BEIRUT - With the region having been, for months, on the brink of a wider conflagration and the war continuing to rage in Gaza and southern Lebanon, what impact could the unexpected deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and his Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian have on Lebanon?
While important for Iran, the event is unlikely to have wider regional implications or change the course of the war. L'Orient Today explains why.
1. Lebanon-Iran relations
Complex relations: Lebanon-Iran relations is a divisive subject, but there is no doubt that Iranian influence has grown significantly in the country. Recently, late Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian stressed that Iran “will remain a loyal friend to the Lebanese republic" on Jan. 12, during one of his numerous visits to Lebanon following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent war. It remains however, that a section of Lebanon's population opposes close ties with Iran.
On Monday, Lebanon's caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced three days of national mourning and that flags will be flown at half-mast on all public buildings. Additionally, "regular radio and television programs will be adapted to the circumstances," Mikati said.
Hezbollah's view: Lebanon's Hezbollah, which was established in the early 1980s by Shia-majority Iran to oppose Israel, has shared its "deepest condolences." The party's official statement mentioned that the party had known Raisi "closely for a long time" and that he was "a strong supporter" and "solid defender of our issues... and a protector of the resistance movements." Hezbollah's television channel, al-Manar, has been relaying broadcasts from Iran's state television channel since the event.
Growing influence: Close relations between the two countries can be credited to Iran's proxy in the region, Hezbollah. The assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, shortly followed by Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, opened the path for burgeoning Iranian involvement in the coutnry. This was secured with the ascent of Michel Aoun to presidency on Oct. 31, 2016. Hezbollah's deal with Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, the largest Christian party at the time, granted the Iranian axis the upper hand.
Over the past five years (amidst an economic crisis which ignited in 2019 with the collapse of Lebanon's banking sector, and a presidential vacuum that has persisted since Aoun's term ended on 31 October 2022) Hezbollah has in essence become a state within a non-functioning state, backed and financed by Iran. In October 2023, L'Orient-Le Jour journalist Mounir Rabih reported that Hamas' October 7 offensive was being planned ahead for months in Beirut, according to several sources within the axis of resistance (Quds Brigades, Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad). Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah denies this.
Notably, in Iran's government structure, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps lead the country's major foreign policy decisions, not the President or Foreign Minister - so though an important moment, the status quo of Iranian support to Hezbollah is expected to continue.
2. War in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah
Iran support to the 'Axis of Resistance' will continue: That includes the Houthi rebel group in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There is no prospect that Iran's support for these multiple fronts against Israel will waver in the absence of Raisi or Amirabdollahian, given that foreign policy is decided by Khamenei. However, Iran will need to find an able candidate to fill Amirabdollahian shoes. The late minister had become the face of local, regional and international talks concerning the war in Gaza and southern Lebanon.
Key context: Since October 7 the late foreign minister visited Beirut six times, most recently on April 27. He met with Nasrallah in February, the heads of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in November, and caretaker Prime Minister Mikati and Foreign Minster Abdallah Bou Habib. Throughout his political career, Amirabdollahian had regular face to face meetings with Nasrallah, whom he said he first met in 2010.
"It is interesting that even when you talk to him at 3 am, he’s so full of zest that you’d think it was 6 am,” he told the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency in 2008 about Nasrallah.
Amirabdollahian was a hardliner who favored a hostile, uncompromising approach to Washington. He had close links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the late IRGC general Qasem Soleimani, was killed in a 2020 US drone strike in Baghdad. Last month, Amirabdollahian praised Iran's first-ever direct attack on Israel. The decision to direct more than 300-plus drones and missiles at Israel was decided by Iran’s Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, who wanted to ensure a strong response, albeit without it being a declaration of full-scale war. This came in response to Israel's attack on an annex of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1. Israel's strike killed Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior Al-Quds Force officer. Another Quds Force official and five Pasdaran members, who had a long history with Hezbollah, dating back to 1998, were killed in the attack. According to some media reports, Zahedi was at the Iranian consulate to meet with leaders of the Islamic Jihad.
Limited impact: Arguably, the loss of Zahedi has a more significant impact on the form of Iran's war effort than the deaths of Raisi and Amirabdollahian. Though Iran is well equipped to replace its chain of command quickly, there may be doubts on the effectiveness of potential replacement candidates. For instance, Esmail Qaani, who succeeded Kassem Soleimani after his assassination, has often been criticized for being too self-effacing, particularly in favor of Hezbollah, and for his poor knowledge of the region — whereas his predecessor was fluent in Arabic.
3. Lebanon's presidency
In Lebanon, is Iran's proxy Hezbollah that holds the key to nominating a new President. So far, the party has refused to concede on their proposed candidate, Sleiman Frangieh. Though Amirabdollahian and Raisi's deaths will cause notable domestic disruption, it is not expected to affect Iran's position on Lebanon's presidential file.
Context: In his last visit to Beirut on 27 April, Amirabdollahian, said he encouraged all Lebanese parties to "speed up" negotiations to reach an agreement on electing a new president, adding that Tehran is ready to support "any agreement" that can end the now six-month vacuum. Whoever will replace Amirabdollahian will likely continue with a similar rhetoric.
In summary:
Important moment domestically for Iran, but limited wider regional implications: Though the deaths of Amirabdollahian and Raisi are unlikely to change the course of the war in Gaza, the incident will likely shift Iran's focus back to its domestic affairs for a while. This is important especially at a time when the country is faced with economic turmoil, following years of heavy US sanctions, corruption and growing internal discontent - evidenced in the record-low voter turnout in the last parliamentary elections.
This assessment could change however, if an external actor (most significantly, Israel) is accused of being behind the death. If that were to occur, the region could be plunged into crisis. So far, Iranian authorities have spoken of the event as an accident tied to bad weather.