Druze leader Walid Joumblatt. (Credit: AFP archive photo)
This sharp response from former Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid Joumblatt, directed at the remarks of Iran’s foreign minister during his brief visit to Beirut late last week, hints at a shift in Lebanon’s geopolitical landscape following Hezbollah’s setbacks in its ongoing war with Israel.
It also reflects a growing sentiment in the country — now openly shared even within government circles — regarding the legitimacy and relevance of the Iranian Axis’ actions, particularly its focus on the Lebanese stage, which has long been the primary battleground in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In an interview with an Arab television channel, Lebanon’s Economy Minister Amin Salam said on Tuesday that it was “unacceptable for a foreign official to dictate what Lebanon should or should not do” — a notable statement coming from a government that has, until now, been heavily supported by the Shiite alliance of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.
The Iranian foreign minister’s visit aimed to rein in Lebanese leaders — primarily caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri — following their joint attempt, alongside Joumblatt, to delink Lebanon’s “support front” in southern Lebanon, which Hezbollah opened on Oct. 8, 2023, from the war in Gaza.
Yet, Joumblatt’s signals have drawn the most attention from observers, as the Druze leader is widely regarded as a keen and subtle reader of geopolitical shifts, in one direction or the other.
Beyond his remarks on the lessons of resistance, made during an inter-Druze meeting in Shaney, in the Aley district, the former PSP head reiterated his stance during an interview with Albert Kostanian on the local LBCI television channel.
Joumblatt explicitly called for separating the Lebanese and Gazan fronts, fully implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 — which notably requires Hezbollah’s withdrawal from areas south of the Litani River — and deploying the Lebanese Army in these areas. He also advocated for the ultimate implementation of U.N. Resolution 1559, a longstanding thorn in Hezbollah’s side. This resolution, dating back to 2004, demands the disarmament of all “Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” in the country.
The fact that Joumblatt chose to resurrect Resolution 1559 — tucked away by nearly everyone 16 years ago after Hezbollah’s armed takeover of Beirut and the Chouf area on May 7, 2008 — speaks volumes about the shifts he perceives in local and regional power dynamics.
It also reflects his assessment of Hezbollah’s trajectory, as he clearly anticipates the group’s ultimate military defeat, even suggesting that the Israeli army could reach the outskirts of Beirut, as it did in 1982.
Is this yet another opportunistic “about-face” by the mercurial Druze leader, as many Lebanese believe?
Such a view underestimates Joumblatt and, more importantly, misunderstands his community's position within Lebanon’s geopolitical landscape.
In Lebanon, a Christian, Sunni, or Shiite leader can afford to be less flexible in their positions because they have a substantial geographic community base to fall back on: From Achrafieh to Bsharri for Christians, northern Lebanon and central Bekaa for Sunnis (not to mention the broader Sunni world beyond), and southern Lebanon, Baalbek-Hermel and the southern suburbs of Beirut for Shiites.
The Druze, however, lacks such a fallback space, as their community is a minority even within its own stronghold. But there is more to it. This territory lies at the heart of the country, making it a strategic barrier between the three predominantly Shiite areas mentioned above.
These reasons, along with many others tied to the unique nature of Joumblatt’s leadership and his constant desire to transcend the narrow confines of his community base and embrace a broader Lebanese, pan-Arab and even international dimension, mean that the Druze leader must be more attuned to geopolitical shifts than others.
After Oct. 8, 2023, Joumblatt extended a hand to Hezbollah, based on shared support for the Palestinian cause. Today, in light of the escalating Israeli actions that are exacting a heavy toll on Lebanon and the serious setbacks faced by the pro-Iranian militia, he has reversed course. That’s all there is to it.
Reassuring Shiites
But this repositioning does not come without caution. What Joumblatt symbolically takes from Hezbollah and Iran, he offers to Berri, whom he now sees as representing “the majority of the Shiites.”
He disagrees with Berri on the timing of the presidential election, which he insists should take place “amid war,” while Berri refuses to consider it until a cease-fire is reached.
Yet, on another front, Joumblatt is in complete agreement with Berri on the need for a “consensus” presidential candidate — one who would be acceptable to the Shiites.
Beyond the persistent question of including the Shiite community in any political and institutional framework — a necessity that many Lebanese stakeholders claim to have understood and accepted, at least verbally — Joumblatt is trying to go further.
To Hezbollah’s supporters, he seeks to convey a message: The sooner you accept the party’s military defeat, the greater your political role will be in shaping the Lebanon of tomorrow, alongside other Lebanese parties.
This is his way of reassuring this constituency, by shifting the focus toward Berri. While this approach may be unpopular with many Lebanese, it also suggests that Lebanon could free itself from Iranian influence.
This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour and translated by Sahar Ghoussoub.
