The more the bombs rain down, the more the Lebanese perceive the prospect of a cease-fire agreement as far-fetched. The more Israel threatens to destroy the entire country, the more the Iranians and Hezbollah outbid, the more Amos Hochstein’s optimism seems out of step with reality.
However, our skepticism could be contradicted in the next few hours. Against all logic — or rather because of another logic — Hezbollah and Israel seem very close to an agreement, provided the former accepts the latter’s demands. Why would Israel stop now? And why would Hezbollah accept an agreement that is so to the advantage of its enemy? Perhaps it’s simply because both sides feel that they won’t get anything better if the war goes on for several more weeks or months. Some parameters elude us: How exhausted is the Israeli army? How much longer can Hezbollah “resist”? What exactly will be the role of the oversight committee, and in particular what will be the United States’ role in southern Lebanon? How often does Israel intend to continue striking Hezbollah, as the agreement would a priori allow? And how does it fit into a broader Israeli strategy that includes the United States, and concerns Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and Iran as well?
More than Israel, Lebanon needs this war to end as soon as possible. With every passing day, the death toll, destruction, desolation, the rift in society and radicalization of minds exacerbate. Every day takes us further away from the possibility of (re)building Lebanon once the war is over. It is foolish to think, in our opinion, that the prolongation of the war could be positive for the country, in the sense that it would further weaken Hezbollah. Nothing good will come of it. Betting on war implies betting on Lebanon’s end.
Better a bad agreement than an endless war. But, that should not prevent us from realizing that the agreement in question is indeed bad for Lebanon for at least three reasons. The first is that it makes it impossible to consider rebuilding the destroyed neighborhoods and villages in the short to medium term. The cost already exceeds $ 10 billion. Who is going to pay for it? Saudi Arabia won’t spend a dollar until the political landscape changes. The West isn’t going to shell out $10 billion for our sake. Qatar and the UAE may see an opportunity, but even for them, the cost is high. That leaves Iran. Can it afford it? Will it be able to? This may complicate the situation further rather than help it. In the absence of swift reconstruction, the displaced will not be able to return home, which risks aggravating domestic tensions.
The second reason is that the agreement will officially turn Lebanon into another Syria. Our country will become a territory where Israel can intervene to its liking, depending on the actions of Hezbollah and its allies. The war against Hezbollah will thus continue through other means: through more or less targeted strikes, through control of the Lebanese-Syrian border and pressure on Damascus as well as through stifling the militia by preventing the entry of arms and money into the country. All of that will take place as part of a U.S.-Israeli cooperation.
The third reason is that the agreement says very little about what will happen north of the Litani. It does not provide for the disarmament of Hezbollah in this area, nor does it allow us to consider, for the moment, a new political dynamic. Israel and the U.S. will try to control Hezbollah in the south or, more generally, in everything that concerns its regional dimension. However locally, they are not the ones who will prevent it from pointing its weapons at fellow Lebanese, resuming its assassinations policy or attempting to impose its domination north of the Litani River to compensate for its losses in the south. The risk we run is that of a double tutelage: that of the U.S. and Israel in the south, and that of Amal and Hezbollah in the north.
We can still avoid this scenario, however, not by refusing the agreement. We don’t have the means to do that anyway, but we can make it more Lebanese by addressing the most essential issues as soon as possible. These include, first and foremost, governance north of the Litani River, which will also enable us to rebuild the south. Other key issues also include a new social contract, reconciliation between the Lebanese, Hezbollah’s disarmament, the implementation of a new foreign policy and the realization that Lebanon must be an actor for peace and not a battleground for others’ wars.
If a cease-fire is reached in the next few hours, we must seize the opportunity to have all these discussions not only with Hezbollah but with all the parties. We can no longer wait foolishly and desperately for Lebanon’s fate to be decided abroad. It’s time to put forward a fully-fledged project that is likely to convince most of the Lebanese. If Hezbollah participates, it could be part of the solution. If, on the contrary, it refuses to change its DNA, if it refuses to be a Lebanese party before being a member of the Iranian apparatus, a new political — rather than military — balance of power must be established with the party. We have no other choice. Turning Lebanon into another Syria is one of the worst possible scenarios. Bashar al-Assad has lost his sovereignty in order to stay in power. Syria is ruined, half the population is displaced or living as refugees, and this persisted for years. The country is a black hole, and if nothing changes, Lebanon is unfortunately heading down the same path.
This article was originally published in French in L'Orient Le-Jour.