We will unfortunately have to end this Q&A session here, as Anthony Samrani will be getting back to the editing room.
But watch this space as we there will be more Q&As to come in future!
Thanks to all of you — and you were many — who sent us questions.
We invite you to follow our live coverage of developments in this major crisis for the region.
Have a good evening, and see you soon!
We will conclude with a question from Nadine Nahas: Could Iran's statements on Sunday evening, suggesting a de-escalation, provide Washington with an honorable way out? In this context, would a withdrawal or freeze on U.S. escalation risk consolidating the current regime rather than weakening it?
Good evening, Nadine, thank you very much. Unfortunately, this will be the last question I can take tonight.
Yes, it is possible that this war will end much sooner than expected. Trump could claim victory — provided the Iranian regime gives in to his demands — and the regime could survive.
Netanyahu, however, will throw all his weight behind continuing the military operation. If the U.S.-Israeli tandem is convinced that they can still inflict considerable damage on their adversaries at a reasonable cost, from their point of view, they are unlikely to stop this swiftly.
Joseph Assaf asks us: Do you think the Iranian regime really has the means to survive a long war against the U.S. axis? Is it possible that the Iranian regime has underestimated the scale of the internal movement that threatens it?
Hello Joseph, this is a key question.
The Iranian regime has chosen war over capitulation through diplomacy. This suggests that it believes it can survive, even in the long term, despite the total imbalance of power. Has it miscalculated?
Or are the U.S. and Israel underestimating its resilience? It took more than a month of operations for Hezbollah to "surrender."
The Iranian regime appears much more solid. However, there is one notable difference: the Shiite population is overwhelmingly opposed to the regime in Iran.
Let's move on to this question from Rabih Mahfouz: Do you think the Iranian regime has not yet shown its full military strength?
Hello Rabih. Thank you for joining us tonight!
It seems to me that it has not yet used its most devastating missiles. Is this to save them for later, or because their launch pads have been destroyed? I have no idea.
The Iranian regime still has three other cards to play.
-The use of its regional allies, particularly the Houthis.
-The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which would, however, have the effect of drying up its financial resources and angering its Chinese ally.
-The use of terrorist attacks in the Middle East or the rest of the world.
We also received this question from Louis, 10, son of Adrien: Who controls Iran and the Revolutionary Guards now after the death of Khamenei and the head of the Revolutionary Guards, as well as other high-ranking government officials?
Hello Louis, what a pleasure to have such a young and mature reader!
Ayatollah Alireza Arafi has been appointed to temporarily assume the duties of Iran's Supreme Leader.
But the real strongman of the regime is Ali Larijani. He was a close associate of Khamenei but is much more pragmatic than the former leader.
Nabil asks us the following question:
In L'Orient-Le Jour on Feb. 25, 1986, exactly forty years ago to the day, a Lebanese politician denounced "Iranian imperialism" when Ali Khamenei (who has just died) spoke of the need to establish an Islamic government in Lebanon. "Iranian imperialism!" Samrani, are we witnessing the end of the Iranian empire of the mullahs?
Hello Nabil,
Thank you for your question!
This is the end of the Islamic Republic as we have known it. It is probably also the end of Iran as a regional power in the short and medium term. It is not yet the end of the Iranian regime, which may survive even if, like Hezbollah, it too will be forced to change its nature.
A question from Hanaa Jabbour
Could the fact that the United States eliminated Khamenei — who was already very old and had probably anticipated his succession — be interpreted as a way for Trump to assert that the objectives have been achieved, thus paving the way for de-escalation?
Iranian retaliation would then allow everyone to save face before putting an end to this escalation: Trump by giving the impression of victory, and Iran by pursuing its strategy with new leadership, admittedly weakened but still capable of acting, a bit like Hezbollah, which is still there despite everything...
Hello Hanaa,
It's a pleasure to hear from you!
That seems like a fairly plausible option to me. There's the strategy, and then there's Donald Trump himself, who is not known for his patience. We cannot rule out a scenario in which he says in a few days' time, "I have achieved my objectives," "I have won," "I am leaving," and leaves the region to deal with the chaos but also the opportunities he has created.
We continue with this question from Anne-Sophie Mercier:
Hello Anthony Samrani,
Are you concerned about the region going up in flames?
Who else is involved? The United Arab Emirates, Dubai, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have unanimously and strongly condemned Iran. Is there a risk that they'll get involved in this war?
Hello Anne-Sophie,
Thank you for your question.
The region is already, to a certain extent, in turmoil, as many countries are involved in the conflict, regardless of their actions. This could escalate with the involvement of Iran's regional allies, but let's remain rational.
