Lebanon-Israel tensions escalate once again: Ask your questions to our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani

That’s it — our Q&A session has come to an end.

Thank you all for your many questions and for following along!

See you very soon 👋

Do you think Joseph Aoun’s call for the army to intervene in case of Israeli incursions could drag the military into a future conflict?

And if so, is this a return to the army-state-resistance triptych, or the rise of a strong state?

Hello Pierrick, thank you for your question. This will be the last one for today.

Joseph Aoun is in a tight spot. Israelis trample on Lebanese sovereignty daily without limits, and his dialogue with Hezbollah has yielded no results. His threat is mostly symbolic, meant to show that the army has the means to defend southern Lebanon and to reassure Hezbollah and its supporters.

But what will he do if Israeli troops carry out another operation on Lebanese soil? Will he risk sacrificing Lebanese soldiers in a lost struggle and putting the state in direct conflict with Israel? I don’t think so.

Is the pope’s visit and the upcoming holiday season truly something Israel is taking into account in delaying potential large-scale strikes on Lebanon?

Or is it simply a timing coincidence?

Hello A&A, thank you for your question.

Honestly, I don’t know. It seems unlikely that even Netanyahu could ignore the significance of something as important as the new pope’s first foreign visit — especially since he happens to be American. But I could be completely mistaken.

Do you think the current attacks in the south are the prelude to a full-scale war against Hezbollah across the country?

Or do you believe they’re mainly a way to reapply pressure on the Lebanese government — to push it into “negotiating” with Israel (accepting currently unacceptable terms) or to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament?

Hello Jean-Bernard,

That’s the million-dollar question — and no one can answer it with certainty. I believe it’s a form of pressure, but Israel also seems dissatisfied with the current situation and won’t hesitate to escalate its operations to change it. However, a total war would carry major downsides for Israel.

First, it could compel Hezbollah to retaliate — even limitedly — which might trigger population displacement. Second, it could anger the Trump administration, which doesn’t want another war. The real question is how much military intensity Israel believes it needs to achieve its goals, which seem fairly clear: weaken Hezbollah, pressure Lebanon into signing at least a security agreement, and effectively create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Relations between Aoun and Salam appear to be more than just tense… What can you tell us about that? Don’t they reflect a deeper rift within Lebanese society?

And in your view, what paths exist to overcome these divisions and move forward for Lebanon as a whole?

Hello Magali, thank you for your question.

Both men keep repeating publicly that their relations are excellent — which, if anything, is proof that they are not. The tension stems from differences in their backgrounds, personalities, methods, and even visions. Still, they seem determined not to reach a breaking point, aware that they need each other to open a new chapter. Lebanon’s interest lies in keeping the gap between them as small as possible. They also share backing from the same foreign actors — the U.S., France, and Saudi Arabia — which can be both an advantage and a constraint.

But the core issue goes beyond Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam: Lebanon has never resolved the question of who truly holds executive authority. Is it a parliamentary system, as the Constitution says, where the president’s role is largely symbolic? Or is it a presidential system where the prime minister’s power is limited? This question remains unsettled because it touches on sectarian fears — and that ambiguity makes effective governance nearly impossible.

I find it hard to understand Hezbollah’s stance — its leaders seem to be playing a losing game by refusing to accept the balance of power against them, with Israel and the U.S. unwilling to back down.

Aren’t they risking everything by maintaining this defiant stance?

It’s always difficult to analyze Hezbollah’s behavior, since we don’t have access to all the factors at play. However, I believe the party is aware of the current balance of power and knows it can no longer wage war against Israel. It’s trying to find a way to adapt and survive under this new reality — but it’s not yet ready to fundamentally change its approach. In my view, Hezbollah sees the current moment as a phase — potentially a very long one — but not as the start of a new era.

From that perspective, it believes that even a new war would threaten its survival less than a shift in ideology that would lead it to disarm and, in effect, deny its very identity.

Do you think Donald Trump will have enough leverage to twist Netanyahu’s arm, or is the latter — accustomed to impunity and driven by fear of imprisonment at home — now unstoppable?

Hello Anne-Sophie,

Thank you very much for your question and your feedback.

