This summer has been particularly challenging for the “Axis of Resistance.” Its deterrence capabilities are severely eroded, and the tactical setbacks inflicted by Israel are becoming increasingly difficult to absorb. Strategic prospects for Iran and Hezbollah are beginning to darken.
Much of this is, of course, a matter of perception. The Gaza war has been ongoing for nearly 11 months, and the dynamics have evolved, and even reversed, multiple times. The conflict is far from over, and no one can say what the Middle East will look like once this cycle of violence ends. The Iranians are masters of “strategic patience” and may believe that none of the setbacks are decisive as long as they don’t undermine the two pillars of their foreign policy: Their network of militias and their nuclear program.
However, even the most zealous supporters of the axis must admit that the situation has rapidly deteriorated. The assassinations of Hezbollah military leader Fouad Shukur and Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Beirut and Tehran, respectively, gave Israel the upper hand. Not only can Israel eliminate key figures of the “resistance” whenever and wherever it chooses, but it can also do so without facing significant repercussions.
Iran hesitated, perhaps even refrained, from retaliating. The operation carried out by Hezbollah on Saturday night into Sunday doesn’t seem capable of restoring the party’s deterrence capability.
Despite party leader Hassan Nasrallah’s assertions that the attack was a success, causing damage, notably at the Glilot base, and claiming that previous Israeli strikes had no impact, skepticism remains. Nasrallah himself admitted that he must now “wait to see if the results are satisfactory.” This can be understood that the party has to see if this will be enough to dissuade Israel from treating Lebanon, including its southern suburbs, as a new Syria — a place where it can operate freely whenever it chooses.
The axis is trapped by its own strategy. It cannot restore its deterrent capability without risking a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States — something it desperately wants to avoid. Iran’s attack on Israel last April failed to achieve its intended impact, and Hezbollah’s recent strike seems likely to follow the same path.
According to the Israeli version of events, which could, of course, be exaggerated, the operation appears to have been a failure. Tel Aviv reportedly had foreknowledge of the timing and details of the attack, and its preemptive strikes significantly limited its impact.
Hezbollah can argue that it didn’t use its long-range missiles and that the operation’s primary goal was to demonstrate its ability to target areas near Tel Aviv. However, this only highlights the limits of the axis. Iran is uncomfortable in direct confrontations with Israel, where its arsenal is relatively limited. While Hezbollah has more options, it is also more exposed. The party’s response, although seemingly curtailed, indicates it is not ready to risk another open and total war with Israel, despite recent claims to the contrary.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might be tempted to exploit this situation, pressing his advantage by striking as many targets as possible, whether human or material, in the South, the Beqaa Valley and possibly, in exceptional cases, even in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
The longer this war drags on, the more the Israeli government feels emboldened to cross red lines. The more it does so, the harder it will be for the axis, particularly Hezbollah, to restore the rules of engagement.
This deadlock is exacerbated by the dwindling prospects for a way out of the crisis for Iran and its allies. They cannot accept a cease-fire in Gaza that would allow the Israelis to resume their offensive in the enclave at a later stage.
But what is their alternative? Time once again seems to be on Netanyahu’s side. Likud leads the polls. International pressure has had minimal effect. The possibility of a Donald Trump victory in the upcoming U.S. presidential election could further bolster Netanyahu. He can hope for more military successes both in Gaza and southern Lebanon. Only massive American pressure, which has yet to materialize, could upend the situation. Netanyahu understands that the axis will do everything possible to avoid an all-out war, granting him the freedom to conduct as many wars of attrition as he wishes.
Yet the setbacks of the Iranian axis do not necessarily translate into a victory for Israel. Its military superiority alone is insufficient to provide a real solution.
Strategically, Israel lacks a credible long-term plan for Gaza, southern Lebanon, the West Bank and the Iranian nuclear issue. It too is trapped by its own strategy. That is why, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations currently taking place in Cairo, which may at best lead to a medium-term truce, this war is far from over. While a regional escalation has fortunately been avoided this time, it is likely that this conflict will only end with a significant strategic shift in the Middle East.
This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour and translated by Sahar Ghoussoub.