Iran and its allies can no longer set the region ablaze. They can only try to extend the conflict to force Trump to back down.
We continue with a question from Axelle Motte:
Why are the Iranians attacking Arab countries instead of focusing their last ballistic missiles on Israel?
Hello Axelle,
Excellent question!
The Iranian regime wants this war to end as quickly as possible. To do so, it must maximize losses among its adversaries. Its ability to do so against U.S. ships or Israel is limited by their air defense systems and their capacity to accept losses.
This is not the case for the Gulf countries. Iran's gamble was based on the fact that by striking the Gulf petro-monarchies, it would push them to put pressure on Trump to stop this war.
However, it was a very bad gamble, as its main consequence was to unite the Gulf countries, despite their rivalries, against Iran and even to draw them directly into this war.
On the contrary, it will make them want to put an end to the Iranian regime. That said, if the regime has the means to continue these strikes over a long period, which would surprise me, can the Gulf survive under such conditions, cut off from the world, for several weeks?
Good evening, Lana, Nicole, Adrien, and Pierrick. Thank you for joining us and for your insightful questions!
Regarding Hezbollah, it had set the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei as the red line for intervening to help its Iranian sponsor. Will it intervene? That is far from certain.
On the one hand, since Oct. 7, we've gotten accustomed to the Iranian axis making numerous threats without actually following through with them.
On the other hand, any intervention would have limited impact, since Hezbollah cannot change the course of the war in any case. But it would come at a massive cost, both militarily and politically, for the party, its base, and Lebanon.
At the same time, can Hezbollah stand idly by and watch the figure who created it disappear before its eyes? Isn't it, in any case, ideologically compelled to die with him?
No one has the answer. I may be wrong, of course, but I believe that it will not intervene. Only if it can, at least, significantly increase the cost for the U.S. and Israel to carry forth its operation.
In any case, this war will weaken it even further and force it to change its nature in order to survive.
You've also posed several questions related to Hezbollah, naturally.
This one, from Lana: To what extent does Hezbollah still have a real capacity to cause harm today? Specifically, if it decided to take action from southern Lebanon, what could it still do?
And this one from Nicole B.B.: I would like to know if Hezbollah has fallen into line since it is not taking any action at the moment. Or what could trigger its involvement in the war?
This one, also from Adrien Clavel: How can Lebanon take advantage of this new (and still very fluid) situation? What should the political and civil forces campaigning for a monopoly on weapons and the strengthening of the rule of law (the latter going far beyond the issue of Hezbollah's weapons and Hezbollah itself) propose?
And finally, these from Pierrick Poisson: Is Hezbollah keeping a low profile in order to divert attention from the presence of Iranian missiles on Lebanese soil? Wouldn't the logical next step after this operation be the disarmament of Hezbollah through political or military means?
We begin with a question from Nabil:
Hello Anthony,
Does the Iranian opposition have sufficient capacity to take over? Thank you in advance!
And this question from Mona, which echoes Nabil's: Is there currently a moderate figure capable of rescuing Iran from this catastrophe? And how could the Iranians continue "the work" as Trump is telling them to do? Are the Americans considering supplying them with weapons? Thank you in advance for your insights.
Hello Nabil, Hello Mona,
Thank you very much for your questions.
Many of you have submitted questions tonight, which is a sign of the importance of the moment we are living in.
In summary, the U.S.-Israeli plan consists of weakening the regime so significantly that it is forced to capitulate or is overthrown internally.
Option A: a more moderate figure takes power and agrees to sign an agreement on American terms.
Option B: the regime is so weakened that it collapses under the combined effect of strikes, internal divisions and pressure from the streets. At present, it is very difficult to know whether these scenarios are realistic, given that the opposition is neither structured nor armed and that the regime's security apparatus relies on hundreds of thousands of people who, for the moment, have remained loyal to it.
Until this changes, Iranians risk being killed in their thousands if they demonstrate again.
Catch up on some analysis
While we wait for our for our co-editor-in-chief to finish penning his editorial, we invite you to read some of our analyses:
After the death of Ali Khamenei, what will (or can) Hezbollah do? by Salah Hijazi
Ali Khamenei, the fall of the architect by Soulayma Mardam Bey
Hello and welcome to our Q&A,
As the U.S. and Israel launched a major military offensive against Iran on Saturday morning — including the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — the entire region now faces a profound upheaval.
This new turn of events raises many questions. Submit yours, and our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani, will answer them here this Sunday evening at 6 p.m. Lebanon time.
