Iran-Israel cease-fire: Anthony Samrani has answered your questions

This brings us to the end of this Q&A session with our co-editor-in-chief Anthony Samrani.

Thank you for all your questions and for your trust.

To keep up with all the latest developments in real time, follow our live coverage here.

Here is a question from E. Gueriery:

Mr. Samrani, since Oct. 7, your analyses and articles have consistently taken an alarmist and anxiety-inducing tone. Yet every major crisis has ultimately been resolved through some intervention or decision — often by Donald Trump or others — proving that your predictions were repeatedly incorrect. Why do you continue to fuel a climate of fear, even after these situations have calmed?

Dear Sir,

You do seem to be a loyal reader! We have experienced — and this is probably not over — an extraordinary acceleration of history since Oct. 7. I’ve never sought to fuel a climate of fear, but rather to explain the stakes of this pivotal moment. I don’t think I’ve been all that wrong, but I also believe the reader is (almost) always right!

One last point, though: these crises are far from resolved. There’s the geopolitical and military reality, which no one can dispute. And then there are the political and social dynamics that such changes inevitably set in motion.

Next question comes from JMZ:

The Israelis have supposedly almost wiped out the Ayatollahs' defense capabilities. So what would be their interest in agreeing to a cease-fire with the Islamic Republic?

Is Benjamin Netanyahu really in a position to say no to Donald Trump, who just helped him fulfill the dream of his life? Not exactly.

Second question: if he continues the war, what would his goal be at this point? If the aim is to further destroy Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic capabilities, or to further weaken the regime, he might try to buy some time.

But if the objective is bigger, it will be very hard to achieve without U.S. support. I don’t rule out that Netanyahu may try to prolong this war, especially if negotiations stall. But his room to maneuver is much more limited now than it was a week ago.

Next up, we have a question from Raed:

Do you think the Islamic Republic of Iran and Khamenei can still claim to represent a caliphate in the Middle East, in the eyes of Muslims who believe in the virtues of offensive jihad over commercial relations?

Hello Raed, thank you for your question,

I believe that the Islamic Republic has lost much of its legitimacy in recent months. This will likely have major long-term consequences, as other actors will try to fill the spaces it once occupied — namely, the fight against Israel and the leadership of political Shiism.

Here’s a question from Anne-Sophie:

Once again, thank you for your work. It’s a bit comical to see Netanyahu hoping for regime change. That has never worked through bombs and religious rhetoric. Because that’s exactly what he’s doing when he says the Persians freed the Jewish people, and now it’s the Jewish people’s turn to free the Persians. If this were to happen, what do you think would be the consequences of the fall of the mullahs’ regime?

Thank you very much, Anne-Sophie,

I’m not really convinced that the Israeli plan was, or still is, regime change. They certainly wish for it. They’ll do everything they can to encourage it. But regime change usually requires either outside intervention or an armed opposition from within. What the Israelis want is to change the regime’s DNA, to cut off each of its tentacles and weaken the head so much that the octopus becomes paralyzed, hoping it will eventually die on its own.

That said, in the case of a long war, some internal shift could be possible. Either the Revolutionary Guards could seize power by force, or Ali Khamenei’s potential successor could move away from the regime’s official line. I really hope I’m wrong, but I have trouble imagining a scenario where the fall of the regime wouldn’t lead to widespread chaos or civil war.

Next question comes from Mark:

What terms would Tehran find acceptable for a deal with the U.S., and what impact would that have on Lebanon and Hezbollah?

Hello Mark, thank you for your question,

It’s hard to give a clear answer. I think the regime needs to show that not only did it survive this war, but that it didn’t surrender. It needs to do this both for domestic reasons and for its standing in the region, especially with its allies. Another point to consider is that the regime won’t want to close off its future options, it will likely want a deal that doesn’t force it to permanently abandon its nuclear and ballistic ambitions.

As for its ties to Hezbollah and other allies, I don’t think the regime is ready to give those up. It will continue trying to play a role, though that role will likely shrink. The connection won’t be cut entirely, and probably never will be as long as this regime is in power. But it is already weakened, with each actor now having to prioritize its own survival. And this story isn’t over: the pressure to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon is likely to keep growing, both internally and regionally.

Here’s a question from Martine:

What can we expect from the U.S.-Iran agreement on Iran’s nuclear program? Will Tehran manage to keep some room for maneuver?

Hello Martine,

That’s a key question. Will the U.S. continue to demand that Iran give up its right to enrich uranium? If that’s the case, it’s hard to see how the negotiations could succeed. At the same time, an agreement resembling the JCPOA — which would allow Iran to enrich uranium within the limits needed for civilian use under IAEA supervision — might not be enough for Washington and Tel Aviv. We also don’t know the extent of the damage done to Iran’s nuclear program. And this crisis could push the regime to speed up its drive for a bomb, seeing it as its only long-term survival strategy.

So diplomats will need to be creative and come up with solutions — like the idea of a regional uranium enrichment consortium — that could satisfy both sides’ red lines. In other words, any potential agreement is likely to take time. The real question is: will the cease-fire hold in the meantime?

We continue with a question from Christophe:

Now, the Iranian people will probably want to "finish the job." Could there then be U.S. and/or Israeli influence and manipulation?

Hello Christophe, thank you for your question,

I think the Iranian people have found themselves caught between the hammer of Israel and the anvil of their own regime — hoping, on the one hand, to see the regime seriously weakened, and on the other, not to pay too high a price for it. The regime will emerge from this war seriously weakened. It can no longer claim to be a major player in the region, and internal cracks are likely to start appearing.

But will this lead to radicalization and militarization (which I think is likely), or to some form of opening and a power shift toward more moderate forces? As long as the security apparatus holds, I don’t see what ordinary Iranians can do. But if serious cracks appear, events could start moving very quickly.

We’re starting this Q&A session with a question from Souheil:

Do you think the truce will hold, or are we likely to see a return to hostilities?

Hello Souheil, thanks for being with us,

The truce still needs to actually begin before we can judge whether it will hold. But the picture seems fairly clear: Donald Trump and Ali Khamenei want a deal. Benjamin Netanyahu may want to continue the conflict to further weaken the regime, but doing so would complicate his relationship with the U.S. president, and it’s not clear what his exit strategy would be.

In my view, the key question now is this: does the shift in the balance of power on the ground fundamentally change the terms of the nuclear deal negotiations? In other words, could Iran accept total capitulation (which seems highly unlikely), or will Washington and Tel Aviv find a way to preserve appearances so they don’t give their enemy the sense of complete humiliation? For this war to end quickly, the regime needs an “honorable” way out.

Hello and welcome to this new Q&A session!

We’ll be starting in just a moment.