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ANALYSIS

Israel vs. Hezbollah: The impending moment of truth

Last October, in these columns, we predicted that Lebanon would be one of the major losers in the Gaza war, regardless of the outcome. Nine months later, the moment of truth is rapidly approaching.

Hezbollah will either emerge from this conflict strengthened, potentially altering Lebanon’s internal political landscape, or it will come out undermined, leaving Lebanon significantly damaged.

Two major strategic issues have been at play since Oct. 7. The first concerns the plight of the Palestinian people and the transformation of Israel into an illiberal state characterized by Jewish supremacism.

The second is the tug-of-war between Israel and the self-proclaimed “Axis of Resistance,” the outcome of which is expected to redraw, if not the map, at least the balance of power throughout the region.

The carnage perpetrated by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip and the legitimate indignation it has provoked have relegated the other major issue in this conflict to the background: Who will win, Iran or Israel?

In the present circumstances, an Israeli victory means the destruction of Gaza and parts of Lebanon, as well as a major regional escalation that could affect Syria, Iraq, the Gulf and, of course, Iran.

The main effect of an Iranian victory will be to strengthen Iran’s hold in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Palestine.

In short, it’s either Israeli scorched earth or Iranian imperialism.

For the moment, Iran has the upper hand in this tug-of-war. Admittedly, Tehran and its allies have suffered many losses on the ground, and its “victory” remains very fragile.

A regional escalation could change everything and threaten the Iranian regime’s survival.

But as long as the US is not prepared to engage in a direct war with Iran, Iran can claim a tactical advantage.

The Houthis pose a constant threat to international trade and the Gulf petro-monarchies.

Iraqi militias loyal to Iran have several American targets in their sights, and now Jordan too. Hezbollah, having been on the defensive for months, is now flexing its muscles in the ongoing war on the southern border.

By using only part of its arsenal, Hezbollah has nevertheless succeeded in creating a “no man’s land” in the north of Israel.

Hamas, which Tel Aviv promised to eradicate, is still able to conduct operations from the Gaza Strip and, according to Israeli estimates, has lost only half its men after nine months of intensive warfare.

The icing on the cake is that, for the first time in its history, Iran launched a direct attack against Israel without paying a high price, all while continuing its nuclear program.

Under these conditions, can Israel accept defeat, even if only initially?

This would mean resigning itself to the implementation of a cease-fire in Gaza without Hamas being annihilated and then concluding an agreement with Hezbollah without obtaining all the desired guarantees.

This scenario seems unlikely at the moment. Yet it is the only obvious way to avoid an all-out war in Lebanon.

If Israel acknowledges Iran’s strategic victory, Hezbollah may agree to halt the fighting on the southern front and make concessions in this area, on condition that it does not surrender its weapons, and continue to possess the means to restart it in the event of an Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Hezbollah would also want to obtain compensation in Lebanon and the region.

Who could then oppose the election of a new (Hezbollah-backed) president,? Or the redistribution of prerogatives among the different communities, whether in the short or medium term, in favor of this regional army – whose influence and power far exceed those of Lebanon – one that had succeeded in bending the Israeli state?

Even if Hezbollah will never be able to turn a blind eye to the internal balances, all the other stakeholders and all the other issues will be relegated to the background.

In other words, if an all-out war is avoided in the next few weeks, it will probably mark the beginning of the official (rather than unofficial) era of Hezbollah’s control over Lebanon.

But the other scenario is even more worrying. A large-scale conflict would have even more dramatic consequences for Lebanon, as it is difficult to see how it could be limited in time and space. Israel would be embarking on a mad venture with limited chances of success. However, the Netanyahu government may feel this is the least of evils in the current situation.

As time passes, the two players seem more trapped by their respective strategic choices and hubris. And if the Biden administration’s red light has indeed turned orange, the diplomatic window of opportunity is likely to close fairly quickly.

There are still timing issues relating to Gaza and the American presidential election. But, ultimately, three issues will be decisive over the next few weeks. Does Benjamin Netanyahu consider an all-out war in Lebanon an asset for his political survival?

Does Israel believe that an agreement with Hezbollah can provide the minimum guarantees it needs?

Is Tel Aviv convinced that, in the medium term, war with Iran is inevitable and that it is necessary to weaken its adversary’s main card as far in advance as possible? Whatever happens, things are heating up for a tense summer.

This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le J0ur and translated by Sahar Ghoussoub.

Last October, in these columns, we predicted that Lebanon would be one of the major losers in the Gaza war, regardless of the outcome. Nine months later, the moment of truth is rapidly approaching.Hezbollah will either emerge from this conflict strengthened, potentially altering Lebanon’s internal political landscape, or it will come out undermined, leaving Lebanon significantly damaged.Two...