Why Nabih Berri has returned to his ‘warrior’ past

 A few days ago, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri swapped his political hat for that of militia commander.

Speaking to the al-Jadeed channel on Sunday evening, Berri made official the participation of his Amal movement in the fight against Israel that pulled in Lebanese groups since Oct.8. Besides his position as speaker of parliament, Berri has thus assumed the role of an active player on the ground. This is despite his mission as a mediator between Hezbollah and the international community, which has been his trademark for years.

The announcement came after two Amal fighters were killed in Israeli strikes on the villages of Blida and Beit Lif over the weekend. The following day, three other Amal fighters were killed. The first Amal fighter to die in the clashes was killed on the southern front in November.

“We are ahead of Hezbollah in defending every corner of Lebanese territory,” said Berri. “In this battle, our movement is resisting with its own military capabilities, as it does not have the same resources as Hezbollah,” he added.

These remarks came as a surprise both in terms of their content and timing, particularly since the war seems to be drawing to a close and diplomatic talks are intensifying to find a settlement in both Gaza and southern Lebanon.

This raises questions on the effect of Berri’s messages, which are likely being delivered to sides at home and abroad.

“Taking part in the battle implies having a sight on political quota shares that would be extracted from any future settlement,” said a source close to the Iran-led axis on condition of anonymity.

Berri first sought to tell his popular Shiite base that Hezbollah is not the only one protecting the inhabitants of the South. He also meant to say that the Amal movement’s members are interested in more than benefitting from clientelism, “but that they can also fight with Hezbollah,” said Karim Bitar, a political specialist.

Another equally important message was addressed to the international community, namely that Amal remains a key party in any modus vivendi in the making, as well as in future settlements, particularly border settlements. “He knows well that the priority at the moment is to be present on the regional stage, much more than at the local level,” political analyst Karim Mufti said.

Schizophrenia

Berri, who has always served as the Shiite communicator with the West — a role his ally, Hezbollah, naturally cannot play — seems no longer willing to be limited to this role. Instead, Berri seems to desire some credit for the potential “victory” against Israel, which Nasralalh’s party will soon proclaim, as anticipated.

It is a dual role that some observers described as “schizophrenic,” in terms of Berri’s explosive swings between “the warrior and the politician.” Former MP Fares Souaid, known for opposing Hezbollah, wrote on X that Berri’s announcement “annuls the status that sets him apart from Hezbollah.”

Souaid called on Berri to choose between his politician and war-lord roles, and stressed that he was better placed as a political figure.

However, Berri is known for his ability to switch roles, and even blend them, as the context requires. The term “diplomatic resistance,” which he used in his interview with al-Jadeed sums up his character well.

“Nabih Berri does not want to be left behind by Hezbollah, which has taken over the field. He doesn’t want to lose face with his party members and sympathizers,” said Mufti. This situation is made all the more delicate because, since the start of the Oct.7 war, Nasrallah has enjoyed a high profile, seizing the slightest opportunity to capture the public’s attention through his numerous television appearances.

In November 1990, Amal and Hezbollah decided to turn the page on the violence that had pitted them against each other since 1987. Concluded under the umbrella of the Syrian and Iranian foreign ministers, Farouk al-Sharaa and Ali Akbar Velayati, the agreement aimed to lay out the new relationship between the two parties, and between them and the Lebanese authorities.

Since then, each has had its own mission. Hezbollah assumes the military role, while Berri manages the country’s affairs. This division now threatens to become a loss for Berri.

“As the state is now worth nothing (in the sense that it is no longer the milk cow) and the parliament speaker has lost a lot of his luster, especially since he has been buffeted by the parties, particularly after the last legislative elections, it is finally Hezbollah that is getting all the glory,” added Mufti.

Distinctiveness

By “reconnecting with his DNA” and his militia origins, Berri — whose movement contributed to the military resistance in the 1970s before gradually fading after the July 2006 war — is not seeking to identify himself to Hezbollah, but rather to stress his distinctiveness.

The proof is that during his interview on Sunday, he insisted that Amal does not have as many resources as Hezbollah, as if to say that unlike Hezbollah, Amal is not financed by Iran.

The content of the statement on the deaths of Amal fighters in southern Lebanon, which differs from what Hezbollah regularly publishes, is another noteworthy fact. Since the start of the clashes, Hezbollah has been saying that its members “died on the road to Jerusalem,” in a clear allusion to its presumed commitment to the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile Amal described its fighters as “martyrs who fell while carrying out their national duty in defense of South Lebanon and the country.”

In circles close to the Amal movement, however, it is believed that the movement’s fighters, mostly from southern villages under threat, have been mobilized on the ground since Oct.8. This information was confirmed by our correspondent in the area who reported that the five Amal fighters were successively killed by Israeli raids while in their houses.

What is certain, however, is that like the other Lebanese and Palestinian Islamist groups taking part in the fighting, Amal is also operating under the wing of, and in coordination with Hezbollah.

Mohanad Hage Ali, a researcher at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, noted that Amal’s fighters “are generally closer to Hezbollah, with whom they have a more deeply rooted relationship. All the more so because, religiously speaking, they are faithful believers.”

This article was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour. Translation by Joelle El Khoury.