A giant poster of Hassan Nasrallah, with the words "We miss you," on July 18, 2012, in Beirut. Photo credit: Anwar Amro / AFP.
An earthquake. A shock. A night of horror watching the southern suburbs of Beirut being bombarded by the Israeli army. And the beginning of a new world, where all scenarios seem possible, for Lebanon and the Middle East.
The death of Hassan Nasrallah, announced by the Israeli army and then confirmed by Hezbollah, is the culmination of a week that has reshuffled all the cards and for which no one was prepared. A full-scale war scenario has been anticipated for nearly a year, and it was known that the balance of power was largely in Israel’s favor. But, no expert, diplomat, and probably no member of Hezbollah or the Iranian axis, could imagine that the most powerful militia in the world would suffer such crushing blows — and Lebanon along with it — in such a short period.
For now, we are far from the 2006 scenario and also far from what is happening in Gaza: it is now clear that the Israeli army has been preparing for this war for nearly twenty years and has dozens of moves ahead of its enemy. It seems to know everything about the party: its hideouts, its leaders, its commanders, its missile depots, its means of communication.
The flying of its drones over Beirut, day and night, sounds like an ultimate reminder: Israel monitors Lebanon's every move. How deeply is the party infiltrated? How much has it underestimated the strength and determination of its adversary? Israel has succeeded in decapitating almost all of Hezbollah’s high command in a few days, a few weeks at most if we include the assassination of Fouad Shukur in the southern suburbs on July 30. The pro-Iranian formation seems totally bewildered, as evidenced by the time it took to announce the death of its leader.
Hezbollah brought to its knees
Several myths have collapsed in recent days: that of the balance of terror that Hezbollah boasted of; that of the omnipotence of a movement that had become a real regional army in recent years; that of the invincibility of Hassan Nasrallah, one of the most powerful men in the Middle East; and finally that of the “unity of fronts” so dear to the Iranian axis.
Hezbollah is brought to its knees and no one has yet come to its aid: neither its Iranian patron, nor the Houthis, nor the Iraqi militias, and even less the Assad regime for whose survival it has sacrificed thousands of men. Despite everything, caution is necessary. We know nothing of what is happening inside the party, nor of the intentions of the Iranians.
Israel has conducted thousands of strikes in a week that have probably destroyed part of Hezbollah's arsenal. But neither the 150,000 missiles and rockets it holds, nor the tens of thousands of armed men that form the militia have disappeared overnight. Although it seems increasingly complicated every day, one cannot exclude the possibility that Hezbollah still has the means to respond to its adversary and wage a total and longer-lasting war.
The party is in shock. Can it recover? It obviously has its calculations. And these must take into account the pulse of its street and Lebanon, which do not want this war. But ultimately, the decision is not up to it. It is up to the Islamic Republic to decide whether it accepts its defeat or launches into an escalation of all the dangers. It may consider that it must at least try to rebalance the power before starting the phase of negotiations, which probably implies giving Hezbollah the green light to use its precision missiles and activate its other allies in the region. But it is a risky bet that could ultimately compromise the regime's survival, as the United States has sent very clear signals that they would not stand by in this war.
Despite its missiles and militias, Tehran does not have the necessary resources to confront Washington and Tel Aviv in a direct conflict, especially since the Gulf countries and Jordan will side with the “enemy”. The Iranian regime, obsessed with its survival, can it put it at risk to avoid a humiliating defeat for Hezbollah? The statement by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Saturday, claiming that Israel will not be able to defeat Hezbollah, can be interpreted in different ways. As a near abandonment, or as a way of buying time before preparing the response.
And Lebanon?
The Islamic Republic sees a large part of what it has built over more than four decades crumbling before its eyes. October 7 and its aftermath were supposed to offer it an unprecedented strategic victory. But it seems to have not realized Israel's determination to weaken it with the barely concealed green light from the Biden administration. Its priority may now be preserving its nuclear program, seen as the regime's last life insurance.
And Lebanon in all this? Israel acts without the slightest restraint or consideration for civilian casualties. The strike targeting Hassan Nasrallah on Friday night caused hundreds of deaths according to Israeli army estimates, to which must be added those who must have perished during the night, unable to flee their homes in time. All this without the slightest international condemnation! If the escalation continues, the toll will quickly reach thousands of deaths and a large part of the infrastructure in the south, Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut will be destroyed.
If a ceasefire is concluded, the country will open a new chapter in its history, dominated for more than two decades by the shadow of Hezbollah and the figure of Hassan Nasrallah. The Secretary General of Hezbollah is the most adored and most hated personality in the Land of the Cedars. His death is an unprecedented and incomparable shockwave, at least since that of Rafik Hariri.
Hassan Nasrallah is the face and voice of the "Resistance Axis". He will of course be replaced, but in many ways, he seems irreplaceable. Whatever the outcome of the war, Hezbollah will emerge very weakened. It will take years to rebuild its credibility with its popular base, all Lebanese, and the countries of the region.
But it will not disappear for all that. The pro-Iranian formation will evolve, mutate, but will remain the strongest on the Lebanese scene.
Will it return to a pure militia state? Will it try on the contrary to become a party "like the others"? It is too early to know. We can however imagine that Hezbollah will become even more paranoid, less inclined to make any concessions, and more determined than ever to re-establish, by any means possible, a balance of power that is favorable to it with the other parties.
All scenarios are on the table. That of a total war, of a defeat that the party will make Lebanon pay for, and of a fragile opportunity to finally learn the lessons of everything that has led Lebanon, beyond Hezbollah, to find itself once again in this situation.
