Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Massoud Pezeshkian at a meeting with the government in Tehran, Aug. 27, 2024. (Credit: Khamenei.IR/AFP)
Is vagueness finally over? On Aug. 27, addressing the new Iranian government, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made some ambiguous remarks. “We should not pin hopes on the enemy. This does not mean that we should not engage with this same enemy in certain situations,” said Khamenei, implying that he authorizes the resumption of dialogue with the West, notably on the nuclear issue.
In support of this interpretation, reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidential election in early July, after he campaigned in favor of reviving diplomatic efforts to have sanctions on Iran lifted.
Also, the appointment of Abbas Araghchi as foreign minister and the return of Mohammad Javad Zarif to the post of vice-president for strategic affairs, both of whom contributed to the signing of the 2015 Vienna Agreement are signs pointing to the same.
As the threat of an Iranian response to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran continues, and as the U.S. presidential election, set for November, is drawing near, is Washington ready to revive efforts towards a deal? L’Orient-Le Jour spoke to Eurasia Group Analyst Gregory Brew.
While the Biden administration reopened negotiations on the Vienna deal in 2021, why does Iran’s position seem to have smoothened now after several cycles of talks reached a dead end?
Some recent comments from Iran's leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, suggest there's a renewed interest in restarting nuclear diplomacy with the U.S. In reality, that interest has been in place for nearly a year and reflects the regime's concerns that sanctions are dragging the economy and weakening internal stability and, in turn, their own grip on power. The new government of Massoud Pezeshkian, which has received Khamenei's support, has made obtaining sanctions relief its top priority and it is likely to pursue it, though space for diplomacy will depend on the outcome of the U.S. election.
With a tight election looming and the risk of a regional war still hanging in case of an Iranian response, how can the current administration leverage Iran’s apparent openness to dialogue?
I think the Biden administration will do what it has done for the past 10 months: Work to contain escalatory pressure in the Middle East, and counter Iran with a combination of diplomatic pressure and military force, while keeping the door open to diplomacy at some point in the future. I don't think we'll see talks resume until after November's election, both because Biden's team doesn't have the time necessary to make real progress and because engaging with Iran is politically unpopular in the U.S. — there's nothing in it for Biden, even if the Iranians are interested in getting talks started again.
There's also the question of Iran's nuclear program and the degree to which it's escalated in the last three years. The Biden administration has made it clear that diplomatic progress and action on sanctions hinges on Iran scaling back its nuclear activities and improving its relationship with U.N. nuclear inspectors. Unless Iran takes steps in that direction, I doubt we'll see any movement on negotiations.
In the current situation, and as an Iranian official said that the JCPOA should be revised, could a potential deal include other issues like Iran’s missile program and its activities in the region, while Tehran has always refused to link these files?
I think it's clear to all parties involved that the JCPOA is dead and that if talks resume, it will be toward a new agreement, though one that uses the original commitments of the 2015 deal as a baseline.
Iran will surely resist tying any of its regional activities or other policies to a deal, but the U.S. will push hard for such a commitment since it's arguably in the stronger negotiating position — Iran wants sanctions relief and the only way to obtain it is through concessions.
But that raises the difficult question: What is Iran willing to give up, and is there actual space for a deal? Even if talks do resume, they are likely to take a long time to deliver anything concrete, and whatever is achieved is likely to be more limited than the 2015 deal and will come without additional action or resolutions from the U.N. Security Council, where Iran enjoys the support of both Russia and China.
This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour and translated by Joelle El Khoury.
