Israeli invasion threats in Lebanon, Hormuz tensions, where is the regional war headed | Our co-editor-in-chief Anthony Samrani answers your questions

That's all the questions our co-editor-in-chief had time to answer today.

We are still covering the war in Lebanon live here.

Thank you for tuning in.

Can we ascertain the plausibility, impact and intensity of a civil conflict if the army enforces the state decision to disarm Hezbollah by force?

Bassam: Hello Anthony,

Can we ascertain the plausibility, impact and intensity of a civil conflict if the army enforces the state decision to disarm Hezbollah by force? We urgently need scenario analysis given the gravity of the situation.

Would disarming them be better if the fallout resembled the 1958 or May 2008 conflicts, rather than facing Israel's nihilistic destruction and occupation? Naturally, risking a war like the 1975-1990 conflict alters those calculations.

Regardless, as our situation significantly worsens, a technical analysis is essential to determine the least harmful decision.

A.S.: Hello Bassam, thank you for your question. It is essential.

Unfortunately, I will have to answer very briefly because of time constraints.

In my view, there cannot be a disarmament of Hezbollah without clashes with the militia. But these confrontations would not, in my opinion, take the form of a civil war in a country where no one wants one.

The greater risk is a climate of ongoing violence, regular clashes and the possible return of political assassinations. That is extremely dangerous. But the alternative is to submit to Israeli plans.

Would Israel have done what it is doing anyway?

Rabih: Despite Hezbollah’s major mistake in launching missiles, do you think Israel would have done what it is doing anyway? Thank you in advance.

A.S.: Hello Rabih, thank you for your question. It is a debate that comes up every day.

During at least the last three wars, the same argument always returns: “In any case, Israel had a plan to invade Lebanon.” However, it must be noted that each time, Hezbollah was the one that initiated the war.

The idea that Israel has a plan seems perfectly logical. That we repeatedly give them a pretext to implement it is far less so.

This brings us back to the central question that divides the Lebanese more than anything today: does Israel intend to attack Lebanon regardless? Does it intend to invade southern Lebanon anyway as part of a “Greater Israel” project?

Personally, I am not convinced by the arguments of those who defend that thesis. On the contrary, I believe Hezbollah, and more broadly the Iranian axis, have fueled the ambitions of a “Greater Israel” more than any other actor since 1948. In that sense, they are the useful idiots of the most extreme factions within the Israeli leadership.

Could people from southern Lebanon effectively become second-class citizens?

Yves: Hello, Mr. Samrani, and thank you for your insights.

Do you think the latent risk, if the situation of those displaced persists, is that people from southern Lebanon could effectively become second-class citizens, living in districts where, politically, they have no voice, neither in decision-making nor at the ballot box?

A.S.: Good evening, Yves, thank you for being with us.

The situation of the displaced is extremely worrying. Will they be able to return home? When? How long can they endure such humiliation, and how long can the country sustain such a humanitarian catastrophe before everything explodes?

If displaced people end up remaining for a long time in regions that are mostly non-Shiite, this could create a new political and social reality capable of upsetting Lebanon’s existing “balances.”

What negotiating leverage does the Lebanese government currently have?

Kyian: What leverage and negotiating power does the Lebanese government currently have? Iran has the Strait of Hormuz, the United States and Israel have military power. What does Lebanon have?

A.S.: Good evening, Kyan, thank you for your question.

Lebanon has very little leverage, and time is not on its side. In my view, it should take strong actions, at least symbolically, against Hezbollah, plead its case with foreign capitals, and finally develop a serious plan outlining what it expects from negotiations with Israel. It is essential to move away from passivity, escalation and confusion.

Is there any hope the Lebanese government could compel the army to do what it has pledged to do?

Joseph: The reasons for the disaster hitting Lebanon are many. One of them seems difficult to acknowledge and almost impossible to overcome: Hezbollah’s infiltration of the army. Is there any hope that the government could compel the army to do what it has promised? If not, is there any option other than accepting that Israel will do the job?

A.S.: Good evening, Joseph. Thank you for being with us.

Hezbollah has infiltrated many parts of the state over decades, and the army does not seem to be an exception. But I think the problem goes deeper. Like the state itself, the Lebanese Army has become accustomed to every issue being resolved “the Lebanese way.” It is neither mentally prepared nor logistically equipped to carry out operations as complex as disarming Hezbollah.

The problem, in my view, is not that it might fail or that it highlights the major risks of such an operation. The problem is that, like much of the state and the population, it has internalized the idea that it has no other role to play than that of a spectator to its own history.

That Israel might “do the job” is logical from Israel’s perspective. But it would be a disaster for Lebanon.

Beyond the cost of the war and its consequences, what would be the end goal of such an operation? A prolonged occupation of the South? Cooperation with the Lebanese Army that would place it in an even more delicate position? Or a peace agreement imposed by force?

Is France’s role as a sponsor useful? Could it do more?

