Iran-US deal: What consequences for Beirut, Tel Aviv, Tehran? Anthony Samrani answered your questions

Trump proposed that Israel withdraw from Lebanon and that Syria disarm Hezbollah with its own army. He says Israel is causing too much collateral damage and that Syria would do a better job. What do y

Here is Charles' question:

Trump proposed that Israel withdraw from Lebanon and that Syria disarm Hezbollah with its own army. He says Israel is causing too much collateral damage and that Syria would do a better job. What do you think? Thank you.

Hello Charles, thank you for your question — this will be the last one for today,

Of all of Trump’s ideas, I think this is by far the most foolish and dangerous. If Ahmad al-Sharaa’s men were to enter Lebanon, it would be a bloodbath, given the extent of the desire for revenge against Hezbollah, and more broadly against the Shiites, that drives them.

This would reinforce the idea within the Shiite community that Hezbollah is the only actor capable of protecting it in a context of existential survival.

Fortunately, the Syrian president is so far resisting this pressure and seems fully aware that he has absolutely no interest in crossing that line.

Hezbollah arms monopoly should be discussed within the country between the different actors. Is Hezbollah open to this type of negotiation?

Here is Nicolas' questions:

The issue of Hezbollah’s weapons should be discussed within the country between the different actors. Is Hezbollah open to this type of negotiation?

Hello Nicolas,

In theory, Hezbollah says yes. It claims it would agree to discuss the issue, on the condition that its weapons are integrated into a defense strategy that it would define itself. In practice, in the past, this has been a way for the party to buy time by throwing the state a bone while simultaneously strengthening its control over that same state.

Has disarming Hezbollah become even more difficult today?

Here is Elie’s question:

Hello Mr. Samrani, and thank you for your analysis! Here is my question: in this new context, what could happen regarding the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament? Is it made easier, or on the contrary, even more difficult today?

Hello Elie, thank you for being here,

It seems to me that it is even more difficult today.

Why does the Lebanese state always align itself against Hezbollah instead of coordinating with it?

The following question comes from Constantin:

Hezbollah has inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli army, and it cannot be said that Israel has gained the upper hand in the latest confrontation (since March 2). How do you explain that the Lebanese state insists on siding with the Israelis against Hezbollah instead of coordinating with Hezbollah (which is ultimately composed of Lebanese) in order to leverage its achievements in the negotiations? Isn’t the weakness of the Lebanese state due to its inability to benefit from the resources deployed by its people in the south?

Hello Constantin, thank you for joining us,

Hezbollah’s use of drones has posed serious problems for the Israeli army, especially as the latter is constrained in its freedom of movement by an American desire not to jeopardize negotiations with Iran. Hezbollah has also shown that it was able to reorganize its forces between November 2024 and March 2026, and it seems to have learned from past mistakes, particularly in terms of communication methods and deployment.

That said, it is difficult to argue that the Israeli army has not gained the upper hand. Without deploying tens of thousands of troops, as has been the case in the past, the Israeli army has managed to occupy the south, level dozens of villages, inflict heavy losses on its adversary, and has been stopped more by the calculations of its American ally than by Hezbollah’s capabilities.

Beyond the fact that I do not really see what such coordination would lead to, the lack of coordination between the state and Hezbollah is also explained by the fact that the party triggered two wars against Israel — which Lebanon is paying for at a very high price — on Oct. 8, 2023 and March 2, 2026, without ever taking into account what the state and the rest of the Lebanese population thought.

Despite everything, Hezbollah is claiming victory. Has it really emerged strengthened from yet another war?

Here is Nada’s message:

Hello, thank you again for your coverage and analysis of the situation. Despite the war continuing in the South, the occupation, the destruction and the deaths, Hezbollah is claiming victory. Has it really emerged strengthened from yet another war?

If so, what impact will this have on reforms and the building of a state? Will the “deep state” become even more dominant? What can anti-Hezbollah forces do in the face of this potential new hegemony? What future awaits Lebanon under a party, or even a duo, that seeks to control it again and again? Finally, does a strengthened Hezbollah mean a permanent state of war with Israel? Thank you!

Hello Nada, thank you for your question,

By its own admission, Hezbollah has lost several thousand men since March. It no longer has the same missile capabilities. The south is a field of ruins. Anger is rising within its base. And the party is becoming increasingly politically isolated and unpopular in Lebanon.

But despite all these factors, it could still emerge strengthened from this war. Imagine a scenario in which the United States forces Israel to withdraw from the south as part of a final agreement with Iran, and in which Tehran actually receives tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars. Hezbollah would then claim it has “liberated” the south and would manage its reconstruction as it sees fit, according to its interests. This is especially true if Arab countries also move toward a compromise with Hezbollah.

However, the most likely scenario is a double burden for Lebanon: an Israeli occupation and a defiant Hezbollah. The south would remain a territory of war and suffering, while the party would likely harden its stance toward the state.

Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, if they survive, will be central. If Iran fails to link the final agreement to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and if Beirut and Tel Aviv eventually reach an agreement similar to that of 1983 (more than a security agreement, less than a peace treaty), the main issue will become the power struggle between the state and the militia. But are Joseph Aoun and the army ready to adopt a tougher policy toward Hezbollah?

Continued attacks in South Lebanon: between Tehran and Tel Aviv, who will have the final say?

We continue with Maryline’s question:

Iran warns that it will retaliate if Israeli attacks on Lebanon continue. On its side, the Jewish state warns that it will strike Iran if it retaliates against Israeli operations in Lebanon. Who really has the upper hand/final say in this story?

