The Ezz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. (Credit: AFP)
On the morning of Oct. 7, 2023, Sana*, a 27-year-old resident of Gaza, felt jubilant.
“We are all proud of what Hamas has accomplished,” she said, echoing the prevailing sentiments of the inhabitants of the besieged coastal enclave.
Hamas Operation al-Aqsa Flood was unveiled in a pre-recorded audio message by Mohammad Deif, the shadow leader of Hamas’s military wing, the Ezz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which was still in its nascent stage.
Little did Sana know that it would lead to the deaths of 1,170 people in Israel, the majority of whom were civilians killed on the same day, according to an AFP tally based on official Israeli data.
The disillusioned young woman reflected on her earlier words more than six months after enduring two months of unprecedented warfare including aerial bombardments, a ground incursion, displacement, and farewells to her family.
“Every day, I curse [Yahya] Sinwar [Hamas leader in Gaza] and Deif,” she said from abroad. “Hamas has dragged us into a war that I cannot even finish.”
“These people have never been our brethren, never understood our suffering,” she added. “Because of them, lives have been lost.”
Sana revealed that many of her family members in Gaza share this sentiment.
Will the mounting anger and despair within Palestinian territory undermine the Islamist movement?
“Residents can attribute responsibility to Israel for its casualties and devastation while simultaneously holding Hamas accountable,” said Khaled Elgindy, director of the Israel/Palestine program at the Washington-based Middle East Institute.
“This level of discontent undoubtedly registers with Hamas, even though it is politically taboo to voice it publicly, whether in Gaza, the West Bank, or on social media, where Palestinian activists oppose any form of overt criticism of the resistance.”
AFP reported that Hamas released a statement on March 31 on its Telegram channel indicating that the Islamist group was issuing an apology — for the first time since Oct. 7 — for the hardships and suffering caused by the war, while reaffirming its commitment to continue it.
Is this a reflection of concerns regarding mounting discontent? When asked by L’Orient-Le Jour, Walid Kilani, Hamas spokesman in Lebanon, stated that no such statement had been issued.
“It’s conceivable that a father who has lost his son, or a mother her children, might express some frustration,” Kilani said. “But these children are the offspring of the cause.”
“No one holds a superior position in war,” he added. “We are all on equal footing and endure the same hardships.”
Kilani cited the “tragic fate” of the three sons of the head of Hamas’ politburo Ismail Haniyeh, who were killed on April 10 in an Israeli airstrike on Gaza.
‘Central issue’
As the war enters its seventh month, there is a prevailing sentiment that Hamas seems to have lost its gamble.
Devastated by Israeli airstrikes and ground operations, the Palestinian enclave resembles an open-air graveyard.
According to figures from the local Health Ministry, nearly 34,000 people, predominantly civilians, were killed in the ongoing Israeli military campaign, though observers argue that these numbers are significantly underreported.
Tens of thousands more have been wounded, with countless bodies still buried beneath the rubble.
A recent World Bank report indicates that over 60 percent of structures have sustained damage, 45 percent of which are residential, rendering one million out of the 2.4 million inhabitants homeless.
Ultimately, this trajectory could lead to the complete decimation of the Gaza Strip and trigger a mass exodus of its residents.
Gazans are aware of this. The price in blood has not yet been fully paid. Some residents suggest that Hamas may have inadvertently provided Israel with a pretext to obliterate the Palestinian enclave. According to them, throughout Gaza, people are expressing their frustration with the Islamist group.
Nura*, a woman in her 60s, shared with Haaretz in early April that she hears these criticisms regularly: At the hospital, where her injured granddaughter has been unable to receive proper treatment while waiting in line to fill her water container, or passing by piles of putrid garbage left unattended.
Officially, the group rationalizes the loss of life, no matter how numerous, as a necessary sacrifice.
“We understand that the sacrifices have been immense and that the people of Gaza have endured significant losses,” said Kilani. “But we are living under occupation and have not seen one day of comfort.”
“For 17 years, we have been confined within an open-air prison,” he added.
