Where does rational thinking end and ideology begin?
This is a question we should all ask ourselves today as we try to decipher the calculations of the main players in the conflict, both in Gaza and Lebanon.
On one side, there is a camp that refuses to accept its (military) victory until it has completely decimated its enemy — in the broadest sense — and another camp that refuses to accept its defeat until it has been entirely annihilated. This mutual, relentless pursuit inevitably leads to a war with no end in sight.
Gaza is gone. Seventy percent of the more than 40,000 dead are women and children. Yahya Sinwar and Mohammad Deif, the masterminds behind Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood operation, have been assassinated. Yet Hamas remains.
It still controls the coastal enclave, holds more than 100 Israeli hostages and even if the war drags on for years, the fundamental situation will remain unchanged. There would be more deaths, more destruction, but no prospect of a political settlement.
So, what is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s exit plan? Occupy northern Gaza and intervene at will in the south of the enclave? Push as many Palestinians as possible to flee toward Egypt, assuming that, under U.S. pressure, Egypt eventually agrees to receive them?
Or is he seeking to destroy every street, every building, every tunnel, every tent until there is not a single Palestinian in Gaza who claims allegiance to Hamas?
The situation in Lebanon is not radically different. Dozens of villages have been wiped off the map. All predominantly Shiite areas associated with Hezbollah have been emptied of their populations and partially destroyed.
Hezbollah has lost its secretary-general, its entire top military command and much of its arsenal. Yet, it remains. It continues fighting in southern Lebanon, launching rockets and missiles at Israel daily.
Here, too, the pertinent question is what is Nentayhu’s plan? Intensify operations, both on the ground and from the air, until Hezbollah finally breaks? Establish a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and reserve the right to intervene in the country whenever he chooses?
Does he want to install a new president in Lebanon atop a Merkava tank or push the Lebanese to turn on each other to isolate Hezbollah?
Netanyahu does not merely want to defeat the Iranian axis; he wants to break it, to bring it to its knees, to ensure it is no longer a threat for years and decades to come.
At the same time, he aims to bury the Palestinian question. In short, Netanyahu seeks to impose a new regional reality. This has been his vision for 30 years. The arrival of Donald Trump could allow him to realize it.
While the president-elect wants the war to end, his priority is for Israel to ‘finish the job.’ What does this mean, if not granting Israel free rein to continue destroying, occupying, annexing and depopulating entire areas?
The coming months look even darker. Israel is in denial on every level — about itself, the Palestinians, Lebanon and the region.
But this denial costs it far less than ours does. Israel is facing displacement, casualties and economic and diplomatic damage. It is nothing remotely comparable to what we are experiencing on the other side of the mirror.
Israel can continue the war for months. We do not have that luxury.
When Nasser lost in 1967, he blamed the entire world for his defeat. But he still acknowledged it. What will it take for Hamas and Hezbollah to do the same? How many Palestinians and Lebanese must die, how many villages or neighborhoods must be wiped out before they admit they have lost?
The recent speech by Hezbollah’s new secretary-general Naim Qassem was particularly troubling in this regard. Not only because of its emphases, its threats against the Lebanese Army or its determination to wage a long war. But because, unlike his predecessor Hassan Nasrallah, he genuinely seems to believe everything he says — to believe that Hezbollah is winning, that Israel is on the verge of collapse and that time is on his side.
For months now, Hezbollah has been wrong in every one of its calculations. It consistently overestimates its strength relative to its adversary and remains stuck in the mindset of 2006. This approach has led to the disaster we are all experiencing, especially the party’s popular base, even more so than the rest of the Lebanese population.
Hezbollah must accept its defeat. It must withdraw from south of the Litani River, begin a process of disarmament, distance itself from Iran and reconsider its relationship with Lebanon and the Lebanese people.
Writing these words immediately brands one as a traitor in the eyes of part of the country. We are none of these things. We harbor no illusions about Israel’s intentions in Lebanon or the region. We believe it must withdraw from every inch of our country and cease to violate our airspace. But we are convinced that we will not achieve this by force, and certainly not through Hezbollah.
Accepting this reality is essential if we are ever to escape this grim escalation, which leads only to suffering for both those who endure it and those who support it. This is our only path to avoid division and perhaps even civil war.
To rebuild Lebanon not against Hezbollah, perhaps not even without Hezbollah, but necessarily with a different Hezbollah.
This article was originally published in French in L’Orient-Le Jour. Translation by Sahar Ghoussoub.