Hezbollah dominates Shiite women's votes in 2022 parliamentary elections

In a study just published on women’s votes in the 2022 parliamentary elections, Ibrahim Jouhari, an expert in data analysis, demonstrated Lebanese women’s preference to vote in favor of candidates on the change lists.

This was not the case for Shiite women, however, who culturally and religiously follow Hezbollah, on whom they are also largely economically dependent.

In a study backed by figures on the Lebanese women’s vote, Jouhari demonstrated how women largely contributed to the election of the 12 change MPs into parliament, except in the Shiite majority electoral districts where preference for traditional parties was firm among women.

Who voted for change?

The study showed that geographically, eight of the 12 Change MPs were elected in Beirut I, Beirut II and the predominantly Druze Mount Lebanon IV. From a sectarian standpoint, the Change MPs received support mainly from Druze voters, followed by Orthodox and Catholics. Shiite voters, on the other hand, showed less sympathy with groups advocating change.

In several electoral districts — including North II, North III, Mount Lebanon and South I — almost 60 percent of women's votes went to Change MPs, compared with a national average of 52 percent.

This figure dropped to 54.7 percent in Bekaa I, South II, 52.1 percent in Bekaa III and 51.1 percent in South III — electoral districts with a majority of Shiite voters. According to the author, women voted in favor of the traditional parties in the last two districts.

Jouhari explained to L’Orient-Le Jour that this phenomenon is “a general trend among women, observed almost everywhere in the world, which consists in favoring candidates advocating change.” However, he said that Lebanon is a nuanced case.

“One has to take into account the effect of clientelism and commercialism within traditional parties, with which men are more closely associated, much less than women,” he said.

Shiites as an exception

The author added that there are several reasons why Shiite women have continued to vote massively for Hezbollah and prove that the party monopolizes Shiite representation.

First is family and social pressure: Within the Shiite community, several family members or friends have some kind of link with Hassan Nasrallah’s party. In particular, they have direct or indirect economic ties with the party or one of its countless associations or organizations.

This is particularly true of women, many of whom are economically dependent on their direct family members. Consequently, any attempt to vote against Hezbollah would threaten this economic dependence. In this sense, family and social pressure guarantee the cast of votes for Hezbollah’s candidates.

Secondly, the Shiite party has an extensive network of charitable and social associations, many of which are run by women, Jouhari added. These institutions are deeply rooted in the local community, providing food, health and social services to Shiite women and their families. These are “safety nets” that women find difficult to vote against.

Third is the relatively deep-rooted religiosity among Shiites and the impact of the “martyrdom mythos, a hermetic social construct” that prevents women from transgressing the prevailing culture and voting for opposition figures. This is in addition to the effect of Hezbollah’s stranglehold on religious authorities. The latter play a decisive role in the community’s daily life, especially in marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody.

All these factors suggest that the electoral landscape in the Shiite-majority areas is heavily controlled, greatly reducing any chance of seeing any change candidates among Shiites breaking through. However, Jouhari said the situation is not exactly hopeless.

“The pressure exerted on women in Shiite majority areas can be partly circumvented through the establishment of a mega center to allow them to vote freely,” he said. That is true particularly since observers have not been allowed into Hezbollah-controlled areas.

The creation of mega centers on election day, an electoral reform necessary to ensure fairness between voters, will allow the Lebanese to vote in their place of residence without having to travel to their home districts.

This voting system never came to fruition because several political parties rejected it. “The mega center could provide the new candidates [opposition or change] among Shiites in Baalbeck or southern Lebanon with five or 10 percent of the votes,” said the researcher.

In the long term, and thanks to state or public stakeholders-sponsored social and development projects, the electoral behavior of Shiites could be further freed and “enable them to pull out of their socio-economic dependence on Hezbollah,” he said.

But both in predominantly Shiite areas and in mixed electoral districts, the solution lies in unifying the list of change candidates in addition to a sound electoral strategy, said Jouhari.

In South III, for instance, voters succeeded in electing Firas Hamdan (Druze) and Elias Jradeh (Orthodox) by unifying their lists, while Shiite candidate Ali Mrad scored very well but failed to make it to Parliament. In South I, Sour-Zahrani, however, three change lists defeated each other.

This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour and translated by Joelle El Khoury.