Driven by its commitment to leading the Palestinian resistance movement, Hamas remains steadfast in pursuing its singular objective, regardless of the toll.
In its view, merely avoiding total military annihilation may suffice to claim victory.
Six months later, has Hamas succeeded in achieving the objectives it set on Oct. 7?
When it initiated its operation, which reverberated like an earthquake on the Israeli side, the Islamist movement appeared to be driven by a series of aims. It intended to elevate the Palestinian issue to the forefront, to fundamentally alter the strategic balance with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to supersede the latter and end the occupation, to compel Israel to respond with visible atrocities and to obstruct the Israel-Saudi normalization efforts, which appeared imminent.
All of this unfolded against the backdrop of the ascendance of the most right-wing coalition in Israel’s history, the escalating detention of Palestinians, the expansion of settlements and the rise in attacks by settlers and raids by the Israeli military in the occupied territories.
“The Palestinian issue has once again taken center stage,” said Kilani.
“From European halls to the UN Security Council and numerous grassroots demonstrations of solidarity in the West.”
“While this achievement is noteworthy, Hamas has not quite realized its full objectives beyond reinvigorating international attention to the Palestinian cause,” said Elgindy.
Although Saudi Arabia has stepped up its demands on the Palestinian side as part of the normalization talks, which were initially suspended with Washington, the issue remains unresolved.
Similarly, in the occupied Palestinian territories, Israeli authorities have advanced their expansion plans over the past six months, seizing a total of 1,100 hectares of land in the West Bank by the end of February and again by the end of March. This marked the largest seizure since the 1993 Oslo Accords, according to the Israeli anti-settlement organization Peace Now.
Deadly repression against Palestinians in the territories has also escalated.
Throughout the week, Israelis from several settlements conducted punitive raids in multiple Palestinian villages, setting fire to homes and assaulting residents, following the discovery of the body of a 14-year-old Israeli settler last weekend.
‘Hamas expected a new intifada’
Did Hamas foresee such a scenario? According to several observers, the Islamist movement made some miscalculations. On one hand, it likely anticipated a resurgence of tensions in the occupied territories, reminiscent of the events in the spring of 2021.
Following the eviction of Palestinian families from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem, there was a surge in Palestinian youth protests there, as well as in the West Bank and Gaza, culminating in an 11-day conflict between Israel and Hamas in the coastal enclave.
“Hamas expected a new uprising in the West Bank and even among Palestinians in Israel in solidarity with Gaza,” said Khalil Sayegh, a Palestinian political analyst. “However, this attempt faltered, and Hamas found itself isolated in the face of the Israeli onslaught.”
Meanwhile, Hamas undoubtedly relied on the full support of its allies within the “Axis of Resistance” for the “grand plan” announced by Deif, particularly Iran and Hezbollah.
But the latter are vehemently avoiding direct confrontation with Israel and the US at all costs, as their very existence could be jeopardized.
This belief is further bolstered by the notion that Oct. 7 could have been the result of a sort of coup d’état by the military wing of Hamas — whose ties with Tehran are notably close — over the group’s political wing.
“The dominant force behind Oct. 7 was clearly the military leadership within Gaza,” said Elgindy.
Even before the conflict, several observers noted discord between the military and political wings, whose leaders, exiled in Qatar, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey, are seen as disconnected from the realities on the ground.
This rift is said to have deepened over time, culminating in the events of Oct. 7.
“There is not just one Hamas,” said Sayegh, “but rather a spectrum of viewpoints within the movement.”
“This is similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, factions are advocating for political engagement and armed resistance simultaneously,” he said.
Sayegh further explained that there are more ideologically radical elements, associated with a messianic vision of ultimate liberation and the end of the conflict.
“These radicals have historically comprised the core of the military wing in Gaza, and the Oct. 7 events may signify their ascent to power, represented by figures like Sinwar and Deif,” he said.
On April 17, Haniyeh’s actions seemed to highlight these internal rivalries.