We will unfortunately have to end this Q&A session here, as Anthony Samrani will be getting back to the editing room.
But watch this space as we there will be more Q&As to come in future!
Thanks to all of you — and you were many — who sent us questions.
We invite you to follow our live coverage of developments in this major crisis for the region.
Have a good evening, and see you soon!
We will conclude with a question from Nadine Nahas: Could Iran's statements on Sunday evening, suggesting a de-escalation, provide Washington with an honorable way out? In this context, would a withdrawal or freeze on U.S. escalation risk consolidating the current regime rather than weakening it?
Good evening, Nadine, thank you very much. Unfortunately, this will be the last question I can take tonight.
Yes, it is possible that this war will end much sooner than expected. Trump could claim victory — provided the Iranian regime gives in to his demands — and the regime could survive.
Netanyahu, however, will throw all his weight behind continuing the military operation. If the U.S.-Israeli tandem is convinced that they can still inflict considerable damage on their adversaries at a reasonable cost, from their point of view, they are unlikely to stop this swiftly.
Joseph Assaf asks us: Do you think the Iranian regime really has the means to survive a long war against the U.S. axis? Is it possible that the Iranian regime has underestimated the scale of the internal movement that threatens it?
Hello Joseph, this is a key question.
The Iranian regime has chosen war over capitulation through diplomacy. This suggests that it believes it can survive, even in the long term, despite the total imbalance of power. Has it miscalculated?
Or are the U.S. and Israel underestimating its resilience? It took more than a month of operations for Hezbollah to "surrender."
The Iranian regime appears much more solid. However, there is one notable difference: the Shiite population is overwhelmingly opposed to the regime in Iran.
Let's move on to this question from Rabih Mahfouz: Do you think the Iranian regime has not yet shown its full military strength?
Hello Rabih. Thank you for joining us tonight!
It seems to me that it has not yet used its most devastating missiles. Is this to save them for later, or because their launch pads have been destroyed? I have no idea.
The Iranian regime still has three other cards to play.
-The use of its regional allies, particularly the Houthis.
-The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which would, however, have the effect of drying up its financial resources and angering its Chinese ally.
-The use of terrorist attacks in the Middle East or the rest of the world.
We also received this question from Louis, 10, son of Adrien: Who controls Iran and the Revolutionary Guards now after the death of Khamenei and the head of the Revolutionary Guards, as well as other high-ranking government officials?
Hello Louis, what a pleasure to have such a young and mature reader!
Ayatollah Alireza Arafi has been appointed to temporarily assume the duties of Iran's Supreme Leader.
But the real strongman of the regime is Ali Larijani. He was a close associate of Khamenei but is much more pragmatic than the former leader.
Nabil asks us the following question:
In L'Orient-Le Jour on Feb. 25, 1986, exactly forty years ago to the day, a Lebanese politician denounced "Iranian imperialism" when Ali Khamenei (who has just died) spoke of the need to establish an Islamic government in Lebanon. "Iranian imperialism!" Samrani, are we witnessing the end of the Iranian empire of the mullahs?
Hello Nabil,
Thank you for your question!
This is the end of the Islamic Republic as we have known it. It is probably also the end of Iran as a regional power in the short and medium term. It is not yet the end of the Iranian regime, which may survive even if, like Hezbollah, it too will be forced to change its nature.
A question from Hanaa Jabbour
Could the fact that the United States eliminated Khamenei — who was already very old and had probably anticipated his succession — be interpreted as a way for Trump to assert that the objectives have been achieved, thus paving the way for de-escalation?
Iranian retaliation would then allow everyone to save face before putting an end to this escalation: Trump by giving the impression of victory, and Iran by pursuing its strategy with new leadership, admittedly weakened but still capable of acting, a bit like Hezbollah, which is still there despite everything...
Hello Hanaa,
It's a pleasure to hear from you!
That seems like a fairly plausible option to me. There's the strategy, and then there's Donald Trump himself, who is not known for his patience. We cannot rule out a scenario in which he says in a few days' time, "I have achieved my objectives," "I have won," "I am leaving," and leaves the region to deal with the chaos but also the opportunities he has created.
We continue with this question from Anne-Sophie Mercier:
Hello Anthony Samrani,
Are you concerned about the region going up in flames?
Who else is involved? The United Arab Emirates, Dubai, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have unanimously and strongly condemned Iran. Is there a risk that they'll get involved in this war?
Hello Anne-Sophie,
Thank you for your question.
The region is already, to a certain extent, in turmoil, as many countries are involved in the conflict, regardless of their actions. This could escalate with the involvement of Iran's regional allies, but let's remain rational.
