Our co-EIC Anthony Samrani answers your questions on annexation risk in south Lebanon, stalemate in Iran

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'It's clear that Lebanon as we know it no longer exists. Why is it forbidden in official discourse to speak of a formal partition?'

And to conclude this long session, two related questions, one from "The Francophone" and the other from Tina.

"The Francophone's" question:

Let's think about the future of Lebanon. It's time that, alongside the "imposed war," there are elites, visionaries, to "think" about the future of Lebanon.

It's obvious that Lebanon's future will be confederated. On one side, the "free Sunnis/Shiites/Druze/Christians," and another region for the "followers of Hezbollah and warmongering causes."

There's no way we're writing a history textbook. The heroes of some are the traitors of others. It's time to stop the hypocrisy. Since 1975, there have been multiple Lebanese identities, not just one. It's time to stop this frustration. We're a burden; we're not going anywhere.

And Tina's comment:

It's clear that Lebanon as we know it no longer exists. Why is it forbidden in official discourse to talk about a formal partition? Not federalism. An amicable partition, like in Czechoslovakia? Not like the Christian partition of 1982. But the Shiite regions on one side, and the other Lebanese on the other. Why isn't there a party advocating this to gauge its popularity? Furthermore, why is the comments section of L'Orient-Le Jour stuck in 2010? Can't we like or reply to other people's comments?

A: Thank you for your questions.

I'm hearing this now in all communities and from all walks of life. It's clear that Lebanese social cohesion is dying. The level of hatred is unprecedented. Identity politics are everywhere. It seems impossible for us to agree on the narrative, the causes, and the consequences of this war. Have we reached the end of the Lebanese dream?

I refuse to accept this idea. A partition of Lebanon would mean the death of Lebanon. And even more than that, since Lebanon truly is, as Emmanuel Macron said, "a country greater than itself." We cannot resign ourselves to it.

Certainly, the challenges are immense. Certainly, the divide between the Shiite community and the rest of the country is deeply troubling. Certainly, we are reliving the same history again and again without learning any lessons.

But once again, Lebanon is an idea before it is a country. And this idea is well worth continuing to believe in, against all odds. And worth doing everything possible to ensure it withstands a country, a region and a world that are increasingly hostile and alien to it. This is the mission that drives us every day at L’Orient-Le Jour and L'Orien Today.

'Isn't the disarmament of Hezbollah the final step that will allow Israel to annex south Lebanon without armed resistance?'

We follow up with two related questions:

Jeremy's question: Isn't the disarmament of Hezbollah the final step that will allow Israel to annex southern Lebanon without armed resistance? The Lebanese Army has no means of protecting its borders, and we will have nothing left but our tears.

And Anne Sophie's question: Greetings from France.

What can the Lebanese government do, in your opinion, to prevent the annexation of southern Lebanon, given an Israeli regime that is running amok and becoming extremist because the international community is turning a blind eye? It's all well and good to call for the disarmament of Hezbollah, but Israel isn't helping with its bombings! Best regards, and good luck in this situation.

A: Hello Jeremy and Anne Sophie, thank you very much for your questions.

In the eyes of many Lebanese, Israel has wanted to seize southern Lebanon for decades, and Hezbollah is merely a pretext. Following this logic, given the weakness of the Lebanese Army, Hezbollah, whatever one thinks of the movement, is seen as the last bulwark against the loss of this territory.

Personally, I am not convinced by this argument, although it cannot be completely dismissed given Israeli history and the statements of its leaders.

Nevertheless, the Israelis withdrew in 2000, and since then, the three wars that have taken place have all been instigated by Hezbollah. In fact, over the past 25 years, Hezbollah has provoked the occupation far more than it has prevented it. He knew perfectly well that by entering this war, the Israeli reaction would be terrible. He's even counting on it to bolster his ideological standing at the expense of the Lebanese people's suffering, starting with those in the Shiite community.

An Israeli occupation must be avoided at all costs, as it will have disastrous consequences for all of Lebanon. We could bet on Hezbollah, which seems to me to be a very bad calculation. Or on an agreement with Israel. But this agreement can only be possible if the authorities are determined to disarm Hezbollah. The full complexity of the situation is clear.

We are caught between two uncompromising actors. Israel is ready to destroy Lebanon to put an end to Hezbollah. And Hezbollah is ready to sacrifice all of Lebanon rather than lay down its arms (and to try to save the Iranian regime).