During his meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Haniyeh was reported as stating that Hamas would disband its armed wing following the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.
Is there a sense that the tide is shifting for the military faction?
Six months later, the conflict rages on, despite the majority of Israeli forces in the southern part of the enclave being redeployed at the start of April following an unexpected announcement by the army.
In many aspects, Hamas in Gaza has fallen short of its goals. While it anticipated a significant retaliation after one of the most severe attacks on Israel, it seemed to rely on certain strategies to temper Tel Aviv’s response and secure a ceasefire.
“Hamas essentially gambled that, given the number of hostages, Israel would not subject Gaza to such intense and indiscriminate targeting,” said Sayegh.
“If the country prioritized the life of a single soldier before, it was reasonable to expect the same concern when hundreds of Israelis were captured,” Sayegh added. “But this assumption backfired and caught them off guard.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — who has consistently stated his aim to “dismantle Hamas” — frequently boasts that victory is within reach.
While Tel Aviv is also focused on projecting strength, some Israeli analysts estimate that the country has neutralized 70-80 percent of Hamas’s arsenal and eliminated 10,000 out of its 30,000 members.
The Israeli military has also succeeded in targeting several high-ranking Hamas operatives, notably Marwan Issa, deputy head of the al-Qassam Brigades, considered a key figure behind the events of Oct.7.
Finding a compromise
In reality, there is no certainty that Hamas’s grip on power in Gaza is under threat. Since the outset of the conflict, the Islamist movement has not disclosed any figures regarding casualties within its ranks.
“It’s extremely challenging to ascertain the number of militants killed or the extent of their weaponry when we rely solely on Israeli estimates,” said Elgindy.
“The [Islamist] organization seems to be largely intact and capable of making decisions,” said Nathan J. Brown, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. “So far, Israeli leaders seem only to have damaged it.”
On the ground, Hamas still controls nearly half of the tunnels it previously operated in the enclave.
Sinwar and Deif, the primary architects behind Oct. 7, remain at large, avoiding capture by the Israeli military.
Despite their miscalculations, both senior leaders can likely find solace in the achievements they’ve secured because a return to the previous status quo appears unattainable.
“Oct. 7 appears to have been less a part of a sustained strategic campaign and more a bold maneuver aimed at disrupting a situation that Hamas deemed intolerable,” said Brown. “Many of the organization’s leaders will likely view the attacks as successful, positioning Hamas as a dominant force within the Palestinian national movement, while highlighting the weakness and ineffectiveness of other structures.”
While Israel and Washington, advocating for a “revitalized Palestinian Authority (PA)” to govern Gaza and the West Bank, adamantly reject any future government with Hamas involvement, the Oct.7 attack appears to have convinced a segment of the population that any cabinet lacking the Islamist group lacks legitimacy.
Despite discontent in Gaza, Hamas and its representatives continue to command significant support.
According to the poll, nearly three-quarters of Palestinians (71 percent) believe the attacks on Oct. 7 were justified, a figure nearly identical to that of December (72 percent).
“Hamas must be part of the solution,” Elgindy said. “Otherwise, it will remain part of the problem.”
“It cannot be sidelined: It will not be defeated militarily, let alone become irrelevant politically,” he added. “The only viable path forward is to reach a compromise with it.”
This necessity becomes even more apparent considering that both Hamas and Israel oppose the PA assuming control of the enclave post-war.
“The new Palestinian government was formed without the involvement of other factions, initiated by [Palestinian President] Mahmoud Abbas, and lacks unanimous support from Palestinians,” said Kilani regarding the cabinet established in March, following the resignation of the previous executive at the end of February.
Faced with this deadlock, observers concur on one point: The Palestinian issue portends a grim outlook.
“Any effort to exclude Hamas would undermine post-war agreements, while any attempt to include it would be rejected by Israel and the US,” Brown said. “This suggests that a clear path forward may not materialize immediately.”
“In the short and medium term, the prospects appear bleak,” he added.
*First names have been changed
This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour. Translated by Sahar Ghoussub.