Israeli threats on Beirut, Iranian pressure, direct negotiations: Our co-editor-in-chief Anthony Samrani answered your questions

What force on the ground will ensure the implementation of the agreement without fear of either Israel or Hezbollah?

Vincent: Whatever agreements are reached, everything depends on implementation. Each side will try to exploit it to its advantage. What force on the ground will ensure enforcement, without fear of either Israel or Hezbollah?

A.S.: Hello Vincent, this is indeed the central question.

The best scenario, in my view, would be to take a few strong initial steps that demonstrate Lebanon’s seriousness in its intention to neutralize Hezbollah. This would help build credibility to negotiate, on one hand, an Israeli withdrawal, and on the other, the support of key countries (the United States, Saudi Arabia, France) for a policy aimed at restoring the state’s monopoly over weapons.

But if Lebanon remains passive and waits for a solution to come from outside, it will most likely come at our expense.

Why is Iran not applying the same pressure over Beirut and south Lebanon?

Sandra: Why has Iran pushed back strongly against Israeli threats targeting Beirut, but allowed strikes in the South and the Bekaa and the ongoing occupation? What is the political calculation behind this distinction?

A.S.: The Iranian regime believes it has won the war. It wants to reach an agreement with the United States that reflects this victory, as well as its undeniable role in Lebanon. It does not want the Lebanese and Iranian files separated, nor does it want a unilateral cease-fire.

Its threats to break off negotiations were decisive in preventing strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, which would have put Hezbollah in a very difficult position.

Its calculation in the South is currently different, likely because strikes there are more “bearable” for Hezbollah and because Iran has an interest in maintaining military pressure on Israel in that area. What is unclear to me is how far Iran will go in insisting on a full cease-fire in Lebanon before signing an agreement with the United States, or whether it will accept — if circumstances require it — a return to the pre-March status quo.

This is the end of our Q&A session with Anthony Samrani.

Thank you for joining us. We leave you with our live coverage of the events in Lebanon and the region.

See you soon.

Who is supposed to enforce the agreement, and how do you break the deadlock?

Camille: In previous cease-fires and since 2024, Israel has never stopped its bombardments or the destruction of civilian infrastructure. The Lebanese government now speaks of the need for “guarantees” that such agreements will be respected. What guarantees are they referring to? And who is supposed to enforce them? In addition, Hezbollah maintains its position that it will not move as long as the Israeli army has not withdrawn from Lebanese territory, while Israel says it will not leave south of the Litani before Hezbollah withdraws. Are there any proposals to break this deadlock?

A.S.: Hello Camille, thank you for joining us.

Israel has never respected the cease-fire signed in 2024, just as it has not respected the Gaza cease-fire, which reflects its broader approach to such agreements.

Lebanon needs two guarantees: genuine respect for the cease-fire and a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces. The United States is expected to play the central role in enforcing these guarantees, but as you rightly summarize, each side keeps shifting responsibility, and it is hard to see how this spiral can be broken.

The advantage of yesterday’s agreement is that it lays out a multi-step process. Washington appears to have realized it cannot obtain the full disarmament of Hezbollah in the short term. If Iran were to give its approval to such an agreement, one could imagine a scenario that would allow for the withdrawal of both Hezbollah and Israeli forces from areas south of the Litani and the implementation of pilot zones.

Even in that case, however, Hezbollah would remain armed in the rest of the country. The question then becomes: how do Lebanese authorities intend to deal with that? And how can Israel be expected to remain passive if Lebanon limits itself to that arrangement?

What is the Lebanese state negotiating if it holds no cards?

Walid: What is the Lebanese state negotiating if it holds no cards?

A.S.: Hello Walid, thank you for your question.

In any case, the state has no other leverage than negotiations. These talks have two important advantages in my view: they allow the state to assert its existence and they secure, on paper, a guarantee of a full Israeli withdrawal.

The most likely outcome, unfortunately, is an agreement — which would not necessarily be a bad one for Lebanon — that is not implemented afterward.

How long will this last?

Celine: How long will this last? We are at our breaking point. We go to school fearing that at any moment an emergency evacuation will be ordered. And why? For a war that is not ours.

A.S.: Hello Celine, thank you for joining us. I think many people feel the same way, though I’m not sure that is any comfort.

I will not try to reassure you. I do not see an exit for now. There could be a truce or a tactical agreement, but I do not see any short-term possibility for Lebanon to fully free itself from Iranian influence and the Israeli presence. Not that it is impossible, even if it is extremely difficult, but it would require a sustained political will and a readiness, unfortunately, to pay the price.

How to prevent Hezbollah from re-infiltrating south of the Litani

We begin with Christina’s question: Where does Hezbollah stand regarding the decision to disarm south of the Litani and the broader disarmament project? Is the Israeli army committed to helping the Lebanese Army regain its positions so that Hezbollah does not re-infiltrate these areas?

Anthony Samrani: Hello Christina, thank you for your question,

Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem just compared the Washington talks agreement to a “humiliating surrender agreement.” Hezbollah will not only reject disarmament across Lebanon but also a unilateral cease-fire, such as the one that took place between November 2024 and March 2026.

If U.S.-Iran negotiations progress and lead to an agreement, Hezbollah could accept tactical compromises in Lebanon, including a withdrawal of its forces south of the Litani. But that would require Israel to accept the same arrangement — which appears highly unlikely — and for its army to withdraw from the area in return.

The preliminary agreement is a kind of lifeline in the middle of a stormy ocean. But its implementation depends on three highly unlikely conditions:

• That Hezbollah accepts an agreement still favorable to Israel and implying an indirect alignment between the Lebanese state and Israel
• That Israel accepts a phased process, given that the 2024–2025 precedent offers little reassurance
• That the Lebanese Army effectively begins implementing its plan to restore the state’s monopoly over weapons

Why would anyone expect this to work if Hezbollah is not consulted?

Rick asks: Why does anybody expect this to work if Hezbollah isn’t consulted? Is it that the Lebanese Army and Israel are now going to work together to dismantle Hezbollah? The cease-fire sounds nice, but I don’t know how it is going to practically work.

A.S.: Hello Rick,

Each party has its own calculations in the negotiations. For Israel, it is a way to pressure Lebanese authorities and position them as partners in the fight against Hezbollah.

For the United States, it is an opportunity to resolve a conflict at a time when the Iran file appears even more complicated.

For the Lebanese state, it is a chance to regain a role after being largely sidelined since the start of the conflict.

But none of these three actors is under any illusion about the reality on the ground. They know that, in the end, it will depend mainly on Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Although a cease-fire may seem unrealistic at this stage — though one can never rule it out — the agreement does at least sketch out a possible path forward. The idea of establishing pilot zones, for example, appears particularly interesting and could allow the Lebanese Army to deploy in areas evacuated by both the Israeli army and Hezbollah.

These are, however, only temporary solutions. Beyond the cease-fire itself, Lebanon faces two almost unsolvable equations: How can a movement that holds its weapons as its most vital asset be disarmed without confrontation — something the army itself does not want?
How can a full Israeli withdrawal and an end to bombardments be achieved without prior disarmament of Hezbollah?

Hello, and thank you for sending in your questions to our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani.