Cease-fire, negotiations with Israel: our co-editor-in-chief Anthony Samrani answered your questions

We are now closing this Q&A session. Thanks for tuning in!

Thank you all for your many questions! Unfortunately, we didn't get the chance to answer them all, but we'll be back soon for another Q&A session.

In the meantime, you can follow all the latest news live from our daily broadcast. See you soon!

'Will Joseph Aoun go to the White House in Netanyahu's presence?'

We have one last question, from Zeinab:

Donald Trump announced that he would invite Joseph Aoun and Netanyahu to the White House for "meaningful discussions" between the two sides. Do you think the Lebanese head of state will go? If not, what would be the potential repercussions of his refusal?

A: Hello Zeinab, thank you for being with us.

Joseph Aoun is in a very delicate position. He can hardly refuse an invitation to the White House, for fear of becoming even more isolated. He cannot go there simply "for the photo op," for fear of facing fierce criticism domestically.

In principle, he could only go to sign an agreement that would change relations between Lebanon and Israel and that would entail, on the one hand, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and on the other hand, the disarmament of Hezbollah. Both of them seem hypothetical at the moment.

'Can Hezbollah divest itself of its military wing to become solely a political party?'

The next question comes from Antoine:

Hello Mr. Samrani, and thank you for your analysis. Are our Shiite compatriots still predominantly for Hezbollah and/or Amal — and if not, would that change the situation, and to what extent? Also, do you think Hezbollah could divest itself of its military wing to become solely a political party, and under what conditions? Thank you.

A: Hello Antoine, thank you for your question.

When Hezbollah entered this war, in reaction to the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, many Shiites expressed their anger and exasperation. As Israel bombed and invaded Lebanon, the reports we received from the ground were very different: They indicated that a large part of the community, including those unaffiliated with Hezbollah, supported the organization in what was perceived as an existential war. Is this the reality? Will this sentiment last if the war ends, if people cannot return home, and if the money needed for reconstruction doesn't arrive? I don't know.

Regarding the second question, no, I don't believe Hezbollah can become a party like any other. I believe it is a militia before it is a party, and that becoming one would mean abandoning its very essence. That said, if someone had told me that Abu Mohammad al-Golani, the leader of a Sunni jihadist movement, would become Ahmed al-Sharaa, the president of Syria, on a conservative Islamist platform, I wouldn't have believed it. Therefore, we sometimes need to be wary of our certainties.

'Does the Lebanese army have the capacity (and the will) to disarm Hezbollah?'

A: We have received numerous questions about the army's capacity and willingness to disarm Hezbollah. I will try to answer them here.

These 10 days are another test for the Lebanese authorities. If they remain passive, Israel will do everything to resume the war or to be in a position where, in the long term, it can occupy the South and bomb, even at a lower intensity, the rest of the country. If they act against the militia, it will create immense tensions in the country with the risk of clashes with the army.

Even in a more favorable context, after the November 2024 agreement, the army has shown its reluctance to reclaim, if necessary by force, the monopoly on legitimate violence. I find it very difficult to believe that it will do more in such an explosive context.

I think the question of Hezbollah's disarmament needs to be divided into two sub-questions.

How do you disarm a party-militia that refuses to do so without plunging the country into chaos and bloodshed? It's a political and technical question, and the answer is far from obvious. On this point, the army can say that it lacks the capacity, that a multi-stage plan is necessary, and that this plan must be accompanied by a genuine political process. These are the arguments generally put forward by the army, but in my opinion, they currently smack of bad faith more than anything else.

Let's be clear: disarming Hezbollah is an extremely complex operation, but the army has shown no real will to carry it out.

This, in my view, is the heart of the problem today. The army, which has grown accustomed to cooperating with the party for decades, doesn't perceive it as an enemy at all.

This leads us to the second question. How do you disarm a party-militia that refuses to do so, while simultaneously rejecting the principle of confrontation with it?

'Can the current situation force Hezbollah to back down?'

Zeidan asks us:

In its usual rhetoric, Hezbollah is claiming victory, thanking Iran for the cease-fire, wants to keep its finger on the trigger, and finally, and perhaps most importantly, still refuses to disarm.

Do you think the current situation will force it to back down, or are we being subjected yet again to a charade that will sooner or later end in more wars?

In this context, what is the risk that Hezbollah will turn against the domestic opposition, which is against its actions, making its discontent known loudly and clearly?

A: Hello Zeidan, thank you for your question.

Hezbollah is indeed celebrating "its victory" as usual. The bursts of gunfire yesterday, and even the rocket attacks, are part of this dual logic: "we have won" and "we are still here." This is first and foremost a message to the Lebanese state.

Hezbollah emerges militarily even weaker from this war. Israel has advanced in the south, destroyed much of the party's infrastructure, and killed many members. But the party knows that the Israeli occupation will allow it to regain popularity not only among its core supporters but also across a broader spectrum. From this perspective, I believe the situation suits them.

Can they agree to surrender their weapons? Some speculate that this could be part of an American-Iranian deal, but honestly, I don't believe it at all. Even Hamas has still not agreed to disarm.

