Lebanon under guardianship

A state is not a collection of tribes. Nor is it a child awaiting instructions from a parental authority. It is not a string of lofty declarations that vanish at the first sign of trouble. A state is made of institutions, rules, interests, decision-making, and, in the best case, a vision and a plan.

It is an understatement to say that the spectacle of recent days falls short of what one would expect from a state worthy of the name. The behavior of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri should surprise no one. The unshakable speaker adapts, like any good zaim (a political boss), to the shifting winds of geopolitics, but still does not seem to grasp that the rules of the game have changed.

The days of makeshift deals, sleights of hand and arrangements among false allies are over. The methods that govern the circus that is now the Lebanese Parliament are completely ill-suited to the current reality of international relations, especially amid the return of global predators. For all his political savvy, Berri has so thoroughly grown used to operating this way that he now appears incapable of doing otherwise.

But what are President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam doing in this mess? Why are the two heads of the executive — who were supposed to restore a measure of prestige and authority to the state — agreeing to play a role that reduces them to tribal chiefs, suspicious of one another, with no mission but to await instructions from abroad and reactions at home?

Why did Lebanon need to wait for a U.S. proposal, delivered by special envoy Tom Barrack, to outline a roadmap for Hezbollah’s disarmament? Why did the official response have to result from a string of meetings between the “three presidents” or their advisers, who themselves were waiting for Hezbollah’s counterproposal? What is the Cabinet for? Why include Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces in it from the outset if not to allow this body — which, according to the Constitution, is supposed to hold real executive power — to debate, decide and embody the state at a crucial moment? Why, finally, was there no explicit mention of disarming the militia north of the Litani River in the first version sent Sunday night to the Americans?

After his meeting with the U.S. envoy, Salam had the merit of answering all these questions and attempting to defuse the controversy. One can only hope the state will now draw the necessary lessons.

How can we expect to be respected as a state if we do not begin by acting like one ourselves? Yes, Lebanon is under a form of U.S.-Israeli guardianship. If we do not comply with the American plan, Hezbollah will continue to be the target of airstrikes beyond the Litani, and the country will be suffocated — no dollars will flow in until the issue is resolved. But unless we admit that we are the primary architects of this situation, nothing will ever change.

Disarming Hezbollah — and more broadly reestablishing the state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate force — must be done in Lebanon’s interest, not in that of the United States or Israel. So too must the improvement of our relations with Syria and the implementation of economic and social reforms. We cannot go on waiting for orders and initiatives from outside, only to complain that decisions are being imposed on us from that same outside.

The chapter on Hezbollah as a militia above a non-state actor is closed. It is free — along with its supporters — to remain in denial and believe that the Iranian method of dragging out negotiations and never leaving the gray zone will save it. It will not. Either Hezbollah agrees to hand over its weapons, or the story will end in blood — again. The worst part is that a large segment of the Lebanese political class, including the party’s closest allies, openly hope that Israel will end up doing the “dirty work” in its place.

The Israeli “enemy” will then be denounced in public, called every name in the book, while privately its actions are welcomed.

The Lebanese state should do everything in its power to avoid such a scenario. It is up to the state — not the United States — to use both carrot and stick to achieve not just the surrender of heavy weaponry, but the complete demilitarization of Hezbollah.

Otherwise, the state will once again be the great dupe of history if the U.S.-Israeli duo settles for the handover of arms and the abandonment of the “resistance,” but turns a blind eye to the party’s mafia-like behavior on the domestic scene. At the heart of the issue is not so much the weapons themselves as their constant use as a tool to bury justice and steer politics.

The party likely believes, perhaps rightly, that disarmament would mean its end. But the state must understand in turn that unless Hezbollah becomes, as soon as possible, a party like any other, neither above nor below, it will continue digging its own grave. And no external guardian will come to save it.

This article was originally published in French in L’Orient-Le Jour. It was translated by Sahar Ghoussoub.