Iran and its allies can no longer set the region ablaze. They can only try to extend the conflict to force Trump to back down.
We continue with a question from Axelle Motte:
Why are the Iranians attacking Arab countries instead of focusing their last ballistic missiles on Israel?
Hello Axelle,
Excellent question!
The Iranian regime wants this war to end as quickly as possible. To do so, it must maximize losses among its adversaries. Its ability to do so against U.S. ships or Israel is limited by their air defense systems and their capacity to accept losses.
This is not the case for the Gulf countries. Iran's gamble was based on the fact that by striking the Gulf petro-monarchies, it would push them to put pressure on Trump to stop this war.
However, it was a very bad gamble, as its main consequence was to unite the Gulf countries, despite their rivalries, against Iran and even to draw them directly into this war.
On the contrary, it will make them want to put an end to the Iranian regime. That said, if the regime has the means to continue these strikes over a long period, which would surprise me, can the Gulf survive under such conditions, cut off from the world, for several weeks?
Good evening, Lana, Nicole, Adrien, and Pierrick. Thank you for joining us and for your insightful questions!
Regarding Hezbollah, it had set the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei as the red line for intervening to help its Iranian sponsor. Will it intervene? That is far from certain.
On the one hand, since Oct. 7, we've gotten accustomed to the Iranian axis making numerous threats without actually following through with them.
On the other hand, any intervention would have limited impact, since Hezbollah cannot change the course of the war in any case. But it would come at a massive cost, both militarily and politically, for the party, its base, and Lebanon.
At the same time, can Hezbollah stand idly by and watch the figure who created it disappear before its eyes? Isn't it, in any case, ideologically compelled to die with him?
No one has the answer. I may be wrong, of course, but I believe that it will not intervene. Only if it can, at least, significantly increase the cost for the U.S. and Israel to carry forth its operation.
In any case, this war will weaken it even further and force it to change its nature in order to survive.
You've also posed several questions related to Hezbollah, naturally.
This one, from Lana: To what extent does Hezbollah still have a real capacity to cause harm today? Specifically, if it decided to take action from southern Lebanon, what could it still do?
And this one from Nicole B.B.: I would like to know if Hezbollah has fallen into line since it is not taking any action at the moment. Or what could trigger its involvement in the war?
This one, also from Adrien Clavel: How can Lebanon take advantage of this new (and still very fluid) situation? What should the political and civil forces campaigning for a monopoly on weapons and the strengthening of the rule of law (the latter going far beyond the issue of Hezbollah's weapons and Hezbollah itself) propose?
And finally, these from Pierrick Poisson: Is Hezbollah keeping a low profile in order to divert attention from the presence of Iranian missiles on Lebanese soil? Wouldn't the logical next step after this operation be the disarmament of Hezbollah through political or military means?
We begin with a question from Nabil:
Hello Anthony,
Does the Iranian opposition have sufficient capacity to take over? Thank you in advance!
And this question from Mona, which echoes Nabil's: Is there currently a moderate figure capable of rescuing Iran from this catastrophe? And how could the Iranians continue "the work" as Trump is telling them to do? Are the Americans considering supplying them with weapons? Thank you in advance for your insights.
Hello Nabil, Hello Mona,
Thank you very much for your questions.
Many of you have submitted questions tonight, which is a sign of the importance of the moment we are living in.
In summary, the U.S.-Israeli plan consists of weakening the regime so significantly that it is forced to capitulate or is overthrown internally.
Option A: a more moderate figure takes power and agrees to sign an agreement on American terms.
Option B: the regime is so weakened that it collapses under the combined effect of strikes, internal divisions and pressure from the streets. At present, it is very difficult to know whether these scenarios are realistic, given that the opposition is neither structured nor armed and that the regime's security apparatus relies on hundreds of thousands of people who, for the moment, have remained loyal to it.
Until this changes, Iranians risk being killed in their thousands if they demonstrate again.
Catch up on some analysis
While we wait for our for our co-editor-in-chief to finish penning his editorial, we invite you to read some of our analyses:
After the death of Ali Khamenei, what will (or can) Hezbollah do? by Salah Hijazi
Ali Khamenei, the fall of the architect by Soulayma Mardam Bey
Hello and welcome to our Q&A,
As the U.S. and Israel launched a major military offensive against Iran on Saturday morning — including the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — the entire region now faces a profound upheaval.
This new turn of events raises many questions. Submit yours, and our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani, will answer them here this Sunday evening at 6 p.m. Lebanon time.
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