We are entering a period similar to that which followed the November 2024 agreement, with a few notable differences. This time, the Israelis occupy much more territory and will continue to violate the cease-fire with impunity. Lebanon will face even greater pressure to act against the party and will receive no reconstruction aid until it does so.

One final notable difference: direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. Can these lead to some form of partnership between the two countries in the fight against Hezbollah, as the Israelis desire, and thus a profound shift in the equation? This seems highly unlikely to me. But Beirut will be in an untenable position in the coming weeks.

'Are there risks of attacks, kidnappings, or a coup in Lebanon?'

The third question comes from Nada:

Thank you for this chat and all the others, as well as for your coverage and analysis of events.

Given the Iranian (Velayati) threats against Lebanon and our prime minister, as well as those made by Hezbollah members (Qomati, Safa, and others), is Mr. Nawaf Salam's life in danger? Are there risks of car bombings or kidnappings, like in the dark days of the civil war? Could the pro-Iranian camp stage a coup?

What room for maneuver does each of the two sides have, the government versus the party, and where does the speaker of parliament stand in relation to the two?

A: Hello Nada, thank you for your question.

It is very difficult for me to answer it. Honestly, I don't know. The "axis" has been accused of being behind numerous attacks in the past, including that of Rafik Hariri. But would it take that kind of risk in such an unfavorable environment? I would say yes, if it considers it its only option.

In my view, Hezbollah, and more generally the Iranian axis, is like a snake that suffocates its adversary very, very slowly, with tact and gentleness, so much so that the adversary in question doesn't even realize it. It's when you try to break free from its grip that it starts to bite, as it did between 2005 and 2008. That's when it appears most dangerous, but is actually most vulnerable.

'How can we explain the fact that the US and Israel now trust the Lebanese state to disarm?'

We continue with Maria's question:

The cessation of hostilities is partly contingent on the launch of peace negotiations and the Lebanese state's commitment to monopolize the weapons of all armed groups, including Hezbollah.

What has changed for the United States and Israel to believe, this time, in Lebanon's ability to achieve a weapons monopoly and see the negotiations through to the end? And do you believe Iran played a role in reaching this agreement, or is it solely due to the Lebanese state?

A: Hello Maria, thank you for joining us!

I believe nothing has changed in the Israeli perspective. This cease-fire was imposed by Donald Trump on Benjamin Netanyahu, who would have liked to continue his war in Lebanon (as in Gaza). Lebanon also played a secondary role, even though the opening of negotiations with Israel dangled the prospect of a new agreement before the American president, which he would present as a diplomatic success regardless of its content.

Iran likely played a role in the sense that American impatience with Israel is also linked to a desire not to torpedo the Islamabad negotiations. However, to present it as an Iranian success, as Hezbollah supporters do, is a leap I will refrain from making.

First, a first round of negotiations took place in Pakistan without a cease-fire being declared in Lebanon, even though Tehran had made it a precondition. Second, the direct negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv were at least as important a factor for Washington. Finally, the terms of the agreement in question leave no room for doubt: even more so than the November 2024 agreement, it is heavily skewed in favor of Lebanon.

Here is an article for further reading on this, which we published before the cease-fire was confirmed: Imminent Lebanon cease-fire: Competing narratives emerge

'How do you interpret the decision to implement a 10-day cease-fire?'

We begin this Q&A session with Lucas's questions:

In the current context in Lebanon, how do you interpret the decision to implement a 10-day ceasefire? Can this be seen as a genuine step towards a lasting de-escalation, or is it simply a strategic pause in a conflict that is likely to continue?

What can we concretely expect from this period on the ground, both militarily and diplomatically, and what are the demands or objectives of the various actors involved?

Finally, given the current dynamics, do you consider the risk of a resumption of hostilities at the end of this period, particularly around April 26, to be high?

Anthony: Hello Lucas, thank you for your question and your continued support.

There are two pieces of good news for Lebanon. One: a respite of at least 10 days. Second: a cease-fire that isn't simply the result of Iranian pressure.

But apart from that, there's really nothing to celebrate. Dozens of villages in the South have been wiped off the map. Tens of thousands of people won't be able to return home. The Israeli army occupies the South to a depth of 8 to 10 kilometers. Lebanon is in pieces. Hezbollah is once again claiming victory. And the conditions of the cease-fire agreement are crystal clear: Israel will not withdraw, can bomb at will, and the government must act against Hezbollah. It's as if the country is effectively divided into several zones.

Could the conflict resume? We can't rule it out. But Donald Trump will exert strong pressure on both sides to prevent it. He wants an agreement, even if it won't be respected by either party, as in Gaza.

Our fate therefore depends on two dynamics: a possible American-Iranian agreement in Islamabad and progress in the negotiation process between Israel and Lebanon.

You're probably wondering,

Is the cease-fire likely to hold, or even be extended? How can the Lebanese state now address the disarmament of Hezbollah? What will become of the Israeli military presence in Lebanon?

Many questions remain.

Our co-editor-in-chief Anthony Samrani will answer your questions here at 1:30 p.m (Beirut time).