The village of Khiam, south Lebanon, under fire from Israeli raids, March 23, 2024. (Credit: Rabih Daher/AFP)
The desolate landscape in south Lebanon since the start of the Israel-Hezbollah cross-border clashes speaks volumes about Israel’s intentions. By causing so much destruction and long-lasting damage — which are not always militarily justified —, Israel is most likely seeking to change the rules of the game that prevailed before Hamas’s Oct.7 attack. Its objective is to secure its northern border by any means.
Several analysts share the opinion that Israel finds it no longer acceptable to return to the status quo that had prevailed in this region since 2006 — given the arbitrary application of UN Resolution 1701. Thus, it will accept nothing less than driving Hezbollah as far away as possible from the border.
The Israeli army’s military objectives — retaliating against the sources of the fire coming from the Iran-aligned militia and its allies and assassinating its top commanders — are coupled with another kind of war: Razing the territory to the ground so the population cannot return home.
Some 90,000 people have been displaced from the border villages and towns. Millions of square meters of tobacco and olive groves — the main source of income for residents — have been burnt down since October 2023. This has caused huge economic losses. This military strategy is dubbed the scorched earth policy and is designed to make the area uninhabitable for both Hezbollah and the local population.
“The Israeli army, which is renowned for its disproportionate acts of war, would thus seek to hurt Hezbollah and the population that supports it,” said Nizar Abdel Kader, retired army officer, political author and military strategist. This interpretation implies that Israel seeks to turn most of the Shiite inhabitants against Hezbollah.
Replay of old scenarios?
The analysts interviewed said there are many reasons for this. Firstly, Israel is seeking revenge for failing in 2006 to weaken Hezbollah in the border area. Secondly, Israel wants to destroy its military bases, local economy, villages and vital resources. This would be a tactic, similar to that used in Gaza since the start of Operation al-Aqsa Flood.
General Abdel Kader and Karim Pakradouni, a former politician who was once close to the Christian parties, agree that this scenario is similar to what occurred during the various Israeli incursions into Lebanon, in the '70s, '80s and 2006. Today, this tactic is motivated by the fact that Hezbollah is constantly repeating that it will not withdraw its fighters and their families from their hometowns in the border area.
“Israel has long wanted south Lebanon to be demilitarized or shared with allied forces,” recalled Pakradouni, who referred to the inception of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) in April 1979, initially led by Saad Haddad, an officer who defected from the Lebanese Army and whom Israel put in charge of a local auxiliary militia. At the time, the latter then proclaimed the area jointly controlled by his army and Israeli army, “the independent south Lebanon” a “security zone.”
Hicham Jaber, a former army officer with close ties to Hezbollah, said “Israel is deluding itself if it believes that the inhabitants of the south will not return to their homes. They have always done so after every military operation.”
Yet, the Israeli determination seems “irreversible” today, said officials in Tel Aviv. “Israel will probably opt for a new strategy,” said General Abdel Kader. He is convinced that the Israeli army is planning a blitzkrieg, to penetrate 30 to 40 kilometers deep into the Lebanese territory. The idea is to create a zone stretching from the Awali River to Rashaya al-Wadi, including Jezzine and Qaraoun. This scheme exceeds the one that prevailed during the decades-long occupation of the border zone, before the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.
“The Israeli message is clear: The Hebrew state will only allow the return of the inhabitants of the south if a solution to Hezbollah’s actions in the border towns is found,” said the military strategist.
“The Israeli army will not be able to repeat what happened in 2006,” he said. However, this hypothesis is not endorsed by other experts, who are convinced that Israel does not even need to invade the Lebanese territory to cause destruction. These objectives can easily be achieved thanks to its military superiority, especially its aerial supremacy.
War... until November?
Retired General Khalil Helou, who is opposed to Hezbollah, disagrees with the hypothesis that the Israelis are seeking to dislodge south Lebanon’s inhabitants for good. “The Israeli army’s policy of causing full-scale destruction is a military tactic designed to expose Hezbollah’s fighters and their movements,” he said.
He believes that the idea of Israel pushing Hezbollah to the north of the Litani River does not hold water. “Israel doesn’t believe it and knows perfectly well that Hezbollah has long-range missiles that can reach up to 200 km,” he said. Even if Hezbollah’s fighters can be pushed beyond the Litani River, the destructive effect of its arsenal will remain unchanged.
How will Israel — which is currently fighting an existential battle — guarantee its security then? Many observers and political leaders believe that the only way out would be to implement Resolution 1701 in its entirety — something that has not been done to date, as both parties have failed to meet their respective commitments — and to deploy the Lebanese Army alongside UNIFIL. Otherwise, the war of attrition will continue, said the experts interviewed.
“Let’s make no mistake: The war in south Lebanon is not linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It’s a border conflict and, by extension, a proxy war between the US, via Israel, and Iran, via Hezbollah,” said retired General Khaled Hamadeh.
In his opinion, it is increasingly clear that “Iran’s military influence in Lebanon is no longer tolerated by the US, in the name of stability in Israel,” he said. Hence, the war is more likely to drag on until the US presidential election, scheduled for November.
This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour. Translated by Joelle El Khoury.