'How do you envision the end of this war in Lebanon? Which scenario is the most logical?'

A question from Dikran:

How do you envision the end of this war in Lebanon? Which scenario is the most logical?

A: Hello Dikran, thank you for your question.

I am extremely pessimistic. And I sincerely hope that the future will prove me wrong.

I don't see the Israelis stopping before imposing a new fait accompli on Lebanon, which will probably involve the occupation of the region south of the Litani River.

I don't see Hezbollah agreeing to surrender its weapons before the Iranian regime falls or the party is completely defeated.

I don't see the state waking up before being placed under foreign control.

I don't see Lebanese society digesting the level of tension and hatred currently pervading it without bloody confrontations.

Our only hope, in my view, depends on either the fall of the Iranian regime (highly improbable) or a considerable weakening of the regime, combined with decisive action by the Lebanese state to disarm Hezbollah and prevent an Israeli invasion. In short, all of this seems utopian at the moment.

'How do you explain President Aoun's continued silence on the nation, even though the war began almost a month ago?'

A question from Nour: How do you explain President Aoun's continued silence on the nation, even though the war began almost a month ago?

A: Hello Nour, excellent question, I ask myself that every day.

The Lebanese state, particularly the presidency, is behaving as if this war is solely someone else's. The inability to deliver a speech, even one aimed at uniting the Lebanese people, who are all suffering from this war, albeit to varying degrees, is symptomatic of the moral and political bankruptcy of this state.

Either it's betting that Hezbollah will resist on the ground or that Israel will make it easier for it to disarm the militia, and in that case, it's criminal.

Either he believes he can reach an agreement with both Israel and Hezbollah, and in that case, it is, at the very least, a very poor reading of the situation.

'What is the current state of Hezbollah's supply networks?'

Here's a question from Michel:

The intensity imposed by Hezbollah seems to have come as a surprise to the Israelis. This inevitably raises the question of the movement's supply. What is the current state of its supply networks, and what are the prospects?

Thank you very much, and take care.

A: Hello Michel, thank you for tuning in.

It is very difficult to separate fact from fiction regarding Hezbollah's actual capabilities in this war. It is carrying out numerous attacks against Israel, even more than during the last war. But these attacks seem to have a rather limited impact, as evidenced by the fact that Israelis living in the north of the country have not been evacuated. Hezbollah claims to have destroyed numerous Merkava tanks without providing any proof of the destruction of a single one.

On the ground, the situation is just as unclear. The Israeli army is advancing, but at a slow pace. Is this due to Hezbollah's "Resistance" or to an Israeli strategy, given that the announced large-scale invasion has not yet begun?

It is very difficult to answer questions about its supply networks. All I can say is that Hezbollah appears to produce some of its own weaponry (particularly drones) and, even before the war, benefited from smuggling networks that operated through Syria.

For further reading, we recommend this article: Three weeks later, what are the outcomes of Hezbollah's attacks against Israel?

'Is the demilitarization of Hezbollah possible? What leeway does the government and the army have to achieve this objective?'

We continue with a question from Antoine.

In the current context, is the demilitarization of Hezbollah possible? What leeway does the government and the army have to achieve this objective?

A: Hello Antoine, thank you for your question; it's a crucial one.

We must be clear that disarming Hezbollah is, in any case, a complex, lengthy, and costly operation. It is all the more delicate to carry out in a context where the army could be seen by a segment of the population as an objective ally of Israel.

No one imagines that the Lebanese Army could accomplish this in 48 hours. The immediate issue is not disarmament, but the state's ability to restore its authority vis-à-vis the militia. And this can be achieved through a series of gradual and symbolic decisions: arrests, checkpoints, deployments, etc.

The problem today is that both the army and the presidency (unlike the government) are sending numerous signals suggesting they are not committed to this mission, which they consider too dangerous and likely to trigger a civil war.

However, while the risk is real, the alternative appears far riskier: an Israeli occupation in the South; a clandestine and vengeful Hezbollah in the north; and communities that will rearm out of an instinct for survival and due to the state's inaction.

In other words, remaining passive in the face of Hezbollah is, in my opinion, the main catalyst for a potential civil war.

'What will UNIFIL's role be during the Israeli troop presence in Lebanon?'

A question from Elie: What will UNIFIL's role be during the Israeli troop presence in Lebanon?

Thank you.

A: Hello Elie, thank you for your question.

