Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is hosting Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in Turkey on June 22. (Credit: Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images)
He was to be one of the major losers of the Oct. 7 attack.
Hamas’ operation shattered his vision of regional stability and his project to normalize ties with Israel. Worse, the looming showdown between the Iranian axis and the Israeli-American camp was expected to either strengthen its Gulf rival in the Arab world or weaken it at the cost of a full-scale regional war, in other words, everything he hoped to avoid.
But history took a different turn. Today, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) appears instead as one of the main winners of the post–Oct. 7 landscape.
The Iranian axis is now a shadow of its former self, and the kingdom paid no price for this shift. The détente declared in April 2023 under Beijing’s mediation was never called into question, even during the tensest moments of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation, and in fact helped prevent broader escalation.
The Saudi crown prince has now emerged as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and one of the key figures of the “new world.”
It was in that capacity that U.S. President Donald Trump granted him his first foreign visit and treated him not as an equal, but not as a subordinate either. MBS has reason to celebrate, he could hardly have hoped for more from his most important ally.
Trump signed a separate truce with the Houthis, favored a diplomatic approach to Iran, met with Syria’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, lifted sanctions on Syria to please him (and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan), and made it clear that normalization with Israel, which is currently out of question, could wait.
The two men speak the same language, as has often been noted. But the comparison with Trump has its limits. MBS is no longer the brash young upstart who welcomed the American billionaire eight years ago. He has matured, learned, grasped the limits of force, and developed a real political and diplomatic framework. MBS is a revolutionary, whatever one may think of his revolution. He has transformed the kingdom and now aims to do the same across the region.
Can he succeed? Can he achieve what even Nasser failed to do? There is no doubt, as Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla puts it, that “there is a Gulf moment in the Middle East.” But that moment remains fragile.
MBS’s project, initially focused inward — Saudi first — still hinges heavily on the price of oil. Its recent drop, partly driven by the kingdom’s own policies, raised questions about the project’s medium-term viability and about MBS’s real ability to shift the economic model in preparation for the long-heralded post-oil era, which will come sooner or later.
The second question is political. What does an authoritarian, nationalist kingdom, obsessed with security and the future, have to offer countries whose realities are worlds apart? What can it say to them about pluralism, freedom, the circulation of ideas or social justice?
There is a world of difference between the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East. Still, it must be acknowledged that Saudi Arabia, unlike the United Arab Emirates, does not seek to impose its model across the region and instead adapts to local realities.
In Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Palestine, Riyadh is pursuing a relatively cautious, multi-sectarian policy that favors preserving the central state. This is not a project of regional hegemony, but rather one of leadership by example.
One key point remains, the most important one. The Iranian era is over. But a Saudi, or even Gulf, era is unlikely ever to begin. The kingdom has struggled to establish itself as the leading power in the Gulf, but the rest of the Middle East is a far more complex playing field, where the limits of Saudi hard power are too evident to ignore.
Even with Iran weakened, even with Saudi gains in Lebanon and Syria, Riyadh cannot stabilize the region without the backing of a powerful ally. Nor can it do so without a resolution to the Palestinian issue.
Europe is too absent to influence the conversation, though the upcoming French-Saudi conference to revive the two-state solution, scheduled for June 17–20, is a promising initiative.
Trump’s America is too disengaged from the region, and above all too pro-Israel, to lead a genuine regional peace project. And Israel, once seen as a potential partner against the Iranian threat, has now become the main gravedigger of MBS’s grand vision.
Israeli policy today threatens not only Gaza and the West Bank, but also Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. How can peace be promoted in such a context? And how can the Israeli era be prevented from simply replacing the Iranian one?
One key player has yet to be mentioned: the historic rival, the intimate enemy, who now appears to be the missing piece in MBS’s grand design.
Nothing seems more unnatural than an alliance between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, between the prince and the sultan.
The two countries faced a major diplomatic crisis in the late 2010s following the Saudi-Emirati-led blockade of Qatar, a close ally of Ankara, and the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Even Turkish television dramas were banned in the kingdom at the time.
But much has changed since then, and everyone now has an interest in easing tensions. On key issues — Ukraine, Gaza, Syria — the two leading powers of the Sunni world pursue largely similar policies.
The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood has also pushed the debate over political Islam, once a major point of contention between them, to the background. What is more, the new government in Syria is supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and even the United Arab Emirates, making it a likely meeting point between Riyadh and Ankara.
Of course, more than a century of political and religious rivalries cannot be erased overnight. The two leaders remain wary of each other, and neither wants to play second fiddle. But together, with one’s petrodollars and the other’s hard power, they have the potential to draw red lines for Israel and force it to the negotiating table.
Together, they could make serious strides toward stabilizing the region. A strong alliance between the two countries could mark nothing less than the beginning of a Saudi-Turkish era in the Middle East.
This article was originally published in French in L’Orient-Le Jour.