Raisi’s death sparks complicated succession, pending Khamenei’s

The Iranian government will continue to operate “without the slightest disruption.” With these words, the cabinet announced on Monday morning that President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and other Iranian officials died in a helicopter accident.

Similarly, the 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved the appointment of Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber as acting president, aiming to reassure the people that institutions would continue operating and to silence rumors about internal struggles over the succession to the presidency and the supreme leadership. The late president was seen as a potential candidate to replace the supreme leader.

While everything seemed to ensure that accession to power is limited to a strict adherence to the Islamic revolution — through repression or ostracizing whoever has dissenting opinions or ambitions — the president’s death has reshuffled some cards.

Organizing the presidential election

Constitution Article 131 stipulates that, after the death of a president, a council comprising the first vice-president, the parliament speaker and the head of the judiciary shall coordinate to organize a new election within 50 days.

Pending the election scheduled for June 28, Mokhber, who was appointed in 2021 following Raisi’s election, will be in charge of running the country’s day-to-day affairs. A close friend of Khamenei, Mokhber once ran Setad, a multi-billion-dollar investment fund directly affiliated to Khamenei.

He was sanctioned by the EU in 2010 for involvement in nuclear and ballistic activities before his name was removed from the blacklist two years later. Mokhber was also sanctioned by the US in 2021 for his role in running Setad (also known as the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO)).

Moreover, he contributed to the strategic and military rapprochement with Russia. Now, he must be able to carry on this role amid a growing popular dissatisfaction with the regime.

While Raisi became president in 2021 after the moderate and liberal candidates were sidelined and amid a historically low turnout below 50 percent, the same scenario will likely repeat in the coming weeks.

Jonathan Piron, a historian focusing on the Middle East and Iran, warned, “Opening up the presidential game would mean running the risk of ending up with a figure that seeks to pursue a more open policy, or even call into question some of the regime’s pillars.”

“This scenario would be particularly risky, given the low turnout and that the regime relies increasingly on its security apparatus, no longer seeking this form of legitimacy since it now relies much more on violence,” Piron said.

Nearly 60 percent of voters abstained from voting in the first round of the last parliamentary elections in early March — the first election after the “Women, Life, Freedom” demonstrations were harshly repressed. This is while an eight percent turnout was recorded in the second round in Tehran.

The question of who the candidates might be also remains open, as Raisi was expected to stand for re-election in August 2025 for a second term. It is rumored that names including that of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf are circulating in ultraconservative circles. However, the competition promises to be tough, with hardliners already vying for his post.

Is the grip over power at risk?

For now, no figure seems capable of replacing Khamenei’s protégé, well-positioned to succeed him as supreme leader. “While the faction behind Raisi could come up with lay presidential candidates, it does not have a cleric with the potential to be supreme leader ready to run for the presidency,” wrote analyst Vali Nasr on X.

Raisi was known for his unwavering loyalty to the supreme leader and had judicial, political and religious expertise. After the presidency was opened to him in 2021, the ruling order seemed to promote him to take the country’s top post, by limiting the range of candidates able to run for the Assembly of Experts in early March.

This body — which would choose the next supreme leader — has taken an even more conservative turn, with reformers including former President Hassan Rohani having given up or been prevented from running.

Along with Raisi, the supreme leader’s son, Mojtaba’s name was circulating as a potential successor to his father. This is now a thornier issue, as the supreme leader had recently made it clear that he had no desire to turn the Islamic Republic into a dynasty.

(Credit: Jaimee Lee Haddad)

While Raisi’s death is a blow to Khamenei, the Iranian regime continues to be held with an iron fist, where dissent may remain contained at least as long as the supreme leader is alive.

This observation largely echoed the place of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within power. The IRGC, which rose to prominence in the 2010s as its interventions abroad multiplied and its control of economic and industrial interests grew, is the ideological arm of the armed forces.

“It’s increasingly a state within a state, with Iran moving more and more towards authoritarianism, relying on its security apparatus,” said Piron. “Depending on the names that will emerge for the presidential election, we could see the IRGC further rising in power.”

The transition period under Mokhber’s term of office could already see Pasdara’s stronger control. “Mokhber’s ties to the IRGC’s core leadership will guarantee that the IRGC’s role in Iran’s administration will remain intact, and even intensify,” wrote analyst Hamidreza Azizi on X.

Homogenous?

Some even pointed to a shift toward military rule. “The guards will not directly get involved in the succession process [of the supreme leader] and we will not see the clergy and the guards standing against each other,” an analyst told the Financial Times.

“But the guards will function as the main advisory arm of the assembly [of experts],” the analyst added.

This will assert their strategic power, given that they are already in charge of the country’s foreign policy, including the “Axis of Resistance” network, and its nuclear and ballistic programs.

“But the IRGC should not be seen as homogeneous either. There are tensions, particularly between different generations,” said Piron, referring to a “very complicated game behind the scenes.”

This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour. Translated by Joelle El Khoury.