Donald Trump has already managed to twist Netanyahu’s arm in Gaza, and to a lesser extent in the West Bank, where he opposed Israel’s annexation of occupied territories. But he did not do so out of conviction that peace requires justice for Palestinians — rather for domestic reasons and his own interests with Gulf countries. All of this remains very fragile. Most importantly, Netanyahu is resourceful and plays the long game, whereas Trump genuinely believes that peace, like everything else, can be bought.

In your view, could a victory by Iran’s allies in Iraq’s upcoming elections push Israel to shift its focus to that front?

Hello Majed, thank you for your question.

It’s not an easy one to answer. I think it depends less on their victory itself than on what they might do with it. So far, the Iran-affiliated Iraqi militias have largely stayed away from the various theaters of war since Oct. 7. If that were to change, there would almost certainly be an American and Israeli response.

Are Aoun and Salam aware of what’s going on, or will the Berri-Qassem alliance drag us into an even more devastating war — the last thing Lebanon needs?

Hello Johnny, thank you for your question.

No one on the Lebanese side wants war — not Nabih Berri, and even less so Hezbollah. The problem is that our leaders, each at their own level, have not understood that the rules of the game have completely changed.

The way they’ve been approaching the issue, which might have worked before Oct. 7, is now entirely obsolete. Israel can do whatever it wants in Lebanon, and no one will come to save us — that’s the reality.

From there, if we want to avoid another war, we have no choice but to act. But how can we do that without risking a civil war? We still haven’t found a way out of that equation.

Everyone knows that Benjamin Netanyahu will always use Hezbollah as a pretext to wage war against Lebanon. Shouldn’t the international community arm Lebanon and give it new means of pressure, such as

Hello Nicolas, thank you for your question.

One could wish for that — but it will not happen. We have to be realistic: Lebanon will never have the military means, whether through its army or through militias, to rival Israel.

The question, therefore, must be reframed: what levers do we have to prevent a potential Israeli threat against us? They are limited and, by necessity, diplomatic. And the more passive the Lebanese state remains regarding Hezbollah, the fewer diplomatic options it has, in my view, to act as a credible player vis-à-vis Israel — because today, no one sees Lebanon as such.

Do you think that if Hezbollah is disarmed, Israel will stop its incursions, occupations, assassinations, overflights, and attacks? Wouldn’t it take the excuse that undisclosed weapons caches still ex

Thank you for joining us today.

I think your question is central because it reflects a concern on many minds, but it also tends, in my view, to freeze — or sometimes distort — the debate. Two main schools of thought have opposed each other in Lebanon on this issue for decades.

The first, already expressed by Michel Chiha, the founder of "Le Jour," argues that the Lebanese model is fundamentally at odds with the Israeli model, making it a threat by nature to the Israeli state.

According to this view, Israel would have an interest in dividing Lebanon to ensure this model fails. This perspective sometimes adds the idea that Israel has long coveted southern Lebanon, which could be part of “Greater Israel” in some interpretations.

The second perspective holds that there is no inherent hostility between the two countries and that Israeli interventions are primarily tied to the presence of armed groups on Lebanese territory aiming to open a front against Israel — whether Palestinian fedayeen in the past or, more recently, Hezbollah.

From my point of view, I believe that Israel’s policy in Lebanon has been driven much more by security considerations than by a desire to weaken Lebanon as a counter-model. The long Israeli occupation in the south no longer included a colonization policy like what occurred in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, or the Golan.

However, two important nuances must be noted:

1. In Israeli history, so-called “security” projects have often paved the way for colonial projects, as in the West Bank. Israel could want, whether Hezbollah exists or not, to push its security borders by turning part of southern Lebanon into a buffer zone.
2. There is a very small ultra-nationalist current in Israel that does dream of colonizing southern Lebanon, and given recent trends, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of further territorial expansion.

Finally — and apologies for the length—I would say it’s important to move beyond this logic, because ultimately we don’t have the answer. Instead, we should define, based on the information available, what our national interests are, what our red lines are, and understand the margins for action, rather than remain stuck in a debate that limits our perspective rather than clarifying it.

We are now starting our Q&A session. There are many of you, and we will try to answer as many questions as possible!

Hello everyone,

As Israel appears to have chosen escalation in Lebanon ahead of December, our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani, will be answering your questions this Friday, Nov. 7, at 2 p.m.