seek revenge.
Because this war comes on the heels of Gaza's annihilation, carried out with the tacit approval of the international community, and because it is being waged by Donal Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu and because Israel lies at the heart at the center of the equation, it is enough to plunge everyone into a form of irrationality where facts no longer matter among its fiercest critics and its staunchest supporters.
And where does Lebanon stand in all of this? What will remain of it after a war that has caused a humanitarian catastrophe in an already fractured country? We are but a small war within the broader conflict.
Israeli air power is focused on Iran, aiming to inflict maximum damage before Trump loses interest. In Lebanon, however, the situation is different: the Israelis have the luxury of time, where nothing –and no one – stands in their way.
Their objective is not just to destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure and create a buffer zone in the south, but above all to pressure the government to take actions against the militia and, in the process, accept a peace agreement on their terms.
The less the Lebanese authorities act, the more room Israel will have to maneuver, showing little concern, as usual, for the consequences for the civilian population.
Hezbollah has exposed Lebanon to Israel’s wrath, and Tel Aviv will make the most of it as long as the Shiite militia remains armed and peace is not imposed.
This article was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour and was translated by Joelle El Khoury
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