Russia’s murky game in the Hamas-Israel war

On Wednesday Nov. 1, as the Israeli army continued its intensive shelling of the Gaza Strip, Ukraine experienced its biggest Russian salvo attack of the year.

According to Ukrainian Interior Minister Igor Klymenko, Russia launched a barrage of several million shells on the country’s eastern regions, targeting 118 towns in 24 hours.

The news went relatively unnoticed, with the war and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza holding the world’s media attention, much in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favor.

The immediate profit Putin hopes to make from the Israel-Hamas war is on Ukrainian soil, it seems. His support of the Palestinian cause has also scored him points with Arab countries and in his rhetorical war against the West.

Putin’s first objective is for the US to reduce its military aid to Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion of February 2022, Washington has become Kyiv’s most important supplier, providing tens of billions in military aid.

“I can guarantee you that without our support, Putin will be successful,” US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told a Senate committee on Tuesday.

“If we pull the rug out from under them now, Putin will only get stronger and he will be successful in doing what he wants to do,” Austin added.

US President Joe Biden has promised to meet Israel and Ukraine’s security needs with $105 billion in emergency funding, which he is asking Congress for, although the pledge to continue financial support for Kyiv is jeopardized by opposition from the right wing of the Republicans.

Additionally, Israel may need specific weapons, like armed drones and artillery ammunition, that are now in short supply because of the war in Ukraine.

Leader of the ‘Global South’

While awaiting American decisions, Russia is also using the Gaza war to play its own diplomatic game. The Kremlin has adopted a pro-Palestinian, pro-Hamas stance which helps it position itself as the self-proclaimed leader of the “Global South.”

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov received a Hamas delegation in Moscow on Oct. 26. Meanwhile, Putin waited over a week before calling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the Oct. 7 attack, and Russia stepped up its hostile statements towards Israel.

Putin compared the siege on Gaza to that of Leningrad, where 800,000 people died.

During an emergency session at the United Nations Nov. 2, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, called Israel an “occupying state” that has “no right to defend itself.”

Russia has previously given Israel the green light on several occasions to strike Iranian bases in Syria. Despite this, in a phone call with Syrian Foreign Minister Faysal Mekdad, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recalled “the unacceptable Israeli air strikes on Syrian territory, which have become more frequent amid events around the Gaza Strip” and “the danger of attempts by outside forces to turn the Middle East into an arena for settling geopolitical scores.”

“It is evident that Russia is presently reverting to the core principles of its diplomacy, which encompass backing the Arab nations, advocating for the liberation of Palestinian territories under occupation, and advocating for the establishment of a Palestinian state,” explained Jean de Gliniasty, former French ambassador to Israel and Russia, and director of research at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS).

“Russia has always known how to push the factors of internal division,” said Nicolas Tenzer, a lecturer at Sciences Po Paris and a specialist in Russian affairs. “Moscow observes the polarization of the Hamas-Israel war in Europe and the US, to fan the flames, as it did before with the Black Lives Matters movement, the Gilets Jaunes or with the Pegida [Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West].”

Russia has strategically positioned its pawns in both Syria and Libya, given its respective closeness to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Libya’s Field Marshal Haftar. The country has also established a military presence in both nations and has been progressively expanding its influence in various African countries in recent years. Russia’s expansion in Africa has been reinforced by its strong collaboration with the leaders of these countries.

There are compelling reasons for Moscow to consider jeopardizing its strong relationship with Tel Aviv. A sense of personal rapport had developed between Netanyahu and Putin, symbolized by the former inviting the latter to the Yad Vashem memorial and Putin reciprocating with an invitation to attend the 2018 May 9 parade in Moscow.

“Despite Russia’s unprecedented influence in the Arab world, it would still be a source of discomfort for them to be compelled to choose sides with Israel,” said Jean de Gliniasty. “They have already begun leaning toward the Palestinians, which could undermine their policy of maintaining a delicate balance that has yielded optimal results thus far. The Russians are treading a fine line,” de Gliniasty continued.

One of Moscow’s major concerns is preventing the transfer of advanced Israeli weaponry to Ukraine.

“So far, Israel has maintained a certain self-discipline in this area, and this is one of the major issues at stake in the relationship between Moscow and Israel,” said de Gliniasty.

This is especially true since the ties between the two countries remain strong.

Tenzer recalled that “in Israel, there is a Jewish electorate of Russian origin, or those with dual nationality, who are more religious than the average Israeli and tend to lean to the right or extreme right, which represents very strong support for Netanyahu.”

“There are also many Russian oligarchs, starting with Abramovich, who visit Israel regularly or live there,” he added.

After the massacre on Oct. 7, thousands of flowers were laid around the Israeli embassy in Moscow.

“So here too, Putin needs to maintain this balance vis-à-vis public opinion, and contrary to popular belief, public opinion plays a certain role in Russia,” said de Gliniasty.

This is especially true considering the country’s historical experiences with major episodes of anti-Semitism, the latest of which occurred on Sunday evening in Dagestan. A hostile mob attacked a plane from Tel Aviv at Makhachkala airport, asking passengers for their passports to check if they were Jewish.

Reviving the Astana process

To avoid further damaging its relations with Israel, Russia can play the hostage card.

According to the official Russian News Agency (RIA), Hamas is looking for eight Russian citizens identified by Russia as possible hostages in Gaza. Hamas said it is ready to release the Russian Hostages, said Abu Marzouk, a member of the Hamas politburo who was part of the delegation visiting Moscow last Thursday.

“We are very attentive to this list and will treat it with care as we consider Russia to be our closest friend," Abu Mazrouk said.

Various media outlets have characterized the captives as individuals holding both Russian and Israeli nationalities.

“Russia could eventually use such diplomatic success to reconcile both sides,” said de Gliniasty. “Now is not the time for negotiation, but for war.”

“So, the only possible mediation at present is for the release of the hostages,” he added.

Russia is already preparing for the aftermath, despite the uncertainties surrounding the outcome of the war.

Russia’s TASS news agency relayed the call of a Turkish historian to revive the Astana format and apply it to Gaza.

"It is important that Russia and Turkey act together against Israeli and American (Western) aggression," wrote Mehmet Perincek.

It remains to be seen whether Moscow will find its place in a field where Turkey and Iran also vie for their interests and where the US is making a comeback in the region.

“It will take at least several years to relaunch a political process," said de Gliniasty. “But one thing is certain: the principle of Russian diplomacy is precisely to talk to everyone, so as to appear, when the time comes, as an essential player in the game.”

This article was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour. Translation by Sahar Ghoussoub.