UNIFIL is condemned to play a spectator role in this war, regardless of the advance of Israeli troops.

The question is, what role will it be able to play in the post-war period? UNIFIL soldiers are supposed to withdraw by the end of 2027.

But can we imagine a U.N. force remaining in Lebanon, with intervention powers more developed than UNIFIL's, to "support" the Lebanese government in its mission to disarm Hezbollah? This is a discussion currently taking place behind the scenes in diplomatic circles.

'Will the Israeli army will be able to disarm Hezbollah, which is much stronger than Hamas?'

A question from Gabriel: We all appreciate your expertise and your efforts.

For over two years, the Israeli army has been unable to disarm Hamas. Do you think it will be able to disarm Hezbollah, which is much stronger?

Thank you.

A: Hello Gabriel, thank you for your question and your support, which means a great deal to us.

I don't believe the Israeli army is capable of "disarming Hezbollah." It can weaken the movement significantly, but we clearly see the limitations, not to mention the cost to Lebanon, of this kind of strategy, both in Gaza and, in the past, in Afghanistan.

A movement like Hezbollah, integrated within the population and the state, cannot be "eliminated" by airstrikes, regardless of their precision and intensity. To use an analogy, let's say Hezbollah's power was equivalent to 100 before 2023. It dropped to 10 after 2024 (and seems to have risen slightly since). At the end of this war, it could be at one. But it's the transition from one to zero that's the most complicated with this type of movement.

"Ending" Hezbollah essentially requires three things: severing its ties to the Iranian regime; the party losing its popular support within the Shiite community; and the state being determined to regain its arms monopoly. None of these conditions is currently met.

'What factors explain Hamas' relative silence and the Houthis' apparent withdrawal from the war?'

The next question is from Bruno: What factors explain Hamas' relative silence and the Houthis' apparent withdrawal from the war?

A: Hello, Bruno, thank you for tuning in.

I think the two situations are different. In my opinion, the Houthis will inevitably enter this war; It's just a matter of time. If the United States is preparing for an operation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis will likely retaliate by targeting the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Hamas is in a more delicate position. It has one foot in the "Axis of Resistance" and the other dependent on Qatar, Turkey and Egypt. The fact that the Iranian regime is attacking its Qatari neighbor, where the entire Hamas leadership has taken refuge, forces the Islamist movement to keep a low profile.

On this subject, if you would like to delve deeper, we suggest you read "When will the Houthis join the war?" and "Why Hamas wants Tehran to stop its attacks on Gulf countries."

'Are we currently witnessing a logic of forced de-escalation or a war whose real objectives make a cease-fire unlikely in the short term?'

We begin with a question from Lucas:

In a context where Donald Trump has postponed his ultimatum regarding strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure until April 6, while claiming that negotiations are progressing (even though Tehran denies direct talks), should this deadline be interpreted as a genuine diplomatic lever toward a cease-fire, or on the contrary, as a phase of preparation for a major escalation? And more broadly, in your opinion, are we witnessing a logic of forced de-escalation or a war whose real objectives make a cease-fire unlikely in the short term?

A.S.: Hello Lucas, thank you for your question.

I'm inclined to answer both. I believe that Donald Trump is sincere in his desire to negotiate and that this phase of relative de-escalation allows him, at the same time, to prepare for the escalation to come.

Let me explain: Trump wants to end this war but cannot do so without obtaining major concessions from Iran, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz. However, the Iranian regime will not make any major concessions without guarantees that this war will be the last and that it will lead to a strategic realignment in its favor.

Under these circumstances, reaching a diplomatic agreement seems impossible.

Escalation appears inevitable. The United States wants, at a minimum, to be able to prevent the Iranian regime from controlling the Strait of Hormuz, which implies a complex, protracted operation with numerous risks.

The American miscalculation lies in believing that a significant escalation (destruction of energy facilities, capture of Kharg Island or the three islands claimed by the Emirates) will lead to Iranian capitulation.

Iran's miscalculation lies in thinking that by maximizing the cost of this war for its adversary and neighbors, it will force them to back down rather than convince them of the necessity of fighting it to the end.

We risk being stuck in this dialectic for several more weeks.

We're (almost) underway.

In a few minutes, we'll launch this Q&A session. Stay tuned.

Q&A starts at 1 p.m.

Greetings. While the outcome of the regional war still seems far off, nearly a month after it began, our co-editor-in-chief will answer your questions here at 1 p.m.