Hezbollah fighters during a military demonstration in southern Lebanon. A portrait of the party's former military commander Imad Mughniyeh, sits in the background. May 21, 2023. (Credit: Jad Abou Jaoude/L'Orient Today)
BEIRUT — Open-source data of GPS jamming in the region shows that in the days leading up to Hezbollah's retaliatory attack against Israel on Aug. 25, there was a noticeable uptick in signal jamming across Lebanon, higher than what has become common in the last 10 months of fighting along the southern border.
Gpsjam.org, a map of global GPS jamming, shows a surge in interference in the week before Hezbollah's anticipated retaliation to Israel's assassination of top party military commander Fouad Shukur in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The jamming subsided slightly following Sunday's attack.
GPS jamming has been a common occurrence in Lebanon since fighting started between Hezbollah and Israel on Oct. 8. Many people have experienced the confusion that comes with having their location scrambled on commonly used apps, such as maps, food delivery, and ride-hailing services.
In July, Lebanon filed a formal complaint against Israel to the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union regarding “purported satellite navigation jamming” which Lebanon has said even “endangered civil aviation in the country.”
Israel has been accused of jamming the satellite navigation systems in Lebanon in its attempts to prevent Hezbollah from targeting sites in Israel. Despite this, Hezbollah has still sent dozens of drones across the border in recent weeks, surveilling several Israeli military and civilian sites. On Sunday, during Hezbollah's retaliatory attack, it sent several attack drones toward the headquarters of the Israeli army's primary intelligence unit at Glilot military base near Tel Aviv.
Even in Israel, social media users have complained about jamming.
One of the Washington Post's reporters in Tel Aviv, John Hudson, wrote on X that "with hostilities escalating between Israel and Lebanon, Israel ramps up GPS spoofing. I’m currently in Tel Aviv en route north but GPS says I’m in Jordan."
With hostilities escalating between Israel and Lebanon, Israel ramps up GPS spoofing. I’m currently in Tel Aviv en route north but GPS says I’m in Jordan pic.twitter.com/jEzqqKGJzd
— John Hudson (@John_Hudson) August 25, 2024
L'Orient Today spoke to Fabian Hinz, a military expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, for insight into how Hezbollah still manages to reach some of its targets despite these disruptions.
How does jamming affect military operations, specifically for Hezbollah?
Satellite navigation jamming involves disrupting signals from various global navigation systems, not just GPS. These systems include the American GPS, Russia’s GLONASS, China’s BeiDou, and Europe’s Galileo.
When these signals are jammed, it impacts any technology that relies on them, from military precision weapons to civilian smartphones. In conflict zones, this can render satellite navigation-guided systems — like missiles and drones — less effective or even unusable.
In Hezbollah's case, it sometimes doesn't allow it to reach its specific targets against Israel but it [still] reaches areas close to its target.
What technologies or methods does Hezbollah use to overcome satellite navigation jamming?
Hezbollah likely employs a range of strategies to navigate and strike effectively even under satellite navigation jamming conditions.
First, they use satellite navigation-resistant antennas, such as Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs), which can better handle interference and maintain functionality.
Those antennas receive their signal from the original satellite navigation systems in space and don't rely on the signal available on the ground.
Moreover, some Hezbollah drones and missiles use visual navigation systems, which rely on cameras and algorithms to match visual data with maps. The drone has a camera on its front and a saved map in its algorithm and so matches the way to its target, using the stored map, with the images its camera is filming. This method doesn’t depend solely on satellite signals and can be effective when satellite navigation is jammed.
How does the effectiveness of these adaptations vary?
The effectiveness of jamming-resistant technology can vary widely. While CRPAs are effective in mitigating jamming, other methods like visual navigation also show promise but depend on the specific technology and conditions. In general, while these adaptations can significantly improve performance, they cannot completely eliminate the effects of jamming.
Satellite navigation and its jamming are global issues affecting all sides in conflicts. The ongoing development of jamming-resistant technologies and alternative navigation methods will continue to play a crucial role in modern warfare. As technology advances, so will the tactics used to counteract these disruptions, making this an ever-evolving field.
How do different military forces adapt to satellite navigation jamming?
Military forces around the world are adapting in various ways. For example, the U.S. and Israel use jamming-resistant antennas and invest in technology to improve resilience.
However, not all the weapons available today are jamming-resistant.
In Ukraine, some missiles were reportedly sent from the U.S. without these adaptations, which affected their effectiveness, so Ukraine has now a stock of U.S.-sent weapons that it can't use because they don't overcome jamming. Meanwhile, countries like Iran and groups like Hezbollah are investing in both CRPAs and visual navigation systems.
What is the current state of technology in terms of resistance to satellite navigation jamming?
The technology to resist satellite navigation jamming is evolving. CRPAs and visual navigation systems are making significant strides. However, the extent to which different forces have adopted these technologies is not fully transparent. What we know is that both military and civilian sectors are investing heavily in improving these systems to ensure reliability despite jamming.