When President Joseph Aoun's term began and Nawaf Salam was swiftly appointed prime minister, many Lebanese expected the next steps in the government formation would also progress quickly. However, the pace has been slower than anticipated. While still far from the typical delays of the past, with negotiations only entering their third week, it is evident that significant obstacles are impeding the process.
Beneath these relatively routine disagreements, the Shiite political blocs (Amal and Hezbollah) suspect a more hidden agenda: the complete exclusion of Hezbollah from the next government. In their view, the signs pointing to this possibility have increased in recent days, though none are definitive. Among the signals are statements from U.S. representatives Darrell Issa and Darin LaHood, both calling for a government in which Hezbollah is not directly or indirectly involved. These remarks have been echoed by several Lebanese-Americans, opposition groups like the Lebanese Forces, and others who oppose the idea of Hezbollah playing a role in the selection of Shiite ministers. While no tangible progress has been made, these parties are actively working to prevent such a scenario.
President Aoun reiterated on Thursday that he intends to create an inclusive government and does not wish to exclude any party from the formation process. Salam voiced a similar stance. Nonetheless, the Shiite duo remains concerned over mounting media criticism of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's proposal for the Finance Minister. Berri suggested former minister Yassine Jaber — a figure closely aligned with, but not a member of, Amal — but his recommendation has faced resistance from several parties. The situation escalated with media reports circulating of Salam rejecting several candidates proposed by Hezbollah for the Health Ministry.
Indeed, the Amal movement condemned these convoys in a statement the following day, and Hezbollah implied it was not involved. But in politics, these convoys are interpreted differently.
For the Shiite duo, these actions point to a deliberate effort to sideline them in favor of independent Shiite figures, potentially weakening what they describe as the "spirit of resistance" within the Shiite community. It seems like an attempt to capitalize on the duo's weakening — especially Hezbollah's — after the war to also diminish its political weight ahead of the 2026 elections. Although the blocs have not explicitly stated it, they implied that they are unwilling to yield. Moreover, the nighttime moped convoys in certain parts of the capital, unclaimed by any specific party, have been interpreted as a clear message from the duo of rejecting any exclusionary efforts. While Amal condemned the convoys the next day, and Hezbollah distanced implied that it was not involved, in political circles, these convoys were interpreted differently.
Has this message been received? Sources close to Salam suggested yesterday that the issue surrounding the Finance Ministry may have been resolved. If confirmed, this would clear one of the main obstacles to forming the new government.
However, the dispute over Hezbollah’s role remains unresolved, as so far, its proposals have been rejected. Another emerging challenge is Aoun and Salam's desire to select ministers from each community without external interference. Meaning, they aim to appoint one of the five Shiite ministers independently — two in collaboration with Amal, two with Hezbollah, and the fifth shared between the Shiite duo and officials. This fifth Shiite minister would be chosen solely by Salam and Aoun, as part of an effort to "liberate all communities from the control of their political representatives" and bring about real change. Officials suggest this demand does not concern the Shiite community alone but would rather apply to other parties too.
For Hezbollah and Amal, it appears their officials want to avoid a replay of the 2006 events, when Shiite ministers resigned from Fouad Siniora’s government, creating a major sectarian rift in the country. At the time, the Prime Minister ignored their departure and continued running the government without the Shiite ministers, as well as without Defense Minister Yaacoub Sarraf, who resigned in solidarity. This sparked a sit-in by Amal and Hezbollah near the Serail in downtown Beirut starting Dec. 1, 2006, effectively paralyzing the heart of the capital for over 500 days. The sit-in only ended on May 21, 2008, following the Doha Agreement, which led to the election of President Michel Sleiman and the formation of a national unity government.
At a time when both Hezbollah and the Amal movement feel increasingly targeted, the duo is determined not to relinquish the card, which allows them to deprive the government of Shiite community participation and, in turn, its national unifying character. This is particularly crucial given their parliamentary representation of the community. Ultimately, the outcome will hinge on the ongoing negotiations and any foreign demands, should they arise.
This article was originally published in French in L'Orient Le-Jour.