“No one wants this law. Not the three presidents [Joseph Aoun, Nawaf Salam and Nabih Berri], not the ministers, not the MPs, not the bank owners. And yet everyone will end up voting for it, because that’s the will of the ‘outside world.’”
The remark came from one of Parliament Speaker Berri’s closest advisers, in response to a question about the likelihood of Parliament passing the financial gap law despite broad political opposition.
A seasoned observer of Lebanese politics, he described a familiar dynamic: political actors, from MPs to the three presidents, constantly navigate between their convictions (when they have any), their interests and, above all, the recommendations that increasingly resemble orders from countries that matter most, chiefly the United States and Saudi Arabia.
A similar account was offered recently by a senior minister and MP, who recalled watching colleagues reverse their positions mid-session during a parliamentary debate on the banking secrecy law, after receiving WhatsApp messages from foreign envoys urging them to vote in favor of the bill.
One could argue that Lebanon has always functioned this way. No president has ever been elected without foreign interference. External involvement has become so deeply embedded in political life that it is no longer questioned or even concealed.
There was no trace of embarrassment in Najib Mikati’s voice when he described, in an interview with al-Jadeed, the backstage negotiations surrounding his appointment in 2005.
At the time, French President Jacques Chirac, after reaching an understanding with the Hariri family, asked Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to contact Saudi King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to secure their approval. Three presidents and a king to appoint a prime minister for a country the size of a French department.
At first glance, this era should feel distant. Lebanon is now said to be living through President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam’s “new Lebanon,” marked by the fall of the Assad regime, the weakening of the Iranian axis and the end of Hezbollah’s political dominance.
And yet Lebanon is no more sovereign than before. The actors have changed, but the rules of the game have not. Syrians and Iranians have been replaced by Americans, Saudis and Israelis. Each plays a distinct role: military for Israel, political for the United States and financial for Saudi Arabia.
Today, Lebanon’s future is shaped in Washington, Riyadh, Tel Aviv and, to a lesser extent, Tehran. These capitals set the direction, define priorities and ultimately decide key outcomes. The election of Joseph Aoun, the timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, the scope of essential reforms and even whether parliamentary elections will be held.
Lebanon is a country under tutelage. Its guardians have decided that it must exit the Iranian sphere of influence, gradually normalize relations with Israel, establish a new relationship with Syria, reconcile with Gulf countries and carry out sweeping reforms to demonstrate seriousness.
They issue instructions, and Lebanon complies, despite the noise. Sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse.
The roadmap is clear. Banking sector restructuring, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, removal from the Financial Action Task Force gray list, the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and a peace agreement with Israel, even if major political and geopolitical uncertainties remain, particularly regarding Israel and Syria.
So, has nothing changed? That would be an oversimplification.
This tutelage differs from previous ones, both in nature and in purpose. Residents of southern Lebanon, subjected to daily Israeli airstrikes, may disagree, but overall the country is in better shape than it was a year ago, even if far from where it hopes to be.
For the first time in decades, external guardianship has not been exclusively detrimental. It has even helped bypass internal obstacles that long prevented reforms objectively aligned with the country’s interests. Lebanon has entered an era of what might be called “happy vassalization,” borrowing a phrase used — with irony — by the review Le Grand Continent to describe Europe’s submission to the United States.
Should Lebanon accept this condition? Agree to relinquish control over its destiny as long as the outcome appears beneficial? If only it were that simple.
First, there is no guarantee that external pressure will overcome all internal resistance. Those who oppose this guardianship do not do so out of concern for sovereignty, but because change threatens their interests. This applies both to major actors, Hezbollah foremost, and to smaller mafias, including the banking lobby, that dominate the system.
Despite unprecedented pressure, Hezbollah continues to refuse to surrender its weapons north of the Litani River. Nothing suggests it will do so absent a direct order from Tehran. As for reform, the vote on the financial gap law will serve as a key test of the balance of power between internal resistance and external pressure.
Second, the intentions of Lebanon’s guardians remain uncertain. Even if domestic obstacles are removed, will they act as benevolent overseers? Will Israel withdraw from the South? Will external powers accept that Lebanon cannot sign a peace agreement with Israel at any cost? At what point might they sacrifice Lebanese interests for their own?
It is never wise to rely entirely on others.
Finally, even in the most optimistic scenario, Lebanon must confront its own reality. Tutelage or not, it remains a deeply fractured country. It cannot be asked to run before it has healed. Otherwise, the risk is reopening wounds that have barely begun to close.
Humanitarian convoy reaches Rmeish, Ain Ibl, Dibil despite obstacles