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EDITORIAL

The new era will also be Shiite … or it won’t be!


There is a community that has lost far more than any other in recent months. It has lost its villages, its neighborhoods, its homes, some of its members and its leader, be they political or religious. It finds itself isolated in Lebanon and in the region as well, and is neither welcome in the Gulf countries nor in Syria. 

This community fears being marginalized, going decades backward, and reasonably, is on the defensive. All Lebanese communities have witnessed, each in its turn, a moment of apogee and decline. But never has the transition from one to the other been so brutal, in every sense of the word.

There is an axis that has lost more than any other in recent months. It has lost many of its leaders, but also a major part of its credibility. It has lost Syria, southern Lebanon and Gaza. It has lost its shields against any potential external attack, its status as a dominant player in the region and the possibility of becoming a nuclear power one day. It has lost more than 40 years- worth of investments in a few weeks. 

This is not over yet. It seems highly unlikely that the next few months will not bring a fundamental change in the Iranian project in the Middle East. All regional powers have had their moments of apogee and decline. But never has the transition from one to the other been so brutal.

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The new Lebanese era is full of promises and challenges. But the most important challenge for the new tandem in power, Joseph Aoun-Nawaf Salam, will be to ensure that these two dynamics  —  that of the Shiite community and that of the Iranian axis —   are no longer bound by the same destiny. To not give in to the militia and its backer, while granting the Shiite community the same position as all others. How can this be achieved?

The answer is not obvious. But the president and prime minister-designate seem ideally suited to the task.

The first is a military man from the south, broadly respected and has cross-community popularity. The second is a diplomat, a staunch defender of the Palestinian cause at the International Court of Justice, for whom dialogue and openness are second nature. They both insisted in their respective speeches on the need to rebuild the war-torn areas and to not marginalize anyone. Everything is now a matter of balance. And that’s the hard part.

 In a normal country, Salam could have formed his cabinet without the [Amal-Hezbollah] tandem’s participation. But Lebanon is not (yet) a normal country where winners can govern and losers would oppose, and Salam had every interest in including these parties in his cabinet. At any price? Certainly not. But at a politically acceptable price.

It is therefore necessary to differentiate between Hezbollah as a militia and the tandem as political parties that monopolize representation of the Shiite community. The reference to the “army-people-resistance” triad? This is unacceptable. The blocking third? Out of the question. But maintaining their stranglehold on the Finance Ministry  — which would enable them to retain control over executive decisions  — seems reasonable, to say the least, in the current context, if it doesn’t imply a halt to all potential future reforms.

In order for Hezbollah to become a party like any other, it must first be treated as such. This means that its injunctions will not be tolerated, without approaching it strictly based on the balance of power. It is important to talk to Hezbollah and integrate it, while setting the red lines from the outset: The militia spirit, in all its aspects, must disappear at all costs. Refraining from threatening the country with a civil war, assassinating the opponents, intimidating the dissidents within the Shiite community and disputing the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence.

Hezbollah’s disarmament of the party, both south and north of the Litani River whatever Naim Qassem may think may be a long process involving a firm and open dialogue on both military and political levels. The ultimate aim of this process, however, can no longer be disputed.

Hezbollah’s de-militarizing assuming it is capable of doing so  is an essential step. However, it is not enough to resolve the entire Shiite issue. The Shiite community can only be fully integrated into the state if the state offers them, like all other citizens, the security and social benefits it had sought to obtain from Hezbollah.

There is also a political dimension. The distribution of power among the different communities must also be addressed. Assuming that Lebanon is moving towards a gradual de-confessionalization of the state and even a rotation of the most important posts among them, the current distribution of power will have to be amended to the detriment of the Christians and in favor of the Shiites, to take account of the country’s demographic reality.

This cannot happen as long as weapons are on the table, but this seems inevitable if arms are ought to disappear.

Unless it is prepared to risk a new civil war, or unless the next elections if they are fully free  sweep away the tandem, all this evolution cannot take place without it. But both Hezbollah and its ally Amal must understand that the past methods have become obsolete and that they are forced to reinvent themselves if they do not want to definitively sever the link that unites them with the rest of the country. Can Hezbollah, a militia before being a party, renounce its nature? Can Nabih Berri, who seemingly believes that the end of Hezbollah’s domination should not be that of political Shiism, accept that the state will not survive without in-depth reform? Lebanon’s short- and medium-term future depends largely on their respective stances. This is because the new era will also be a Shiite one… or it won’t be.

This article originally appeared in French in L'Orient-Le Jour and was translated by Joelle El Khoury.

There is a community that has lost far more than any other in recent months. It has lost its villages, its neighborhoods, its homes, some of its members and its leader, be they political or religious. It finds itself isolated in Lebanon and in the region as well, and is neither welcome in the Gulf countries nor in Syria. This community fears being marginalized, going decades backward, and...