It is a heated, explosive and even taboo subject. But Lebanon no longer has the luxury of ignoring it or clinging to matters of principle: Should the country normalize relations with Israel?
Should it normalize relations with a state that occupies and bombs it, that has waged a genocidal war in Gaza, and whose military adventurism and expansionist ambitions threaten and unsettle the entire region?
When the question is framed that way, the answer seems obvious. But it cannot be framed only that way. Normalization is a political question before it is a moral or symbolic one.
The answer must depend above all on Lebanon’s interests and on the consequences such a move would have for the country and the region. The issue is not simply whether one is for or against normalization, but rather under what conditions it could be considered acceptable.
Peace is never a given. It means shaking hands with the enemy. But war cannot last forever either.
Israel is a nuclear state that is not likely to disappear anytime soon, despite the region’s prophets predicting its end for decades. In the end, Lebanon will have to make peace with its neighbor. But when, and at what price? Two shortcuts must be avoided here.
The first is to assume that normalization with Israel necessarily amounts to a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. The past two years, the worst in Palestinian history since the Nakba, have shown how reductive that view is. Have the countries that do not recognize Israel done more for Palestine than the others?
Did Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Iran or Lebanon do more than South Africa, France, Egypt, Jordan or even the United Arab Emirates over the past two years?
The Palestinian cause has been instrumentalized by many, but no one has advanced it through war against Israel or by refusing normalization. Lebanon is the clearest example of this. Not only has that policy failed to help Palestine, it has come at a steep cost to Lebanon.
The second shortcut is the opposite one: Portraying normalization as an automatic path to stability and prosperity.
Here too, there are many counterexamples. Sudan normalized relations with Israel, yet it has been mired in civil war for more than two years. Egypt and Jordan are no longer battlegrounds of what used to be called the “Arab-Israeli war,” but the American support they have received since making peace with Israel does little to hide the fragility of their regimes.
Even in the Middle East, geopolitics has its limits, and a peace agreement alone cannot make up for the failures of poor governance.
Lebanon should take note. The notion that normalization would open the floodgates for currency, allowing the country to sidestep reform, is being heavily promoted by part of the political class and even more so by the banking elite, driven by the unspoken hope of restoring their power and preserving their impunity.
Let’s be clear: in the current context, we are not in favor of normalization with Israel.
Not because it is Israel, and not because we believe Lebanon should take part in the “resistance” against the enemy or “liberate” Palestine, but for at least three reasons.
The first has to do with timing. The war remains too fresh in people’s minds, as do the massacres in Gaza. Granting such a victory to a man responsible for the deaths of more than 20,000 children in two years would be indecent.
Beyond that, could there be a worse time for Lebanon to negotiate? What leverage does the country have against the pressure of Israeli power and American might to ensure a balanced deal?
The Syrian example offers little reassurance: Damascus is willing to conclude a security agreement with Tel Aviv, but the latter is demanding so much — using its position of strength to humiliate its adversary — that Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa has been forced to wait.
And unlike in Lebanon, Sharaa has powerful and sympathetic allies, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Granted, those who lose wars never have the privilege to set timelines, and Lebanon — whether it likes it or not — is in the camp of those who lost.
It is true that Lebanon would be even more weakened if Syria and Saudi Arabia were to take the leap, leaving it on the sidelines of this regional reshuffle. But we are not there yet, and Donald Trump’s dreams of peace seem entirely out of step with realities on the ground.
Lebanon no longer wants to be at war with Israel, but that does not necessarily mean making peace tomorrow. The priority should instead be to disarm Hezbollah, revive the armistice agreement and negotiate Israel’s withdrawal and the demarcation of borders, including, if necessary, through direct talks.
The second reason concerns the impact normalization would have on Lebanon. Peace with Israel has had a profound, even structural, effect on every country that has taken that step, far beyond the Palestinian question or the resulting geopolitical realignments.
It has become a vital element in the survival of the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes. It enabled Morocco to secure recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara and partly explains the radicalization of Algeria’s leadership. It has also strengthened Abu Dhabi’s regional ambitions which, before Oct. 7, it openly embraced — unlike other Arab states — by seeking to build a strategic partnership with Israel.
Normalization would have equally significant consequences for Lebanon, not only on its relationship with Israel and its ability to stay out of regional power struggles, but also on its internal balance.
In a country as fragmented as ours, and in the absence of a new social contract capable of uniting and reconciling the Lebanese, normalization would likely deepen tensions between communities.
That could happen either because of disagreements over what kind of relationship Lebanon should have with its neighbor, or, though less likely, because the communities would compete to become the main partner of the new patron, as they once did under Syrian tutelage.
We cannot make peace with Israel before making peace among ourselves. Otherwise, it will inevitably be peace for some and a defeat for others.
The third and final reason has to do with Palestine. On its own, Lebanon’s stance has not advanced the cause, nor can it.
But it could, if normalization were once again used as leverage in the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative, which was announced in 2002 in none other than Beirut. Much has changed since then.
The Palestinian state has been overrun by Israeli settlers, and Israel is now more dominant and less willing to concede anything than it was in 2002. It prefers the erasure of the Palestinians to peace with the Arabs.
Yet, Arab countries should not abandon one of the few levers they have left in this issue. If the past two years have proven anything, it is that regional peace will remain an illusion as long as the Palestinian question is unresolved. The separate peace deals brokered by Washington have shown their limits, and Arab states have every reason to negotiate collectively with Israel.
If Lebanon still had credibility — or the will to rebuild it — it could have taken a leading role in such an initiative instead of merely waiting for signals from Riyadh.
The longer we stand by instead of addressing this crucial issue, the higher the cost will be for Lebanon, whether in normalizing ties with Israel or refusing to do so.
This piece originally appeared in French on L'Orient-Le Jour. Translated into English by Sahar Ghoussoub.
