There are only three of them. Three who can decide whether the "new Middle East" will come into being through another escalation that plunges it into a great unknown, or through the famous "package deal" that has been touted for years.
The Russians, the Chinese, the Europeans and the Gulf's petromonarchies will certainly try to weigh in on the debate. Ultimately, it will be decided between Donald Trump, Ali Khamenei and Benjamin Netanyahu.
Let's start with the third. With the one who will not be around the table this Saturday in Oman but certainly intends to have his say, at least as much as the other two.
Among the three, Benjamin Netanyahu is the one with the clearest intentions. He has dreamed for decades of toppling the Iranian regime, which he considers the greatest threat to Israel's security. This dream began to take shape on Oct. 8, 2023, and the Israeli prime minister does not want to miss a unique opportunity to end this regime that now lacks the means to defend itself. What does this mean concretely? That Netanyahu's goal is not necessarily regime change — which would likely involve a massive ground operation — but at minimum the dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, as well as its missiles and militias. An agreement below this objective would undoubtedly be seen as insufficient in his eyes. If he cannot directly oppose Donald Trump's desire to favor a diplomatic option, it's evident that he would prefer to resort to force. What will he do if his main ally is satisfied with a much narrower agreement?
We come to Donald Trump. The leader of the world's foremost power is an unpredictable man, convinced he masters the art of the deal better than anyone and unlikely to be drawn into a large-scale military adventure. However, he is ready to use force to achieve his goals. What is he looking for in this situation, besides a Nobel prize? Is it clearly defined in his mind? Doubtful. The U.S. president wants an agreement more restrictive than the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action].
But does this imply for him the dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, considered a red line by Tehran? And will the agreement include a regional aspect on ballistic missiles and pro-Iranian militias? On the first point, the White House tenant may show more moderation than his Israeli ally. On the second, Washington is already exerting significant pressure on all of Iran's allies in the region. But to what extent is he determined to get involved to defeat them or compel the Islamic Republic to abandon them permanently? During his first term, Trump was willing to make a deal with North Korea. Could the fact that Iran, unlike Korea, is defenseless, and especially that Israel, which he boasts of being its best ally, is involved, encourage him to be more maximalist in his demands, even if it means having to resort to force? The bets are open.
Despite the unpredictability of the U.S. president, the plans of the last of the three are currently the most difficult to decipher. The Iranian regime has lost almost everything in 18 months. It can rely neither on China nor Russia for help. Its external shields, starting with Hezbollah, are riddled with bullets. Its air defense system has been shattered to pieces. So much so that it is hard today to see what might, militarily speaking, deter the Israeli-American duo from taking action. In this context, considering that the regime is obsessed with its survival, wouldn't it be willing to forsake its nuclear ambitions and regional claims to ensure it?
To respond affirmatively would be to misunderstand this regime. Ali Khamenei has seen what happened to Muammar Gaddafi after he agreed to dismantle his nuclear program. He has seen what happened to the Soviet Union after Gorbachev attempted to reinvent it. He is a paranoid man, a political animal — contrary to the view sometimes held of him — yet remains a staunch fundamentalist. The experience of recent months likely encourages him to be more flexible in reaching an agreement. But it should also convince him that the more he yields, the more his regime and legacy risk going up in flames. On paper, he is no doubt ready to conclude a JCPOA+. But it all depends on what is meant by JCPOA+. Can he entirely renounce his nuclear program? This would be surprising. Turn the page on more than 40 years of regional expansionism? Ali Khamenei might be tempted to play the long game. To accept lying low, taking the time to recover and waiting for a more favorable context before resuming his nuclear and regional activities. But the supreme leader is 85 years old, and his succession is far from assured. His son, Mojtaba, seems to be the favorite. Does he share his father's views?
Will he be accepted by the clergy, and especially by the Revolutionary Guards? Doesn't the transformation of a project intended to be revolutionary into a clerical-political dynasty challenge the DNA of the Islamic Republic? Iran's calculations concerning negotiations with the United States remain quite obscure because the country is at a pivotal moment, a quiet yet ontological transition. Ultimately, the question for Iran is not only about the regime's existence but also its deep identity. The entire region, Lebanon in particular, is eagerly awaiting the answer.