Hello Maryline, thank you for being with us

Donald Trump will act as the arbiter of this power struggle. On the ground, the advantage lies with Israel. But if Iran threatens to derail all negotiations in the event of Israel’s refusal to withdraw from South Lebanon, what will the American president do? How far will he go to force his ally to leave Lebanon without having achieved its objectives?

With the agreement signed last Sunday, can we imagine a direct application of this agreement on Lebanon, knowing that Israel is continuing its strikes in the south?

Giorgio asks us:

With the agreement signed last Sunday, can we imagine a direct application of this agreement on Lebanon, knowing that Israel is continuing its strikes in the south? And what consequences will this have on the Washington talks on June 22?

Hello Giorgio,

Lebanon is directly mentioned in the agreement to be included in the global cease-fire. From this perspective, it is an Iranian victory. However, the Israeli withdrawal is not mentioned, whereas some Iranian leaders had stated that it would be included. According to Hezbollah, Iran has in any case committed not to sign the final agreement as long as the Israelis have not withdrawn from south Lebanon.

In the meantime, things will remain unclear in Lebanon, especially in the South. Fighting will continue but at a lower intensity, and the Israeli army will continue to occupy the territory.

This raises serious questions about the future of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. Israel is likely to set even more impossible demands. Hezbollah will, on its side, do everything it can to torpedo the negotiations, arguing that only Iran can secure an agreement favorable to Lebanon. What will the Lebanese state do in this situation? It remained relatively passive at a time when conditions were more favorable. It is hard to imagine it changing its stance completely today.

How can we explain the harshness of Donald Trump’s remarks toward Benjamin Netanyahu?

The next question comes from Antoine:

How can we explain the virulence of Donald Trump’s statements toward Benjamin Netanyahu?

Hello Antoine, thank you for being with us,

I explain it by three factors:

• The Trump style: Trump does not hesitate to berate both his allies and his adversaries.
• The feeling of having been trapped by Netanyahu in the war against Iran
• The fact that part of the MAGA base no longer hides its hostility toward Israel, and that Donald Trump therefore wants to distance himself from a relationship perceived as “toxic.”

For more on this topic:

Clinton, Chirac, Obama... When Netanyahu’s allies ran out of patience

How should we analyze this sidelining of Tel Aviv by Washington?

Here is Maha’s question:

It is hard to imagine American support for Israel completely eroding. But how should we interpret this sidelining of Tel Aviv in the drafting of an agreement that nevertheless includes Israeli concessions? Is this yet another communication maneuver by Donald Trump, who wants to showcase his achievements in the region? Or is it a prelude to something more significant in U.S.–Israeli relations?

Hello Maha, thank you for your question,

I do not believe this is a maneuver. There is a clear deterioration in U.S.–Israeli relations, particularly because of this conflict. Washington has, for several weeks now, been treating Tel Aviv not as a close ally but as a partner viewed with distrust. The two have already gone through crises in the past, and the two administrations may reconcile fairly quickly. But something much deeper is happening and this is unprecedented: a growing hostility within American public opinion, including among Republicans, toward Israel.

Could this, in the longer term, lead to a rupture with major strategic consequences? It is still too early to say, but it is undoubtedly the biggest threat to Israel’s security in the short and medium term. And much of the responsibility lies with one man, Benjamin Netanyahu, who has always presented himself as the key figure in maintaining this uniquely close relationship between the two countries.

Was this war a war for nothing?

We continue with Bassel’s question:

Given the final agreement that seems to be taking shape, can we say that this was a “war for nothing”? What has really changed in a lasting way? Did Donald Trump fall into his own trap, as this conflict has reinforced the image of an Iran that is dominant in the region?

Hello Bassel, excellent question,

Intoxicated by the success of his operation in Venezuela and other operations he carried out in the past, such as the killing of Qassem Soleimani, Donald Trump believed he could achieve a quick and total victory. In this, he was mistaken — greatly aided by Benjamin Netanyahu.

From an operational standpoint, the outcome remains difficult to assess: to what extent have Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs been damaged? This is an important factor in determining whether this war was fought for nothing, and it will have an impact not only on the continuation of negotiations but also on Iran’s role in the region in the short and medium term.

From a (geo)political standpoint, the situation is much clearer. Iran emerges strengthened from this war. An open conflict with the United States represented the greatest possible threat to the survival of the Iranian regime. The fact that it survived, that its security apparatus remained united, that regional proxies continue to respond to its calls, and that Gulf countries are compelled to re-engage with Tehran are all victories to its credit. If negotiations succeed and Iran effectively obtains tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars, one could likely say that this war gave a second life to a regime that was running out of steam.

If negotiations fail, the picture will be much more nuanced. How will the regime manage an exhausted economy, an angry population, and potentially vengeful neighbors?

This is the end of the chapter, not yet the end of the story.

Our 1st question is from Leila: Many crucial questions remain unresolved… Could this agreement still fall through?

Hello Leila, thank you very much for being with us,

The sustainability of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States (see 14-point outline) depends on future negotiations over the nuclear issue. Given that these talks are expected to be very difficult, the agreement could indeed still collapse, even though there is a sense on the American side of a willingness not only to exit this war but also to reach a new arrangement with the Islamic Republic.

Tehran has already obtained numerous concessions, including the exclusion of militias and missiles from the negotiations. The question is whether Washington will settle for something similar to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—in other words, a freeze of Iran’s nuclear program—or whether it will maintain its pre-war demands for a complete dismantling of that program, which Tehran will likely refuse.

Another issue that could derail part of the process is Lebanon. We will discuss this together in the next questions.

For more about this topic got to our journalists Salah Hijazi's artcicle: ''US–Iran deal: Lebanon's ordeal is far from over''

Hello everyone,

We will begin this Q&A session on Wednesday at 1 p.m. (Beirut time). See you shortly!