We had the opportunity to meet Joseph Aoun before he was elected president. He was exactly as he had been described to us — affable, intelligent, moderate, politically astute and quite knowledgeable about his dossiers, which is particularly rare in our country. Amid the mediocrity that had engulfed the Lebanese state, he seemed one of the few officials who were truly up to the tasks and fit for the circumstances.
It’s no surprise that we enthusiastically witnessed his election in January. While there were doubts about his political agenda, his inauguration speech — though sparse on detail — outlined the shape of a “new era,” one that promised to break away from the very practices that had led Lebanon to ruin.
In a particularly delicate context — marked by a form of Israeli-American tutelage on Lebanon — characterized by the thorny issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament and the need to reshape our relations with Syria after decades of hostilities, Aoun’s initial steps toward a state-building worthy of the name were fairly convincing.
There even seemed to be a natural complementarity between him and his Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, along with a shared determination — despite their different backgrounds and styles — to undertake deep reforms while preserving Lebanon’s fragile balance.
Then, doubt set in. Cracks appeared. Questions started to flood in. What if Aoun was much less of a reformer than hoped? What if the president was actually more comfortable with the practices of this “former world” that his leadership was supposed to bury?
It would be presumptuous to provide final answers to all these questions. The former army chief has only been at the presidential palace for a few months and should navigate an Assembly dominated by traditional parties, in which he does not have his own parliamentary bloc. But these questions are coming up now because of how Aoun has handled the new central bank governor’s appointment.
Why did the president attach, like a barnacle to its rock, to Karim Souaid’s candidacy while simultaneously dismissing all other candidates? What unique qualities does this asset manager have that make him the only one deemed worthy of such a crucial role in the eyes of the president?
We do not know Souaid. His brother, former MP Fares Souaid, a March 14 camp figure, is a refined and cultivated man, something Lebanon no longer has enough of. But that doesn’t change the fact that the president’s candidate is seen by many reformers as the candidate of the banking lobby, most notably by SGBL CEO Antoun Sehnaoui. This may be a false accusation, but nothing so far suggests otherwise: neither the past statements of the favorite candidate nor the form of the support sometimes displayed by the media outlets close to this lobby or several traditional parties.
This is not about doubting Souaid’s competence or the president’s choice. Rather, it’s about understanding why, despite the opposition of the prime minister and several of his ministers, Aoun insists so strongly on his appointment.
Restructuring the banking system, in which the next governor will play a key role, is a major issue for depositors, banks and the state. Ultimately, it’s about determining who will or will not bear the cost. Equally important is the need to sign an agreement with the IMF, redefine our monetary policy and move away from a “cash-based” economy.
Didn’t these challenges justify a more transparent appointment process? Without claiming to transform Lebanon overnight into a Scandinavian country, wasn’t it necessary to understand the programs of the main candidates for the position before selecting the fortunate one?
All the most serious contenders maintain good relations with the U.S. and would have fiercely fought against money laundering and the parallel economy of Hezbollah and its allies. Therefore, the president’s choice was not based on this point. And it wasn’t because of these considerations that he dismissed, with a wave of the hand, the options of Jihad Azour, the regional director of the IMF, and Camille Abousleiman, the former MLabor Minister, both of whom are well-versed in the dossier.
Is this a tactical choice by the president to avoid antagonizing the banking lobby and find a quick resolution to this complex issue? Or is it a more strategic decision that reveals not only a desire not to undermine the old system — except for Hezbollah — but also to carve out the lion’s share for himself?
The Franco-Lebanese businessman Samir Assaf — the only name with consensus within the executive branch — refused this position. The majority of ministers are either in favor of the president’s choice or do not want to oppose him. Salam did not wage a real battle to impose another candidacy. Because of all that, Souaid is supposed to be appointed as the central bank governor this Thursday. Unless there is a last-minute U-turn or a surge from political parties that have positioned themselves as opposition forces for years, the president will win his first showdown against Salam.
It’s disheartening. Not because one has triumphed over the other — the president is, in any case, much more popular than his prime minister and is assured of remaining at the head of the state for the next six years. But because their collaboration was key to the possibility of a different Lebanon. And the compromises of today and the battles to come already have the taste of a missed opportunity — one year before legislative elections that were once heralded as decisive.
This article was translated from L'Orient-Le Jour.
