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Modus operandi of the Arouri assassination

Many experts agree that Israel’s technological superiority enabled it to carry out “the perfect crime.”

Modus operandi of the Arouri assassination

A charred car near the scene of Saleh al-Arouri's assassination in Beirut's southern suburbs. Jan 3, 2024. (Credit: Mohammad Yassine / L'Orient-Le Jour)

While the assassination of Hamas Deputy Chief Saleh al-Arouri, a man long wanted by Israel, was not surprising, the means Israel employed to commit this “perfect crime” in an area highly secured by Hezbollah, was.

The elimination of the Hamas official in the heart of Beirut’s southern suburb was made possible through a combination of technological, military and human resources. Several military and cyber-attack experts confirmed that Israel’s new tech was a fundamental element in its operation.

How did Israel carry out the operation despite Arouri’s likely rigorous security measures?

Several factors “facilitated” the identification and targeting of Arouri. First, there was the human element, or in other words, espionage operations. As is known, Lebanon has long been fertile ground for the recruitment of spies for Israel.

Several media reports published in 2022 in particular, spoke of a surge in spy networks. In an investigation published that year, ASAS media spoke of more than 170 networks operating in Lebanon, representing more than 10,000 active agents. ASAS quoted a security source saying that COVID-19 facilitated the recruitment of these agents, but it goes beyond that.

In 2014, the Israeli Mossad modernized its recruitment system using new technologies. The Israeli intelligence service started an international campaign on social media to attract collaborators and promised good pay.

Lebanon, which has been going through an unprecedented economic crisis since 2019, has allegedly been one of the most targeted countries for recruitment since.

“The Israelis were targeting Arabs in their own language with tempting promises,” Janane Khoury, a professor of international criminal law and consultant on cybersecurity, told L’Orient-Le Jour.

“One must not think that the salaries offered to Lebanese people are high. It’s a preconceived idea,” said Abbas Ibrahim, former head of Lebanon’s General Security agency and former deputy head of the army’s intelligence services, probably to dissuade any potential candidates.

Nevertheless, this does not dispel the possibility that Arouri’s assassination was carried out thanks to agents on the ground who had been spotting and tracking him for some time, Ibrahim said.

“There were blunders, probably due to overconfidence in Hezbollah’s security system and some laxity,” said General Khaled Hamadeh, a retired army officer.

In Hamadeh’s view, the attack on Hamas’s deputy chief must have required the use of moles very close to the camp, probably within the Palestinian ranks or Hezbollah’s circles. Only the investigation, if successful, can confirm or refute this theory.

Misstep

“Saleh al-Arouri traveled a lot both inside and outside the country and met a lot of people. He certainly made one or more missteps by defying the security rules imposed on him,” said Ibrahim.

The possibility that he had used a mobile phone or any other device emitting transmissions and connection to social media could be one of them.

Ali Ahmad, a university lecturer in political communication told L’Orient-Le Jour that there are many ways Arouri could have been located. He could have been fount the first time “thanks to his voice print, which sophisticated software can detect over a diameter of at least up to 50 meters,” said the expert.

Since Israel knew Arouri lived somewhere in Beirut’s southern suburbs, all it had to do was probe the area to track his voice, although this was a lengthy process.

“All he had to do was use the mobile phone once to pinpoint his position for the manhunt to begin,” said Ahmad. “The Israelis obviously have Hassan Nasrallah’s voiceprint. If they haven’t managed to locate him to date, it’s simply because they can in no way detect his voice transmissions where he is,” he added.

Ahmad said other means could also have been used to follow the target, like the new magnetized vehicle number plates, which a suitable system can therefore detect. “What is known is that they fired at one of the cars in the convoy, that of Arouri, as well as at the flat where he went to make sure of their shot in case he delayed getting out of the vehicle,” said Hamadeh.

Aircraft vs. drone

The primary investigation suggests that Israel used a field agent to coordinate the information with drones, which took high-precision images of the location and the people targeted, and one or several aircrafts to fire the rockets.

The aircraft, which investigators believe was probably equipped with a jamming system, evaded the Lebanese Army’s radars.

Of the six rockets that targeted Arouri’s location, two failed to explode. This is why military investigators were able to identify the makeup of the missiles and concluded they were fired from an aircraft and not from a drone, which was also in the adjacent airspace that day.

“This type of rocket, known as a GBU 39 B, or small-diameter bomb, is remote-controlled and weighs 120 kg. It is too heavy for a drone to carry it,” a military source close to the intelligence services told L’Orient-Le Jour on condition of anonymity.

“Clearly, we are facing a real cyber war,” said Ahmad.

Lebanon, ranked 117th in the world by the International Telecommunication Union, is lagging far behind in this area. Meanwhile, Israel is one of the five most advanced countries in the information and communications technology sector, Khoury said.

“Lebanon needs to be aware of the technological omnipotence of the Israelis, who have a specialized military unit, known as Unit 8200, which is affiliated with the Defense Ministry. This unit, which collects all kinds of data for military intelligence purposes, is one of the largest in the world,” she added.

“With nearly 500 of the world’s most successful companies operating on its soil, the Hebrew state covers all areas of cyber security and espionage,” Khoury continued.

Khoury believes that the fault in Lebanon is eminently political, before being technological.  Hamadeh agrees. “Even though Hezbollah has great military power, that’s hardly enough. There is a fundamental principle to be taken into account: that of national security, which the whole country is supposed to be part of. Hezbollah’s problem is that it does not cooperate with the country’s security services,” said the retired officer.

“When there is harmony at the minimum within a social milieu, advances are less likely."

This article was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour. Translation by Joelle El Khoury.

While the assassination of Hamas Deputy Chief Saleh al-Arouri, a man long wanted by Israel, was not surprising, the means Israel employed to commit this “perfect crime” in an area highly secured by Hezbollah, was.The elimination of the Hamas official in the heart of Beirut’s southern suburb was made possible through a combination of technological, military and human resources. Several...