Axelle: Good evening, dear friends at L’OLJ. I send you all my thoughts and prayers in these days of anxiety and uncertainty. My question: Is France’s sponsorship useful? Could it do more? Do better, and how?

A.S.: Good evening, dear Axelle. Thank you for your kind words; they mean a lot to us.

France is doing its best and, it must be acknowledged, is the only country truly mobilizing to stop this war.

Paris denied a report by Axios — previously revealed by L’Orient-Le Jour — about a proposal to end the war in exchange for Lebanon recognizing Israel.

France appears to prefer not to publicize this initiative in order to give it a chance in a context where its leverage is limited and its relations with Israel and the U.S. are strained.

The proposal reportedly interests Israel, which knows it needs Lebanese authorities to “finish off” Hezbollah and would also secure the closure of a volatile front that has existed for decades. From Israel’s perspective, this would be a decisive step toward a separate peace with Lebanon.

However, Israel is unlikely to negotiate seriously until it has achieved its military objectives, which will probably involve occupying southern Lebanon.

For now, the Lebanese front remains secondary for Israel as long as the war with Iran continues. In other words, from Tel Aviv’s perspective, the Lebanese war has not yet truly begun.

Will Lebanon be able, in the long run, to avoid a civil war with these rates of internal displacement?

Anne-Sophie: Hello, Mr. Samrani. Thank you for your work. This war is taking a turn for the worse! My thoughts are with those displaced by Israeli attacks.

Will Lebanon be able, in the long run, to avoid a civil war with these rates of internal displacement? We’re already sensing communal tensions...

Also, what would be the consequences of an Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon?

A.S.: Good evening, Anne-Sophie. It’s a pleasure to have you with us!

This war, like all previous ones, is taking a very ugly turn. The humanitarian cost on Lebanon is already exorbitant. It will also likely intensify internal tensions and create a new political, military and demographic equation.

I don't believe in the possibility of a civil war — no one wants that — but tensions are indeed likely to be very high, and could even escalate as Israel invades southern Lebanon or as Hezbollah resists it.

The consequences of an occupation would be terrible: population displacement, demographic engineering, and political and security pressure on Lebanese authorities. And all of this would also provide fuel for Hezbollah’s rhetoric.

On this subject, we invite you to read: Shiite displaced: The 'unwelcome' of Lebanon's new war

Could Iran link the Lebanese front to the Iranian front until Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon?

Pierrick: Hello, Mr. Samrani, thank you to you and your team for your work.
Isn’t it possible that Iran could link the Lebanese front to the Iranian front and maintain pressure on the Gulf countries until Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon?

Have a good day.

A.S.: Hello Pierrick, thank you very much for your warm support.

Yes, it is a possibility, but for now it seems rather hypothetical. It would require the war to end with an agreement, the regime to be in a position to dictate the terms of that agreement, and to be strong enough to impose a halt to the Lebanese front with Israel, which clearly wants to separate the two.

The Iranian regime has also shown in the past that it is not willing to sacrifice itself for either Lebanon or Hezbollah. In my view, the most likely scenario is that the war in Lebanon continues even if the war in Iran stops.

Are Israel and the US doomed to fail?

We begin with a question from GA: At this stage, it appears not only that the Iranian system will survive this war, but also that the forces leading the offensive have failed to gain the upper hand and destabilize it. In Lebanon, Hezbollah does not appear to have been weakened as most commentators expected, and it does not seem to be particularly struggling against Israel; on the contrary, it is even dictating, to some extent, the pace of the military escalation.

What can the U.S. and Israel do? Is their action doomed to fail?

Anthony Samrani: Good evening GA, thank you for being with us.

In recent days, the Iranian regime has clearly regained the upper hand. It had long prepared for this war, organized itself to survive it and, above all, its ability to block ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz is a strategic card that could even allow it to emerge from the war in a position of strength.

But we should be cautious. What recent conflicts — both in Ukraine and in the Middle East — have shown is not only that dynamics can change very quickly, and that it is impossible to predict the seismic waves that the ongoing war may produce.

Operationally, Washington and Tel Aviv are currently achieving their objectives, although the nuclear issue is far more complex. Strategically, however, it looks for now like a complete failure.

But it is still too early to draw conclusions. Much will depend on when the conflict ends and on the state of the regime — which has a strong chance of survival — at that time.

As for Hezbollah, the picture should be more nuanced. The group is in better shape than many expected, but again, we are only at the beginning of the war. Will it be able to withstand an invasion by the Israeli army? And if Israeli occupies the South, what will remain of Hezbollah in the rest of Lebanon?

Thanks for tuning in! You still have a few minutes to send our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani, your questions on the ongoing war in Lebanon and tensions in the region.

Ask your questions in the comments or by email at livechatolj@lorientlejour.com

Hello, and thank you for joining us.

Amid this regional war, which extends far beyond the U.S., Israel, Iran and Lebanon, its implications and consequences can be difficult to grasp.

Our co-editor-in-chief, Anthony Samrani, will answer your questions here at 7 p.m.